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Abstract 
This Research Paper is a contribution to a wider cost-of non-Europe assessment in the Area of Freedom Security and 
Justice requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties that can be found here. The research 
takes stock of the state of play in European Union cooperation in the area of legal immigration. The Research Paper 
identifies gaps and barriers of current sectorial and fragmented EU legal immigration acquis. It assesses their 
economic impacts and impacts at individual level in terms of fundamental rights protection and non-discrimination 
laid down in international, regional and EU human rights and labour standards. The research highlights the need for 
‘more EU’ in upholding equal treatment standards between third country workers with EU nationals in relation to 
working and living conditions. The Research Paper elaborates on the potential benefits, cost drivers and feasibility 
of different policy options for the EU ranging from: better enforcement, to the gradual extension of EU legislation 
towards other labour market sectors or bringing back to the idea of a Binding Immigration Code. The research 
concludes that EU internal market, national administrations as well as EU and Third Country Citizens would benefit 
from more homogenous policy approach in the area of legal migration. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Research Paper examines ‘the cost of non-Europe’ in the area of legal migration. It is a 
contribution to a Cost of Non-Europe report on the matter, which in its turn feeds into a wider Cost 
of Non-Europe assessment in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, requested by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties that can be found here. Figure 1 below illustrates our 
approach in this Research Paper - the key steps and main components comprising and structuring the 
‘cost of non-Europe’ on legal migration.  
Figure 1. Steps in identifying the ‘cost of non-Europe’ in the area of legal migration 
 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
Firtsly, the Research Paper provides an overview of the state of play in European cooperation and 
action in the area of legal migration. It then elaborates on the legal gaps and practical barriers of 
current EU legal migration policies. The gaps and barriers are established against the international, 
regional and EU legal benchmarks and standards. The paper highlights that there is an acute need for 
‘more EU’ in upholding EU, regional and international standards, in particular, on equal treatment 
provisions applicable to third country nationals admitted on different national and EU schemes.  
Secondly, the Research Paper continues by assessing the economic and individual impacts of these 
gaps and barriers. Among ‘individual impacts’ we include fundamental rights, income, employment, 
health, living conditions etc. We understand ‘economic benefits ‘as more societal – they relate to tax 
revenue and GDP generated.  We further assess the costs of these individual and economic impacts in 
a status quo situation.  The Research Paper identifies that EUs internal market, and thus EU citizens 
are loosing from keeping the fragmented and patchy EU’s aquis in the area of legal migration. 
Therefore, there is a need for action/legislation at the EU level as opposed Member States acting alone. 
Identifying gaps 
and barriers 
(Chapters 1 - 4)
•What is the 
background and 
state of play?  
(Chapter 1)
•What are the 
international, 
regional and EU 
standards? 
(Chapter 2, Table 
7)
•What are the key 
gaps and barriers? 
(Chapter 3, Table 
8 and Chapter 4)
Assessing their 
economic and 
individual impacts 
(Chapters 4 - 6)
•What are 
qualitative 
individual 
impacts?  
(Chapters 4)
•What are the 
quantitative 
individual and 
economic 
impacts? (Chapter 
5, Table 13)
• What are the 
costs of status 
quo? (Chapter 6, 
Table 14)
Proposing policy 
options (Chapter 7)
• What are the 
links between 
policy options 
and gaps and 
barriers?  (Table 
17)
• What are the 
potential benefits 
and cost drivers of 
policy options? 
(Table 18/ Figure 
23 and Table 19)
•What is the 
preferred policy 
option? (Table 20) 
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Thirdly, the Research Paper elaborates on the key benefits, key cost drivers and feasibility of different 
policy options for the EU. Policy options for future intervention are proposed on the basis of academic 
and policy debates. It is further assessed on whether and to which extent they address the individual 
and economic impacts resulting from gaps and barriers. The Research Paper further identifies the 
preferred policy option on the basis of this assessment. We conclude that EU’s internal market, 
national administrations and society via social support and pention schemes as well as third country 
national would benefit from closing the gaps and barriers at the EU level. More homogenous policy 
approach in the area of legal migration would lead to simplified procedures, more legal certainty, 
higher intra-EU mobility and thus would increase EU’s attractiveness.  
This Executive Summary further outlines in a greater detail the ‘key findings’ of the interdisciplinary 
analysis, following the steps indicated above. It then synthesises the main policy options for future 
EU level intervention in the area of legal migration.  
1. IDENTIFYING GAPS AND BARRIERS  
1.1. BACKGROUND: A DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EU LEGAL MIGRATION POLICY  
The Tampere European Council Conclusions of October 1999 set the first EU political agenda for the 
progressive building of a common EU immigration policy. Following the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty that same year, representatives of EU Member States adopted the ‘Tampere 
Programme’ which called on the European Commission to present legislative proposals for the 
progressive harmonisation of common rules on conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals (TCNs) for reasons of employment and their rights at work. The Tampere Programme put 
special emphasis on the development of a common EU immigration policy firmly rooted in the 
principles of fair and non-discriminatory treatment between third-country workers and national 
workers. October 2019 will be the 20th anniversary of the Tampere Programme, which will also 
coincide with the taking over by Finland of the EU Presidency. This Research Paper is a timely 
contribution to take stock on where we are in the area of legal migration 20 years after the Tampere 
Council Conclusions.  
Since 1999, mainly representatives of ministries of interior have been ambivalent about this policy, 
showing resistance to the fulfilment of the 1999 European Council’s agenda. The European 
Commission started to implement the Tampere Milestones, with the presentation of a 2001 legislative 
initiative for a directive providing shared norms for labour migration for all categories of third-
country nationals, and a (non-legally binding) policy tool for launching an Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) on legal migration. Both initiatives were withdrawn after suffering a lack of 
support by Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council members, although public support for 
international and EU-level decision-making on migration was at its height among EU citizens. As the 
binding EU wide scheme for all third-country nationals was not implemented, the EU value added of 
having ‘more EU’ in the area of legal migration was never fully demonstrated. This could potentially 
explain, why EU level decision making has increasingly became so challenging (see also Figure 2 
below). 
Despite expectations to the contrary, however, the difficult kick-off of EU policy in this area did not 
prevent Member States from progressively and dynamically enacting a common EU policy on legal 
and labour migration. The EU took a sectoral approach – the legal migration acquis is now composed 
of a wide array or ‘patchwork’ of EU directives (see Table 4. Types of EU legal migration directives). 
Some of these directives, namely Blue Card Directive (2009/05/EC), and Commission proposal for 
revision in June 2016 (COM(2016) 378 final), Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU), Intra-
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Corporate Transferees Directive (2014/66/EU), Students and Researchers Directive ((EU)2016/801 – 
recast),  can be qualified as ‘first admission’ directives, covering the conditions of entry and residence, 
as well as the rights at work, for certain categories of third-country nationals in the Union.  
Other directives, namely Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU), Long-Term Residents Directive 
(2003/19/EC) and Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) provide for a common procedure for 
issueing work-residence permits, EU long-term residence status and a right to family reunification. A 
key positive contribution emerging from these directives is that they provide for a common set of 
standards, protections and rights below which national governments cannot go in their domestic 
migration policies. These include a body of shared EU norms focusing on guaranteeing security of 
residence, family life, common administrative procedures for issuing residence/work permits and 
intra-EU mobility for TCNs legally residing and working in the EU. The interviewees, in particular 
those representing Member States, has acknowledged the EU added value in having the Single Permit 
Directive, as it indeed has simplified the administrative procedures and thus increased the speed and 
transparency in this process across the EU. Although, Single Permit Directive’s potentials for 
protecting the rights of third country workers were sometimes seen as compromised by national or 
EU admission categories and not always evident among on-line survey respondents as well as Delphi 
method discussants representing trade unions, employers and civil society.  
The European Parliament has played a decisive role in the building of a common EU legal and labour 
migration policy framework, and ensuring its democratic accountability. This has been particularly 
the case since the official recognition of its role as co-legislator in this area only in the very end of 2009, 
with the Treaty of Lisbon:   
EU policies dealing with legal and regular immigration fell outside the expansion of the 2004 
Council Decision expanding the ordinary legislative procedure to Title IV EC Treaty. The Lisbon 
Treaty has filled this gap by extending the latter and QMV [Qualitive Majority Vote] to these 
domains. A new Article 79.5 TFEU has been also incorporated, which refers to the exclusive right 
hold by Member States ‘to determine the volumes’ of admission of TCNs coming to seek work.”1   
The Lisbon Treaty consolidated the European Parliament’s role in the area of legal migration. 
According to Peers, it not only confirmed EU’s competence on these policy domains, but it also 
indicated that EU competences could cover all remaining aspects of admission for labour-related 
purposes other than ‘volumes of admission’.2  
The European Parliament has subsequently strengthened its position as co-owner of the EU migration 
policy agenda and priorities. The relevant Parliament Committees (LIBE and EMPL) have further 
placed emphasis on the need to develop a general EU policy framework of intervention and address 
the vulnerability and labour exploitation risks of third-country nationals in the EU, as well as securing 
their employment rights and equal treatment. The European Parliament has also called for a ‘holistic 
approach’ in the area of migration   namely that “the Union will need to establish more general rules 
                                                        
1 Carrera, S. (2011). The impact of the treaty of Lisbon over EU policies on migration, asylum and borders: the 
struggles over the ownership of the Stockholm programme. In Guild E. and P. Minderhoud (eds.) The First Decade 
of EU Migration and Asylum Law (pp. 227-254). Brill, p. 246.  
2 Peers, S. (2008). Finally'Fit for Purpose'? The Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal 
Order. Yearbook of European Law, 27(1), 47. 
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governing the entry and residence for third country nationals seeking employment to fill gaps 
identified in the Union labour market”.3  
 
1.2. STATE OF PLAY: INCOHERENCY, SELECTIVITY AND SECTORALITY 
The ‘Europeanisation’ of this policy area has meant a number of ‘trade-offs’ in the final forms that feature 
the EU legal and labour immigration acquis. These mainly relate to several instances of ‘minimum 
harmonisation’ in and among the adopted directives, which often leave a wider margin of manoeuvre to 
Member States during the domestic transposition and implementation phases. They also relate to a high 
degree of fragmentation and complexity of currently existing legal acts and systems, both in EU and 
domestic arenas. For instance, EU and national regulations and residence/worker permits for the highly 
skilled third country workers, and also some short-term and seasonal work-like schemes that run in parallel 
(see Figure 7),4 which results in fragmentation and incoherency. The Figure 2 below illustrates that current 
state of play in the area of legal migration is defined by the ‘minimum harmonisation’ approach that further 
prevents from unleashing the full potential of EU added value - ensuring a fair level playing field, 
increasing intra-EU mobility and EU’s attractiveness. Limited current experience This further translates in 
the challenge to bring ‘more EU’ in the area of legal migration, and in particular, in labour migration.  
 
Figure 2. State of Play: ‘Minimum harmonisation’ loop leading to ‘less EU’  
  
Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
                                                        
3 European Parliament (2016), Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for 
a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
4 As for instance the interview for this Research Paper revealed that national short-term work permit scheme in 
Poland has been misleadingly accounted by Eurostat as ’seasonal work’ while Poland is pending to transpose 
the Seasonal Work Directive..4 In 2014-16, over 95% of all permits appear to have been issued by Poland.  
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A case in point illustrating such ‘self-informing’ loop of ‘minimum harmonisation’ preventing more 
EU is the current EU Blue Card system. While its main goal was to set up an EU-wide regime for the 
admission of highly skilled TCNs, it still allows Member States to keep using their own national highly 
skilled schemes and permits. For example, in 2016, EU Member States issued only 8,988 or work 
permits under the EU Blue Card Directive (1% out of all work related permits), 10,921 work permits 
for researchers under the EU Students and Researchers Directive (1.3% of all work-related permits), 
and - 35,961 work permits for highly skilled under national schemes (4.2% of all work-related permits) 
(also see Figure 5 and Figure 6).5 Nevertheless, even abovementioned national and EU schemes 
altogether amount only for 6.5% work permits issued for highly skilled persons and researchers.  
A new legislative proposal revising the EU Blue Card was presented in 2016 by the Commission 
Commission’s Impact Assessment accompanying this legislative proposal indicated that  the schemes 
are underused - “the very low overall numbers of permits issued to highly skilled foreign workers 
clearly show that neither the national schemes nor the EU Blue Card – and the two combined – are 
sufficiently effective in attracting highly skilled workers”.6 EU Blue Card proposal is currently in inter-
institutional negotiations. The European Parliament’s negotiating mandate is supporting the 
Commission’s initiative for establishing an EU-wide scheme for highly skilled workers and abolishing 
parallel national schemes, going further in broadening the scope and reinforcing rights, notably for 
intra-EU mobility.  This is proving to be the most controversial issue in the area of legal migration 
inside JHA Council rooms, which has led to the quasi-freezing of negotiations on the proposal. 
While, some EU Member States consider that they can better fix shortcomings of the EU Blue Card 
scheme by continuing using their national systems for highly skilled third country workers, EU 
Member States alone could not unleash the potential of the completing fair level playing field for EUs 
businesses and intra-EU mobility, that has to be developed at EU level.  As the the Commission 
Commission’s Impact Assessment has shown - the separate national schemes for highly skilled third 
country nationals entail intra-EU competition without necessarily increasing the attractiveness of the 
EU as a whole. 7 The authors of this Research Paper, as well as in previous research argue, that EUs 
‘attractiveness’ for third-country nationals  lies in equal treatment provisions,  intra-EU mobility and 
simplified and transparent procedures.8 The later has been to some extent addressed by Single Permit 
Directive (2011/98/EU). 
The authors of this Research Paper continue to argue that perhaps the highest price which has been 
paid for advancing ‘Europeanisation’ in this field has been the development of a worker-by-worker – 
or what we call ‘sectoral’ – approach.9 The toolbox of EU instruments comprises specific ‘first entry’ 
                                                        
5 Eurostat (2018) Eurostat Databasse, migr_resocc Table for 2016. (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-
and-managed-migration/data/database). 
6 Commission Staff Working Document (2016), Impact Assessment accompanying Proposal for Directive, on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, 
COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016, SWD(2016) 193 final, p. 7. 
7 Commission Staff Working Document (2016), Impact Assessment accompanying Proposal for Directive, on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, 
COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016, SWD(2016) 193 final, p. 7. 
8 S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds) (2014), Rethinking Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration Policies: 
Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and Beyond, Brussels: CEPS; S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and 
M. Stefan (eds) (2017), Pathways towards Legal Migration into the EU: Reappraising Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, 
CEPS Paperback, Brussels; 
9 S. Carrera and M. Formisano (2005), “An EU Approach to Labour Migration – What is the Added Value and 
the Way Ahead?”, CEPS Working Document No. 232, CEPS, Brussels, October; S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele 
(eds) (2014), Rethinking Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration Policies: Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, 
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directives (a total of four so far) covering the conditions of entry and stay, and the rights at work, of 
different categories of ‘migration administrative statuses’ of third-country nationals. These broadly 
include the highly qualified, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and researchers. Such an 
approach has came about with the objective of prioritising certain categories of third-country nationals 
who are deemed by Member States’ representatives as ‘more useful’ or ‘needed’ for perceived labour 
market needs, chiefly highly skilled workers.10 Although, in addition to long lasting criticisms from 
academia, there is an increasing acknowledgement of labour market shortages at various skill levels 
among the EU institutions. This was  in particular, stressed by the European Parliament11 and 
European Economic and Social Committee12 that overly narrow legal avenues lead to increase of 
irregular migration and undeclared work, at the same time unfilled vacancies present a ‘bottle-neck’ 
for growth of businesses and could potentially solve the depopulation of the rural areas in the rapidly 
ageing Europe.  
The approach on legal migration in the EU has became salient and sensitive political issue in the 
aftermath of so called ‘European Refugee Humanitarian Crisis’, subject to various controversies and 
emotional debate, often lacking evidence. Academics, especially labour economists are proving that 
EU and its Member States would benefit from more legal migration that could fill in vacancies, to 
sustain current social welfare model, and to increase growth and innovation (see Annex 9 for detailed 
discussion).   
Firstly, EU needs more workers from third-countries to fill in vacances that are not filled by nationals, 
despite training and re-training efforts. Academics find that migrants are often complementary to 
national labour market, as they specialise in different production tasks due to different abilities and 
experiences. Peri highlights that therefore rather than causing lower wages or higher unemployment, 
they can instead complement the national workers and even make the latter more productive through 
occupational reallocation and specialisation in more advanced tasks.13 For example, Lithuanian ship-
building and ship-repair industry is counting on the specially trained black-smiths from Belorus as 
these specialists are not prepared in Lithuania and when such vacancies are filled, companies can 
create more employment for local engineers and mechanics.14  
                                                        
Canada and Beyond, Brussels: CEPS; S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds) (2017), Pathways towards 
Legal Migration into the EU: Reappraising Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, CEPS Paperback, Brussels; Vankova, Z. 
(2018), “Circular migration from the Eastern partnership countries to the EU – the rights of migrant workers in 
Bulgaria and Poland”, PhD dissertation, Maastricht University, funded under the FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN call of 
the Marie Curie Actions — Initial Training Networks funding scheme (Project number – 608417). 
10 A. Wiesbrock (2009), Legal Migration to the European Union – Ten Years After Tampere, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen, pp. 545-549. S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds), Rethinking Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration 
Policies: Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and Beyond, Brussels: CEPS; 
11 European Parliament (2016), Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need 
for a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
12 EESC (2016) Opinion Towards a coherent EU labour immigration policy with regard to the EU Blue Card 
adopted 14 December 2016; EESC (2017) State of implementation of legal migration legislation, SOC/553, 
adopted 5 July 2017.  
13 Peri, G., & Sparber, C. (2009). Task specialization, immigration, and wages. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 1(3), 135-69. Cattaneo, C., Fiorio, C. V., & Peri, G. (2015). What Happens to the Careers of European 
Workers When Immigrants “Take Their Jobs”?. Journal of Human Resources, 50(3), 655-693. Foged, M., & Peri, G. 
(2016). Immigrants' effect on native workers: New analysis on longitudinal data. American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 8(2), 1-34. 
14 Žibas, K. (2007) Labour immigration in Lithuania: situation analysis, OIKOS Lietuvių migracijos ir diasporos 
studijos: 16-30, Vilnius (https://eltalpykla.vdu.lt/bitstream/handle/1/33248/ISSN2351-
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Secondly, on another occasion Peri evidences that young third country nationals increase the ratio of 
working to retired population and hence improve the sustainability of the welfare systems in the EU 
Member States that are rapidly ageing and experiencing demographic change.15  In the labour 
markets, third country workers could provide the skills and the abilities for jobs to be performed by 
young workers, preserving the demand for complementary jobs performed by older population.  In 
addition, third-country nationals have contributed to filling the labour demand relates to home and 
health services and in particular the needs of elderly population. In the absence of third country 
workers, these services would be performed mainly by stay-at-home women, affecting their labour 
force participation and their retirement decision.16 
Thirdly, IMF in 2016 finds that immigration increases the GDP per capita of receiving economies, 
mostly by raising labour productivity.17 The estimated effect is economically significant: a 1 
percentage point increase in the share of migrants in the adult population can raise GDP per capita by 
up to 2 percent in the long run. Both high- and low-skilled migrants contribute, in part by 
complementing the existing skill set of the population. Similarly, Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport and 
Ortega and Peri found that a higher share of third country nationals increases GDP per capita.18 The 
effect of migration appears to operate through an increase in total factor productivity, reflecting an 
increased diversity in productive skills and, to some extent, a higher rate of innovation. Looking at 
OECD countries, Aleksynska and Tritah also find a positive effect of immigration on income per capita 
and productivity of receiving countries, especially for prime-age immigrants.19 
Despite the evidence of the existing and growing economic and societal needs for more immigration 
at the various skills levels, a ‘selectivity’ rationale in first admission schemes at both national and EU 
level has by-and-large disregarded medium- and low-skilled third-country nationals, such as migrant 
domestic workers, workers in constructions and the beauty industry, long-distance drivers and others. 
Second category concern self-employed persons in atypical situations, like for example, start-upers, 
touring artists, other talents in IT, creative and sports industries, whose entry and residence conditions 
are either not well defined in national legislations or do not take into account high mobility needs. If 
such categories are covered by the national admission schemes, the Single Permit Directive 
2011/98/EU would cover them and they would be issued permits according to the EU procedure. 
Nevertheless, the EU Single Permit Directive does not provide an answer to the disproportionate 
levels of migrant workers falling into undeclared or irregular situation in these sectors, which is more 
often related to the absence/ or very narrow entry channels under national migration policies and 
schemes. Also, the EU Single Permit Directive does not contain intra-EU mobility and 
                                                        
6461_2007_N_4.PG_16-30.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y); Sipavičienė, A. and M. Jeršovas (2010) ”Darbo Jėgos 
Migracija: Poreikis Ir Politika Lietuvoje” (Labour migration: Needs and Politics in Lithuania), IOM Vilnius. 
15 Peri, G. (2011). Immigration and Europe’s Demographic Problems: Analysis and Policy Considerations. CESifo 
DICE Report, 9(4), 3-8. 
16 Peri, G., Romiti, A., & Rossi, M. (2015). Immigrants, domestic labor and women's retirement decisions. Labour 
Economics, 36, 18-34. 
17 Jaumotte, M. F., Koloskova, K., & Saxena, M. S. C. (2016). Impact of migration on income levels in advanced 
economies. International Monetary Fund. 
18 Alesina, Alberto, Johann Harnoss, and Hillel Rapoport. "Birthplace diversity and economic prosperity." Journal 
of Economic Growth 21, no. 2 (2016): 101-138. Ortega, F., & Peri, G. (2014). The aggregate effects of trade and 
migration: evidence from OECD countries. In The Socio-Economic Impact of Migration Flows (pp. 19-51). Springer, 
Cham. 
19 Aleksynska, M., & Tritah, A. (2015). The Heterogeneity of Immigrants, Host Countries' Income and 
Productivity: A Channel Accounting Approach. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), 150-172. 
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residence/labour rights in another EU Member State, which are crucial for atypical or new types of 
working arrangements, as it often happens with start-upers, touring artists, etc. 
Seasonal workers in agriculture, hospitality and tourism sectors are covered by the EU scheme 
providing common EU rules covering seasonal third-country workers. Nevertheless, their rights are 
not adequate to those of Blue Card holders, intra-corporate transferees or researchers. After being 
admitted seasonal workers are restrained by the legal gaps in rights and practical barriers, for 
example, how the right to change employer or sector is transposed and implemented in practice, and 
lack of possibilities to bring their family members, to exercise intra-EU mobility, etc. Seasonal work 
directive address potential labour exploitation and unfair working conditions for medium- and low-
skilled TCN workers, which is a bare minimum, often already covered by international and regional 
treaties (see futher discussion on international standards in Chapter 2). 
The ‘embedded sectorality’ at the foundations of EU legal migration policy also leads to differential 
treatment regarding working and living conditions, and rights at work, between third-country 
nationals who were admitted under different directives.20 Our analysis of the provisions confirms 
above-mentioned selective rationale, ‘better’ and ‘higher’ conditions and rights at work are only on 
offer for ‘the highly qualified’. This has often been justified at policy levels as a way to make the EU’s 
and Member States’ labour markets more ‘attractive to foreign talent’.21 The inertia of this type of 
reasoning,  can be seen in current political priorities. For example, the President of the Commission 
has explicitly referred to the issue of the ‘EUs attractiveness’ as a main  justification for the revision of 
the Blue Card Directive.22  
These conditions and rights at work for Blue Card holders already stand in stark contrast to those 
granted to other categories of third-country nationals, chiefly seasonal workers; they also leave a gap 
for medium skilled/qualified third-country nationals in the EU. The EU sectoral approach on labour 
migration results therefore in a systemic differential treatment among different administrative categories 
of third-country nationals, and between them and EU mobile citizens, that further increases 
complexity and fragmentation. 
At the moment of completing manuscript, Commission is conducting a ‘Fitness Check’ that evaluates 
the EU legal migration acquis and pays close attention to assessing the main caveats and incoherencies 
                                                        
20 Friðriksdóttir, B. (2016) “What happened to equality: The construction of the Right to Equal Treatment of Third-
Country Nationals in European Union Law on Labour Migration”, Dissertation,  Radboud University Nijmegen, 
2016; M. van den Brink, S. Burri and J. Goldschmidt (eds) (2017), Equality and Human Rights: Nothing but Trouble?, 
Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM), pp. 123–146. Vankova, Z. (2018), “Circular migration from 
the Eastern partnership countries to the EU – the rights of migrant workers in Bulgaria and Poland”, PhD 
dissertation, Maastricht University, funded under the FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN call of the Marie Curie Actions — 
Initial Training Networks funding scheme (Project number – 608417). 
21 S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds), Rethinking Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration Policies: Comparative 
Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and Beyond, Brussels: CEPS; S. Carrera, A. Geddes and E. Guild (2017), 
“Conclusions an Recommendations: Towards A Fair EU Agenda Facilitating Legal Channels for Labour 
Mobility”, in S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds), Pathways to Legal Migration into the EU: Concepts, 
Trajectories and Policies, Brussels: CEPS.  
22 Juncker, J.-C. (2014) “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change”, 
Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July:  
”I want to promote a new European policy on legal migration. Such a policy could help us to address shortages 
of specific skills and attract talent to better cope with the demographic challenges of the European Union. I want 
Europe to become at least as attractive as the favourite migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA. As a first step, I intend to review the “Blue Card” legislation and its unsatisfactory state of 
implementation.” 
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that affect the current framework, including those identified in this Research Paper. The Fitness Check 
is a welcomed step forward. It has the potential to pave the way for further streamlining, filling gaps 
and guaranteeing a higher degree of uniformity among third-country nationals, and between them 
and EU mobile citizens, regarding human rights and labour standards.   
1.3. INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND EU STANDARDS: FAIR AND NON-
DISCIMINATORY TREATMENT  
EU policy on legal and labour migration does not exist in isolation of the international, regional and 
EU human rights principles and legal commitments and third-country worker labour standards to 
which a majority of EU Member States have willingly abided. The notion of ‘fairness’ and non-
discrimination advanced in the 1999 Tampere Programme must be therefore read and interpreted in 
light of the standards provided by these instruments.  
The Tampere Milestones and principles have found expression in EU primary law since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Article 79 TFEU, read in conjunction with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU CFR), stipulates that legally residing third-country nationals must be treated 
fairly and in a non-discriminatory manner when it comes to working conditions, which are deemed 
to be closely connected to workers’ health, safety and dignity. They may also enjoy intra-EU mobility. 
The EU CFR is complemented by a set of international and regional human rights and labour 
standards to some of which Member States have committed themselves. Furthermore, Article 151 
TFEU is a central legal basis for the promotion of employment, improved living and working 
conditions and combating social exclusion in the EU, irrespective of migration status. The entry point 
is the notion of ‘worker’ and not of ‘migrant’. 
All the main international and regional instruments of direct or indirect application to labour 
migration are based on the principle of equality of treatment between third-country workers and 
national workers. While States keep their sovereignty regarding admission for employment-related 
purposes, the United Nations and the Council of Europe offer a human rights and labour standards 
framework which limits States’ discretion at times of discrimination against third-country nationals, 
in comparison to other foreigners and nationals, in domestic labour markets. The Research Paper 
identifies the UN International Covenants, the International Labour Organization (ILO) instruments, 
and the CoE human rights system as the most relevant parts of this framework. However, as Table 5 
illustrates with the sample of nine EU Member States, not all relevant Treaties are ratified. Thus, 
although, regular and correct implementation of these legal instruments by States parties are 
moreover monitored by Treaty and human rights bodies, which also issue crucial guidelines and 
opinions, the EU cannot overly rely on them.There is a need for ‘more EU’ in ensuring equal treatment, 
in line with standards set by international and regional bodies that carry crucial interpretive weight 
when assessing the lawfulness of States’ policies.  
 
The UN Global Compact on Migration, which is currently in negotiations, identifies as one of its 
objectives the facilitation of “fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent 
work”. The current second draft calls for States to recommit themselves to upholding these same 
standards. The Research Paper finds that there is a clear role for the EU to contribute to promoting 
and ensuring a common level playing field of international and regional human rights and labour 
standards protection (non-discrimination among workers) which otherwise could undermine the 
effectiveness of EU secondary law on labour migration. For example, international and regional 
standards are part of ensuring the ‘fair level playing field’ and from the standpoint of internal market 
it could be seen as not ‘fair’ when certain standards are binding some employers in the EU Member 
States in their treatment of third country workers, but not the others. 
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A key question is the extent to which the systematic differential treatment inherent to the current state 
of play of EU legal migration policy constitutes unlawful indirect discrimination in light of these 
standards. Such assessment must take into account the extent to which an inequality of treatment is 
necessary, proportionate and legitimate, both in its objectives and outcomes. Whereas, under 
international and EU law different treatment of third-country nationals on the basis of an objective 
justification can be legitimate, the sectoral approach produces discriminatory outcomes that are 
cannot always be justified under above mentioned criteria of proportionality and necessity.  
The Research Paper concludes that in light of the individual impacts of the current EU sectoral 
approach, there is an inconsistency between the worker-by-worker directives and these international 
and regional labour rights and human rights standards. For example, the blanket restriction on family 
life for seasonal workers, that is different from Blue Card workers, raises questions of necessity and 
lack of proportionality.23 Furthemore, in the Luxembourg Court Case C-540/03 European Parliament v 
Council of the European Union Advocate General Kokott Opinion confirmed that the wide appreciation 
given to EU Member States in the current EU directives is not always dully justified: “Since human 
rights must be protected effectively, and the law has to be clear, Article 8 of the [Family Reunification] 
Directive is contrary to Community law.”24In addition,  on several occasions the ILO Committee of 
Experts expressly recognised discrimination by design in the EU’s legal migration directives in their 
Report, “Promoting Fair Migration” to the International Labour Conference in 2016,25 as well as in 
ILO Technical Note prepared on the Seasonal Migrants Directive.26  ILO experts have expressed 
concerns about how these EU directives and their impact assessments have not duly taken into 
consideration and upheld ILO standards.  
 The systemic discrimination resulting from ‘selectivity and utilitarian rationale’ in admission schemes 
is further amplified and nurtured by the wealth of evidence and research demonstrating that third-
country nationals are indeed discriminated against in EU labour markets (on the basis of their 
migratory background, national or ethnic origin, religion), with third-country women being 
particularly exposed and often subject to sub-standard and vulnerable jobs and occupations.  
1.4. KEY GAPS AND BARRIERS: THE RESTRICTIONS IN LAW AND PRACTICAL 
CHALLENGES TO ENJOY FAIR AND EQUAL TREATMENT AT WORK 
The Research Paper takes the perspective of migrant workers and identifies some of the gaps and 
barriers concerning their rights and legal status stemming from the status quo in the area of legal 
migration at the EU level (see Table 8). The entry into the EU labour market for TCNs is subject to 
numerous gaps and barriers related to application procedures, labour market tests and other 
                                                        
23 Zoeteweij-Turhan, M. H. (2017). The Seasonal Workers Directive: ‘… but some are more equal than 
others’. European Labour Law Journal, 8(1), 28-44. 
24 CJEU (2005) Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 8 September 2005 1(1), Case C-540/03 European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union supported by Federal Republic of Germany and Commission of the 
European Communities, para. 105.  
25 International Labour Office (ILO) (2016), General Survey concerning the migrant workers instruments, Report 
of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour 
Conference, 105th Session, Geneva, 22 February, para. 106; see also International Labour Office (ILO) (2014), 
“Fair Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda”, Report of the Director General, International Labour Conference, 103rd 
Session, Geneva. 
26 ILO (2010), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379 ILO Note 
based on International Labour Standards with reference to relevant regional standards, Geneva. 
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requirements. Entry and re-entry conditions depend on the profile and ‘legal status’ of the third-
country nationals irrespective of their actual skills and qualifications, which in turn is a direct result 
of the sectoral approach to labour migration developed at the EU level. The analysis shows that Blue 
Card holders are the only category of third-country nationals who can benefit from extensive re-entry 
conditions refered to at the EU level as circular migration that allow for absences from the territory of 
the Member State while accumulating residence periods for access to long-term residence. 
Gaps regarding the secure residence status and limitations to changing employers, especially for low- 
and medium-skilled temporary workers, as well as barriers related to different enforcement capacity 
at national level, are likely to increase labour exploitation, because bargaining power diminishes. 
While the EU Single Permit Directive provides equal treatment and procedural rights for third country 
nationals in employment relationships, it leaves out self-employed persons (unless they are already 
long term residents). It does not sufficiently address the challenges in sectors where disproportionate 
numbers of third country nationals lack safe, regular and orderly entry schemes at national levels to 
perform that type of work. The case of migrant domestic workers illustrates the very precarious 
situation of persons who are not covered by any of the first entry directives; they often enter as tourists, 
students,’au pairs’ and when over-staying their visas they are exposed to falling in irregularity – 
performing undeclared work without necessary work/residence permits (see Box 3. Case study: 
Third-country nationals in domestic work sector).  
Similar situations arise for long distance drivers, self-employed, as well as those working in services, 
such as delivery, beauty salons, etc. The Research Paper further identifies certain gaps between the 
different categories of migrant workers to access to permanent residence in the EU, as well as various 
regimes for intra-EU mobility and family reunification. Here again, seasonal workers are the migrant 
workers’ category with the least rights – no right to family reunification, long-term residence or intra-
EU-mobility – as opposed to more privileged categories of highly qualified migrant workers.   
Furthermore, the current EU legal migration acquis does not remedy barriers for all categories of 
workers in the field of recognition of qualifications and social security coordination related to the 
national instruments in the Member States. The Research Paper demonstrates that the first admissions 
directives, covering Seasonal Workers, highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), Intra-corporate 
Transferees (ICTs) and Students and Researchers, are relevant to the social security rights of TCNs, in 
particular the Regulation 1231/2010 that extended such rights to TCN previously excluded solely on 
the basis of their nationality.27  However, they lack important social security coordination principles, 
for example Article of Regulation 1231/2010 only covers issues of social security in relation to family 
members and survivors that are “legally resident in the territory of Member State”, but not to those 
left in the country of origin. The first admissions directives, as listed above, also fall short of addressing 
gaps and barriers, especially when it comes to procedures for recognition of qualifications in regulated 
professions. Equal treatment in these directives applies only once authorisation has been obtained, 
which could lead to periods of dequalification for highly qualified persons working in perceived ‘low-
skill’ jobs while awaiting recognition. For example, as Vankova describes her findings from the focus 
group discussions - the recognition of diploma for a medical doctor from third country in Poland can 
take more than two years and in a meanwhile the person has been opting to become seasonal worker.28 
                                                        
27 Regulation (EU) No 1231/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 extending 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 to nationals of third countries who are not 
already covered by these Regulations solely on the ground of their nationality, JOL_2010_344_R_0001_01, 24 
November 2010, Brussels.  
28 Vankova, Z. (2017), “Implementing the EU's Circular Migration Approach: Legal and Migrant Perspectives on 
Entry and Re-Entry Conditions in Bulgaria and Poland”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Research 
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This presents high costs for individual (getting low salary/ de-skilling), society (not having enough 
doctors/ quality healthcare) and economy (amount of taxes being paid).  
The benchmark assessment part of this Research Paper showed that the EU is still some way off from 
developing a fair labour migration policy. In some of the EU Member States, negative public attitudes 
towards migration are hindering the efforts to reinvigorate approaches to EU legal migration. EU 
Member States that have higher percentages of third-country nationals seem to be more positive 
towards immigration from third countries for employment. Meanwhile, other EU Member States that 
are less exposed to migration and can be better defined as emigration countries, remain most 
restrictive towards immigration from third countries. The negative attitudes towards migration thus 
correlate with lack of experience of immigration from third countries. As explained in Figure 1Figure 
2 the complexity and low usage of EU wide schemes thus can be in turn  feeding into negative public 
attitudes towards widening entry channels and rights of third country nationals. 
2. WHAT ARE THE INDIVIDUAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS?  
This gaps and barriers analysis should be understood in a broader context, not only the loss of possible 
tax revenues, loss of GDP related to difficulty to hire the right skills, loss of innovation opportunities, 
intra-EU mobility, increasing attractiveness of the EU region as a whole, but the overall impact that 
also extends to social aspects - equal treatment, integration, long-term demographic trends, social 
cohesion. 
The individual impacts resulting from the differential set of entry/residency conditions as well as 
rights of different categories of third-country nationals lead to differences in economic outcomes 
between the former and EU national workers with similar characteristics. The Research Paper 
demonstrates how gaps and barriers contribute to the differences in economic and individual 
outcomes between TCNs and the EU nationals. For example, gaps and barriers in equal treatment 
increases the likelihood of discrimination at work and when accessing services.  
FRA MIDIS II survey findings confirm that one-third of North Africans and one-fourth of sub-Saharan 
Africans continue to experience discrimination based on their ethnic or migration background, the 
former related the experiences of discrimination due to their Arabic-sounding name while the later – 
on their skin colour.29 For most of them, discrimination is a recurring experience in various parts of 
life, particularly in the area of employment. 30 While this survey have not distinguished between the 
different categories of migrants according the first admission schemes (i.e., Blue Card or Seasonal), it 
should be noted, that third country nationals of all skills levels are more at risk of discrimination 
depending on where they are coming from, which in itself becomes a barrier of accessing and enjoying 
their equal treatment rights at the workplace. In addition, sub-Saharan Africans continue to be 
experiencing systemic discrimination in possibilities to access the EU. For example, the European 
Parliament report has highlighted the issue that:  
only 2,1% of the beneficiaries of the EU Blue Card during the first phase of the implementation 
in 2012 came from Sub-Saharan Africa. This may indicate implicit racial bias applied 
preventing certain types of workers to access to some more favourable statuses and therefore 
enjoying equal treatment with other workers or other family members. The lack of diversity 
                                                        
Paper No. RSCAS 2017/34, European University Institute, Fiesole. 
29 FRA (2017) Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, main results.  
30 Ibid.  
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among the EU Blue Card holders may reflect national policies and practices which can 
perpetuate forms of direct, indirect or institutional discrimination towards new candidates.31  
Recent Eurostat statistics on EU Blue Card decisions granted by citizenship confirm a trend of 
extremely low numbers of EU Blue Card holders from this region: in 2016 there were only 455 
decisions to grant Blue Card to citizens of sub-Saharan Africa32 out of total 20.979 decisions to grant 
Blue Card. This amounts to only 2.2% of all granted decisions in 2016.33  
The European Commission’s Impact Assessmend focused on the impact of the EU Blue Card Directive 
on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon. It concluded that:  
Even though it is hard to estimate the real benefits or damages of 'brain drain' it can be 
assumed that small LDCs close to powerful economic regions are more likely to suffer from 
'brain drain' than larger countries. This type of emigration may put the state’s economy at risk, 
and more directly, may affect the education system as well as the healthcare and engineering 
sector.34 
The Commission’s Impact Assessment acknowledged the very low numbers of Blue Card applicants 
coming from LDCs, as “[i]n 2013, 188 out of 12 963 Blue Cards (1,45 %) were granted to citizens of 
LDCs.” However, this Commission Assessment did not assess the barriers and obstacles for applicants 
from LDCs, such as direct, indirect or institutional discrimination. It did not either cover other costs 
such as lost remittances due to qualified nationals working underqualified work, falling into 
irregularity and becoming victims of human trafficking.  
The econometric analysis implemented in Chapter 5 of this Research Paper shows that employment 
rates of male third-country nationals are lower compared to those of the native population and EU 
mobile citizens of the same age group and education level. They also report lower wage income. TCNs 
are, on average, more likely to be overqualified for their job and to work part-time. At the same time, 
they are less likely to have a permanent job and to exert supervisory responsibilities. The largest 
differences relate to women TCNs who are 16 percentage points less likely to be employed than native 
women and 13.5 percentage points less likely to be employed than mobile EU women with the same 
observable characteristics. There are also substantial differences relative to native women and mobile 
EU women in terms of wage income, contract duration, and part-time work. Legal gaps and barriers 
(restricted access to the labour market, restrictions on job mobility, re-entry and circular migration, 
insecure residence status) can indeed explain some of the reported differences in outcomes between 
TCNs and EU nationals.  
For instance, TCNs are more likely than mobile EU citizens to name ‘restricted access to the labour 
market’ as the main reason for being unemployed or overqualified for their job: 6.5% versus 2.2% and 
                                                        
31 European Parliament (2017) Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled 
employment (COM(2016)0378 – C8-0213/2016 – 2016/0176(COD)), Rapporteurs: Claude Moraes (Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) Jean Lambert, (Committee on Employment and Social Affaires), 28 
June, Brussels.  
32 ’Sub-Saharan Africa’ counted as 46 African countries, excluding Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, 
Sudan and Tunisia and Western Sahara.  
33 Eurostat (2018) Table EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship [migr_resbc1], last update: 
30-10-2018. (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database). 
34 Commission Staff Working Document (2016), Impact Assessment accompanying Proposal for Directive, on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, 
COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016, SWD(2016) 193 final.  
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7.1% versus 2.5%. Legal restrictions to access the labour market are associated with an employment 
rate 5.5 percentage points lower for men TCNs and 13.5% points lower for women TCNs (when 
compared to TCNs with same observable characteristics but not facing the restrictions). Even though 
the labour market restrictions usually apply to TCNs in the first year(s) since arrival in the EU, they 
can leave a longer-term scarring effect and lower labour market attachment. 
Furthermore, a combination of legal gaps and barriers increases the likelihood of working part-time 
and results in a lower incidence of having a permanent contract. For men TCNs, legal gaps and 
barriers can also explain part of the wage gap (vis-à-vis similar EU nationals). Barriers to recognition 
of qualifications are considered by 21% of TCNs as the main obstacle to getting a job matching their 
skills. These barriers are tougher for TCNs than for mobile EU citizens. Barriers to intra-EU mobility 
indeed make TCNs less mobile than EU nationals. These barriers include, among others, the need to 
obtain new residence and work authorisations, a lack of status recognition, and the restriction on 
accumulating years of residence for long-term residence status. This might have negative implications 
for adjustment to changes in economic conditions, knowledge flows within the EU, and for EU 
attractiveness to skilled immigrants. 
3. THE COSTS OF STATUS QUO: QUANTIFYING IMPACTS OF GAPS AND BARRIERS  
Drawing from the findings of the econometric analysis, we then quantified and monetised the impacts 
of several gaps and barriers for TCNs as compared with the native population. The analysis focused 
on two key impacts – employment and income – and assessed the implications for earnings of 
individual migrants (individual impacts) as well as tax revenue (economic impacts). It is also worth noting 
that while our analysis focused on these two impacts other impacts are possible but were difficult to 
quantify and monetise for the purposes of this Research Paper. Such impacts included health and 
GDP.35  
A summary of these impacts are presented in Chapter 6 of this Research Paper. The key parameters 
are summarised in Annex 6 with the key parameters to assess impacts of gaps in employment and 
wages. We mainly used 2016 data for the translation of impacts into monetary figures. The greatest 
impacts were seen for barriers imposed on family migrants, which were mainly due to limited 
employment opportunities for spouses of third-country nationals. The estimated loss to individuals 
and society due to poor recognition of qualifications was also relatively large.  
 
  
                                                        
35 Some studies have investigated this issue. For example, one study investigated the potential economic impact 
of reductions in migration due to Brexit. The study found that a decrease in net migration of 91,000 could result 
in a reduction in GDP estimated between 0.63% and 1.19%. Per capita GDP would fall by an estimated 0.22% to 
0.78% (Portes and Forte, 2017). 
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Table 1. Summary of monetised individual and economic impacts - status quo 
 Estimates* 
Gap/barrier Lost annual income, net 
(individual impact) 
Lost annual tax revenue 
at aggregate EU level 
(economic impact) 
Intra-EU labour mobility €31.2 million EUR €8.5 million 
Recognition of qualification €3.2-5.3 billion €1.4-2.3 billion 
Re-entry and circular migration No estimate made 
Secure residence Est 100,000 people affected; no estimate made 
Work authorisation €1.1-2.3 billion  €445-891 million 
Family reunification €6.9-8.7 billion €2.6-3.2 billion 
Social security Est. 100,000 people affected; no estimate made 
Equal treatment €21 billion €8 billion 
Notes: *Own calculations, unless otherwise noted, see detailed Table 14: Summary of monetised impacts in Chapter 6. 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
 
4. WHAT ARE THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTIONS?  
4.1. IDENTIFYING THE POLICY OPTIONS 
The Research Paper identifies four main policy options on the basis of ongoing academic and policy 
debates on the future of EU legal and labour migration. They present inter-related strategies with 
differences in ambition and speed on how to streamline the current EU legal migration acquis (length 
of arrows in Figure 3 is representing the speed of changes). 
The benefits and costs of different policy options are discussed in light of how they address identified 
gaps and barriers, particularly those resulting from the sectoral approach, and how they remedy 
individual and economic impacts. (See Table 17. Overview of policy options’ potential benefits in 
addressing key gaps and barriers in Chapter 7).   
Option 1 focuses on ensuring better enforcement of current EU sectoral directives (including 
increasing awareness on the current provisions, enforcing current equal treatment and labour rights 
provisions as foreseen in Single Permit Directive/monitoring at the EU level how the current ‘first 
entry’ Directives are implemented). It would essentially not close all gaps but would address some of 
the practical barriers, such as lengthy procedures and administrative difficulties. Nevertheless, major 
gaps and barriers resulting from the sectoral approach would remain unaddressed, as essentially 
Member States would continue to have the wide margin of appreciation on interpreting the directives 
and on which options they accept certain categories of third country workers. Therefore, it is working 
towards maximum harmonisation in a least ambitious way. It could take, for example more than 30 
years until better enforcement of current acquis could achieve this goal. 
   Option 2 implies a gradual extension of categories of workers and their rights within the logic of 
sectoral first-entry directives, i.e. migrant domestic workers, construction, transport workers, those 
working in beauty industry, self-employed, who are over-represented among the undeclared and/or 
irregular migrant workers due to overly narrow entry channels at national and EU level, and therefore 
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not covered by the EU Single Permit Directive. It would not close the overall gap but would narrow 
gaps and would lower certain barriers, particularly in relation to the entry and employment rights of 
newly added categories of third-country nationals, who often risk being exploited, and falling into 
irregular situation. This option would use re-cast of Directives as to bring them towards maximum 
harmonisation – it would take 30 – 20 years to recast all directives and to reach the level of rights as 
foreseen in the Blue Card Directive.  
Option 3 entails the elaboration and adoption of a non-binding EU immigration code that would bring 
together all existing (and fragmented) EU rules in a one document. This option would aim to close the 
gap between sectoral directives in a long run by putting in place aspirational standards. This option 
is already moving out of the logic of the sectorial approach. It is rather a slower strategy, in comparison 
with Option 4 taking from 10 to 20 years towards the goal of maximum harmonisation. The non-
binding immigration code could follow the precedent of the Fundamental Rights Charter which, in 
2010 turned from a non-binding document summarising European Fundamental Rights into a binding 
legislation with Treaty of Lisbon. 
Option 4 proposes the elaboration and adoption of a Binding Immigration Code that would imply 
abandoning the sectoral approach logic and adopting a global horizontal directive for all TCNs no 
matter their perceived skills status. This option would aim to close the gaps and barriers between 
different sectoral directives in a one leap taking 5 – 10 years to get first results of maximum 
harmonisation. This option would build on the success in the are of administrative procedures 
achieved with Single Permit Directive. It would go further - to unify the procedures and rights of all 
third country nationals presenting a major EU added value potential.  A positive spillover would be 
the simplification of entry/residence and employment conditions for all TCNs, raising the awareness 
and improving the equal treatment clauses, leading towards increased intra-EU mobility and thus 
increased attracticveness of the EU as a whole in much shorter time-span.  
Figure 3. Difference in time moving towards maximum harmonisation 
 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
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4.2. THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION: BENEFITS, KEY DRIVERS OF COSTS AND 
FEASIBILITY 
Option 4 emerges with the greatest estimated benefits due to its strong orientation towards equal 
treatment and family reunification overall. The costs associated with inequal treatment between TCNs 
and nationals are substantial with lost income estimated to be over EUR 21 billion and family 
reunification over €6.9-8.7 billion. As the Table 2. Summary of estimated benefits of policy options 
shows, the Binding Immigration Code ensuring equality of treatment between third country workers 
and EU national workers would amount to over €15.75 billion individual benefits and €6 billion 
economic benefits.  
The benefits and costs of different policy options are discussed in  detail in Chapter 7, in light of how 
they address the gaps and barriers identified in Chapter 3 and how they remedy individual and 
economic impacts studied in Chapters 3 through 6 (see Table 17 and Table 18). The assessment does 
not perform a fully-fledged economic cost-benefit analysis and are rather limited estimations. 
Table 2. Summary of estimated benefits of policy options  
 
OPTION 1:  
Better enforcement 
OPTION 2: 
Gradual  Extension 
OPTION 3: 
Non-binding 
Immigration Code 
OPTION 4: 
Binding 
Immigration Code 
Intra-EU 
labour 
mobility 
€7.8 million 
individual benefits  
and €2.125 million 
economic benefits   
€15.6 million 
individual benefits  
and €4.25 million 
economic benefits   
€15.6 million 
individual benefits  
and €4.25 million 
economic benefits   
€23.4 million 
individual benefits  
and €6.375 million 
economic benefits   
Recognition of 
qualification 
€1.6 - 2.65 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.7 - 1.15 
billion economic 
benefits   
€0.8 - 1.325 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.35 - 0.575 
billion economic 
benefits   
€0.8 - 1.325 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.35 - 0.575 
billion economic 
benefits   
€1.6 - 2.65 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.7 - 1.15 
billion economic 
benefits   
Work 
authorisation 
€0.55 - 1.15 billion 
individual benefits  
and €222.5 - 445.5 
million economic 
benefits   
€0.55 - 1.15 billion 
individual benefits  
and €222.5 - 445.5 
million economic 
benefits   
€0.275 - 0.575 billion 
individual benefits  
and €111.25 - 222.75 
million economic 
benefits   
€0.825 - 1.725 
billion individual 
benefits  and 
€333.75 - 668.25 
million economic 
benefits   
Family 
reunification 
€1.725 - 2.175 
billion individual 
benefits  and €0.65 - 
0.8 billion 
economic benefits   
€3.45 - 4.35 billion 
individual benefits  
and €1.3 - 1.6 
billion economic 
benefits   
€1.725 - 2.175 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.65 - 0.8 
billion economic 
benefits   
€5.175 - 6.525 
billion individual 
benefits  and €1.95 - 
2.4 billion economic 
benefits   
Equal 
treatment* 
€5.25 billion 
individual benefits  
and €2 billion 
economic benefits   
€10.5 billion 
individual benefits  
and €4 billion 
economic benefits 
€10.5 billion 
individual benefits  
and €4 billion 
economic benefits 
€15.75 billion 
individual benefits  
and €6 billion 
economic benefits 
Note: * Equal treatment is overlapping with other gaps and barriers, and therefore we refrain from summing up the 
different benefits per option. It is based on author’s own calculations taking into account Table 14: Summary of 
monetised impacts and  
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Table 17. Overview of policy options’ potential benefits in addressing key gaps and barriers, when ‘low impact’ is 
assigned to be 25%; ‘moderate’ - 50% and ‘high’ - 75%. These are all estimations. These benefits may not be realised 
immediately, but may take several years. The figures have bee annualised.  
Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
A Binding Immigration Code would eventually increase EU ‘attractiveness’, as the EU would treat 
migrant workers with human dignity, in line with international human rights and labour standards, 
and not only on the basis of economic arguments and outputs. A Binding Immigration Code is also 
likely to increase intra-EU mobility among all categories of workers, who, as the econometric analysis 
shows, are willing to adapt to labour market situations.  
The Table 3. Summary of policy options assessment below gives a rough assessment of the key benefits 
(see also Figure 23. Estimated economic benefits annually at aggregate EU level (EUR millions), cost 
drivers (Table 19) and  feasibility of each policy option.  The grounds for the assessment are defined 
in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 3. Summary of policy options assessment 
 Key benefits Key Costs Feasibility 
Option 1 Low Moderate High 
Option 2 Moderate High Moderate 
Option 3 Moderat Moderate Moderate 
Option 4 High Low Low 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
 
The assessment on the basis of key drivers of costs and benefits confirms that Option 4 would be the 
fastest and most likely way to close the most gaps and barriers resulting from the sectoral nature of 
the EU’s current legal migration design. However, such initiative requires great political commitment 
by EU institutions and the willingness of Member States. The feasibility was assessed during the 
interviews and Delphi method discussion, conducted for the purpose of this research paper. The 
interviewees and discussants have confirmed that feasibility in the current political climate is the key 
challenge for Option 4 to be realised. Some of the interviewees and discussants refered to freezing of 
the Blue Card revision due to the lacking of political support to address gaps and barriers for the 
highly qualified third country nationals across the EU. Although there are claims that some Member 
States believe those gaps and barriers are better addressed through national approaches, the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment for the Revision of the Blue Card Directive has shown that both EU 
and Member States would benefit greatly by streamlining the rights and labour conditions of TCNs.36 
 
                                                        
36 European Commission (2016), Communication on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment 
(“EU Blue Card”), COM(2014) 287 final, Brussels, 22.5.2014; European Parliament (2015), European 
Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing Implementation Appraisal, The EU Blue Card Directive, December 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/558766/EPRS_BRI%282015%29558766_EN.pdf). 
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Among the concrete recommendations on how to overcome current feasibility challenges we highlight 
the following proposals:  
 
Firstly, EU legislators should address the gap between EU legal migration law and international and 
regional standards, and the findings and recommendations issued by UN and CoE monitoring bodies, 
as this affects the effectiveness of EU secondary legislation in this area. It would help in cases where 
systematic (institutional) discrimination may exit. In addition, the Commission should convoke a 
permanent network of lawyers and judges to better enforce current standards. 
 
Secondly, the EU legistators should take the responsibility over the shaping the evidence-based and 
rights-based narrative over the legal migration. The European Party Families could for example get 
sanctioned for spreading hate speech and xenophobia. For example, such MEPs would not be allowed 
to get EU funding, as it is not in line with EU’s fundamental values.  The current anti-migrant political 
climate and toxic populist and/or nationalistic discourses constitute major barriers to Binding 
Immigration Code and is a source of EU’s unattractiveness for third country nationals to choose the 
EU as their destination. The rights of migrants should be seen and embedded in a wider rule of law 
framework, as systemic differential treatment or discrimination has negative results, not only on the 
individuals concerned, but also on societies, and is likely to result in rights standards backsliding for 
all workers and/or third country nationals and, in particular, for ethnic minorities and other 
vulnerable groups. Therefore, there is a need for ‘more EU’ in shaping a more robust and well-
articulated rights-based discourse by EU institutions and agencies.  
 
Thirdly, a set of accompanying policy measures could be additionally explored, such as, a broadened 
social dialogue (social partners and civil society) so as to inform EU policies and evaluate their 
implementation and effectiveness. The broadened social dialogue could feed into and inform the 
increased role of the EU’s Common Labour Authority in monitoring labour rights standards for TCNs 
across the EU and improving access to justice by third country workers. The latter could also be linked 
and feed into the EU’s Rule of Law Mechanism proposed by the European Parliament. 
  
 | 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Background: 20 Years since the Tampere Programme 
The European Union’s legal migration policy is rooted in the first multi-annual programme on the 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) agreed on 15-16 October 1999 in Tampere, Finland. 
Following the entry into force of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, and the transfer of migration policy to 
shared competence between Member States and the EU, the European Council laid down in the 
Tampere Programme the policy parameters or ‘milestones’ to drive the progressive development of a 
common EU migration policy in the years to come.  
Such a common policy was expected to include the approximation of national policies on the conditions 
of entry and residence for third-country nationals (non-EU citizens, TCNs), and their rights in the EU. 
The Tampere Programme enshrined as a key policy goal “a fair treatment paradigm” in EU migration 
policy, according to which the EU should ensure “fair treatment” of all TCNs residing legally in its 
territory. It called for a “more vigorous integration policy” aimed at granting them rights and 
obligations comparable to those of EU citizens, and non-discrimination “in economic, social and cultural 
life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia”.37  
The fair and non-discriminatory treatment paradigm now finds expression in the provisions of the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty. Article 79.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) proclaims 
that the Union shall develop a common immigration policy ensuring fair treatment of TCNs. The notion 
of ‘fairness’ in the context of legal migration (chiefly for employment and related purposes) must be 
read in light of the emphasis placed by the EU Treaties on the individual and the protection of her/his 
fundamental rights and human rights international labour standards in actions falling within the remits 
of EU policy.38  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR) stipulates in Article 31 that every worker, irrespective 
of administrative migration status, has the right to fair and just working conditions that respect his/her 
dignity, health and safety. Similarly, Article 15 EU CFR enshrines the obligation for states to ensure that 
TCNs authorised to work have “equivalent working conditions than those of EU citizens”. Any 
limitation or derogation by EU member states to these human rights and labour standards, which would 
imply differential treatment among third-country nationals, and between them and EU citizens, must 
be well-justified, proportionate, necessary and legitimate so as not to incur unlawful discrimination 
contrary to international human rights law and labour law.  
Labour and living standards is an area where the EU and its member states do not act in isolation. The 
concept of ‘fairness’ of TCNs in working conditions needs also to be read in light of a robust body of 
international and regional human rights standards to which the same EU member states have to abide. 
These standards have mainly emerged from various United Nations instruments and human rights 
treaties. International labour standards have been adopted in the context of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). ILO has called for a fair global governance of labour migration that ensures non-
discrimination and the principle of equal treatment between third-country workers and national 
workers. It has placed special emphasis on the need for member states to develop equality policies 
towards third-country workers that address their vulnerability to various forms of discrimination and 
                                                        
37 European Council, Conclusions Summit 15-16 October 1999, Tampere, paras 18-21. 
38 S. Carrera, A. Geddes and E. Guild (2017), “Conclusions and Recommendations: Towards a Fair Agenda 
facilitating Legal Channels of for Labour Mobility”, in S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds), Pathways 
towards Legal Migration into the EU: Reappraising Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, CEPS Paperback, Brussels, pp. 
183-209. 
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prejudices in domestic labour markets on grounds of nationality, which often are obscured by or 
intersect with other discrimination grounds such as race, ethnicity, colour, religion and gender.39  
While too often forgotten in past EU policy discussions and legislative activities, some of these legal 
standards are not just ‘aspirational’ but rather constitute legally binding obligations that EU member 
states have committed themselves to internationally. Others carry an interpretative weight, such as at 
times of assessing the lawfulness of national policies towards third-country nationals. International and 
regional human rights and labour standards instruments usually apply to monitoring or treaty bodies 
responsible for the interpretation, review and regular evaluation of states parties’ correct 
implementation.  
The United Nations is currently holding high-level discussions on international human rights and 
labour standards in the area of migration. The Heads of State and Government and High 
Representatives agreed at the UN Summit of 19 September 2016 the so-called ‘New York Declaration’,40 
in which they declared their intention to pay particular attention to the application of minimum labour 
standards for migrant workers regardless of their status, as well as to recruitment and other migration-
related costs.41 This was followed by the opening of the negotiations of the ‘Global Compact for 
Migration’ that in its second draft published in May 2018 calls for the need to facilitate labour mobility 
at all skill levels and “fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard[ing] conditions that ensure decent 
work”. The Global Compact calls for the promotion and effective implementation of existing 
international instruments related to international labour mobility, labour rights and decent work. 
Despite expectations to the contrary, EU policy on legal and labour migration has developed in a rather 
dynamic fashion during the past two decades.42 Member states’ positions in this area have been 
ambivalent, however. Ministries of Interior have shown much resistance to ‘Europeanising’ 
competences in this policy domain, thereby controverting the original call by the European Council in 
Tampere. However, member states have progressively committed themselves to a Union policy setting 
that provides for a harmonised set of legal standards, rights and administrative guarantees to which 
national labour migration policies can no longer be inferior.  
The existing EU policy framework on ‘legal migration’ is composed of a complex, compartmentalised 
or fragmented body of EU directives that cover the conditions of TCN legal entry and residence, and 
the rights attached therein. This is particularly so with respect to the current form of the EU legal acquis 
that deal with access to employment and working conditions of third-country nationals.43 Based on the 
official call by the above-mentioned Tampere Programme, the European Commission proposed a 
directive which would have covered the conditions of entry/residence and the rights of all third-country 
                                                        
39 International Labour Office (ILO) (2014), “Fair Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda”, Report of the Director 
General, International Labour Conference, 103rd Session, Geneva; ILO (2016), “General Survey concerning the 
migrant workers instruments”, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 105th Session, Geneva, 22 February.  
40 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016, New 
York Declaration, A/RES/71/1, 3 October 2016. 
41 Paragraph 57 of the New York Declaration states, “We will consider facilitating opportunities for safe, orderly 
and regular migration, including, as appropriate, employment creation, labour mobility at all skills levels, circular 
migration, family reunification and education-related opportunities.” 
42 A. Wiesbrock (2009), Legal Migration to the European Union – Ten Years After Tampere, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen, pp. 545-549. 
43 This Research Paper does not cover the external dimensions of EU legal and labour immigration policies, i.e. 
instruments resulting from international cooperation such as agreements and other non-legally binding tools.  
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nationals in the EU.44 The proposal did not find consensus among member states’ ministries of interior 
and was withdrawn in 2006.  
Since then, the EU has developed a policy approach to legal migration characterised by ‘sectorality’, 
which suffers from ‘embedded fragmentation’.45 The sectoral approach has translated into a legal 
framework depending on the type of employment/specific labour sector for which TCNs are to be 
admitted in the EU, as well as to the creation of different EU administrative statuses ascribed to each of 
them and that present different degrees of working and living conditions as well as rights. There are at 
present four EU legal acts that cover, respectively, highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), seasonal 
workers, intra-corporate transferees, and researchers, trainees and students, volunteers, pupils and au 
pairs.  
Since 2014, one of the key policy priorities of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has 
been “a new policy on legal migration”. In his Political Guidelines published in 2014, Juncker 
emphasised that such a policy would need to address skill shortages and “attract talent to better cope 
with the demographic challenges of the European Union”. Juncker emphasised that the Union should 
“become at least as attractive as the favourite migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA”, and called for a review of the EU Blue Card Directive in light of its unsatisfactory implementation 
by EU member states.46 
The emergence in 2015 of the so-called ‘European Refugee Humanitarian Crisis’ shifted the main EU 
political focus and debate towards the areas of asylum, borders and irregular immigration, and away 
from the extent to which the forms of EU policy on economic immigration are ‘fit for purpose’ and the 
facilitation of labour mobility. That notwithstanding, the 2015 European Agenda on Migration 
announced the Commission’s plan to embark on REFIT (the Commission's Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance) initiative47 in the form of a so-called ‘Fitness Check’ of the EU legal migration acquis, to 
identify “gaps and inconsistencies” and reflect on ways to simplify and streamline the existing EU 
framework.48 This type of initiative was introduced via the Commission’s Communication on the Smart 
Regulation in the European Union.49  
The Fitness Check aims to evaluate the above-mentioned legal migration directives in light of the criteria 
of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and – more generally – EU added value. The notions of 
effectiveness and efficiency include individual and societal impacts, as well as full compliance with 
fundamental rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and international labour standards. The Fitness 
Check will pay particular attention to improving existing rules “in light of the need to prevent and 
combat labour exploitation which is common among migrant workers”.50 The Commission has also 
prioritised “the effective enforcement of the relevant EU acquis to ensure the protection of the rights of 
                                                        
44 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence for the purpose 
of paid employment and self-employment activities, COM(2001) 386 final, Brussels, 11.7.2001. 
45 S. Carrera, A. Geddes and E. Guild (2017), op. cit. 
46 J.-C. Juncker (2014), “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change”, 
Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July. 
47 European Commission Staff Working Document (2015), Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
(REFIT) - State of Play and Outlook - REFIT Scoreboard (SWD(2015) 110 final), annexed to Better Regulation for 
Better Results - An EU agenda, Communication (COM(2015)215 final). See also European Commission (2015), 
Better Regulation Guidelines, Chapter on “Evaluations”, p. 50-66, SWD (2017) 350. 
48 European Commission (2015), A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13.5.2015, p. 14. 
49 European Commission (2014), Smart Regulation in the European Union, COM (2010) 543 final.  
50 European Commission (2016), Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing 
Legal Avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197, 6.4.2016, Brussels, p. 18. 
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the migrants who are working in the EU, in particular to prevent labour exploitation, irrespective of 
their legal status.”51  
The Fitness Check was officially launched at the beginning of 2017. The European Commission is still 
working on the Fitness Check as of this writing (June 2018) and a final product is expected in the second 
half of 2018.52 One of the main reasons behind this delay is the current state of negotiations on the 
revision of the EU Blue Card Directive as proposed by the Commission in June 2016,53 which is proving 
to be particularly difficult in the Council.  
Since 2004, the European Parliament has been a co-legislator in the policy area of legal and labour 
migration. The Lisbon Treaty further consolidated that role. The Parliament adopted in 2016 a 
Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean that calls for a ‘holistic approach’ on migration in the 
EU.54 The Resolution underlined the need to develop a ‘comprehensive labour migration policy’ in line 
with Europe 2020 strategic goals.55 It highlighted that the current EU’s legal framework on TCN workers 
remains fragmented “as it focuses on specific categories of workers, rather than generally all migrant 
workers”. 56 It concluded that in the long run “the Union will need to establish more general rules 
governing the entry and residence for third country nationals seeking employment to fill gaps identified 
in the Union labour market”.57  
The second half of 2019 will see the 20th anniversary of the Tampere Programme. It will also coincide 
with the taking over of a new Finnish Presidency of the EU in a decisive phase in European integration, 
characterised by European Parliament elections and inter-institutional renewal at EU levels. It is 
therefore a critical moment to take stock of the progress made and obstacles encountered in building a 
common EU migration policy since 1999, and to assess the added value and individual and economic 
‘costs and benefits’ that have emerged from EU policy in the domains of legal and economic 
immigration.  
 
II. Objectives and scope of the Research Paper 
This Research Paper feeds into ‘the cost of non-Europe’ (CoNE) in the area of migration which is part of 
a wider CoNE on the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The Research paper was requested 
by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE 
Committee). The main rationale of this Research Paper is to critically examine the extent to which EU 
policy and law have ‘added value’.  
The notions of ‘gaps’ and ‘barriers’ will be understood to mean respectively: 1) Gaps -  the areas or 
situations not covered by EU law, and 2) Barriers - the administrative or practical obstacles faced by 
individuals while trying to exercise the rights and guarantees provided by the EU’s legal migration 
                                                        
51 Ibid. 
52 European Commission, DG HOME (2017) Legal Migration Fitness Check: Consultation Strategy, Version as of 
01.02.2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/legal_migration/fitness_check_legal_migration_-_consultation_strategy_1.2.2017_en.pdf). 
53 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM(2016)378 final, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016. 
54 European Parliament (2016), Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for 
a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
55 Ibid., para. 121. 
56 Ibid., para. 122. 
57 Ibid., para. 123. 
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acquis. The Research Paper investigates the impacts of these gaps and barriers on individuals and 
society, some of which are then translated into monetised figures.  
As with the Commission’s Fitness Check, the material scope of analysis focuses on the seven main 
directives on legal and labour migration outlined in Table 4 below, as well as other relevant and related 
EU policy documents and their transposition deadlines. Table 2 demonstrates how only four of these 
seven directives contain provisions that deal with ‘first entry’ conditions for third-country nationals. 
Each of these present different deadlines for national transposition. Concerning the geographical scope, 
it is important to underline that the UK, Ireland and Denmark have not participated in their adoption 
and are not bound by them.58 Only, Ireland opted into the 2005 Researchers Directive.  
 
Table 4. Types of EU legal migration directives 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
III. Research questions  
The Research Paper assesses the individual and economic impacts that the current worker-by-worker 
or sectoral approach guiding EU legal and economic migration policy experts in light of international, 
regional and EU human rights and labour standards on fairness and non-discrimination.60 What are the 
impacts of the current state of affairs in EU action and cooperation on legal migration? Our research 
places special emphasis on the individual impacts as experienced by the TCNs working in the EU, as 
                                                        
58 S. Peers, V. Moreno-Lax, M. Garlick and E. Guild (2012), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): 
Second Revised Edition, Volume 2: EU Immigration Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
59 In this Research Paper, we consider Family Reunification Directive, not as a first entry directive, as we analyse 
conditions on which TCNs can reunify with the family member that has been earlier admitted under one of the 
’first entry’ directives. 
60 The material scope of the paper aims to include neither the residence or employment conditions of refugees and 
asylum seekers, which fall under the so-called ‘Common European Asylum System’ (CEAS), nor a detailed 
assessment of xenophobia, racism and discrimination, which was covered by other studies commissioned by the 
EPRS. 
Is this ’first 
entry’ 
directive’? 
EU directives (all covered by the Fitness Check) Transposition 
deadline 
No Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) 25.12.2013 
No Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) 03.10.2005 
No59 Long-Term Residents Directive (2003/19/EC) 23.01.2006 
Yes EU Blue Card Directive (2009/05/EC), Commission proposal 
for revision in June 2016 (COM(2016) 378 final) 
19.06.2011 
Yes Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU) 30.09.2016 
Yes Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive (2014/66/EU) 29.11.2016 
Yes Students and Researchers Directive ((EU)2016/801 – recast) 23.05.2018 
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well as the economic impacts on receiving societies. It explores this question in light of the following set 
of four sub-questions: 
1) What is the current ‘state of play’ in EU action and cooperation in the area of legal migration? This 
question aims to identify and map the main EU legislative instruments and policy measures adopted 
since 1999 in this domain. The particular attention is paid to the labour migration as the key area 
allowing for the cross-comparison among different legislative and policy initiatives. 
2) What are the international, regional and EU standards (benchmarks) in the area of legal migration? 
What are remaining gaps and barriers in EU legislation and across legislative instruments? This question 
aims to identify the potential incoherencies between EU legal migration acquis and international, 
regional and EU standards, in particular in the area of labour migration. 
3) What impacts do these gaps and barriers have on individuals in terms of protecting their fundamental 
rights and freedom and what is the economic impact? 
a) How are the rights and freedoms of third country nationals legally residing in a Member State 
impacted by the EU legal migration acquis and policy? When answering this question particular 
attention is placed on a different sets of working conditions for perceived or assigned skill levels as 
framed by differing third-country national statuses. 
b) What are the economic impacts of these gaps and barriers in the EU? When answering this 
question, we focus on the differences between third-country nationals and EU citizens and the extent 
to which economic benefits could be generated by closing the gaps.  
4) What are the policy options for future EU action and intervention? What are their potential costs and 
benefits and feasibility? This research question aims identifying and further developing the different 
policy options, at the EU level and within the LIBE Committee’s competence, for addressing the gaps 
and barriers in EU action and cooperation in the area of legal migration. This Section pays particular 
focus on policy options that are consistent and compliant with the EU constitutional duties of fairness 
and equality prescribed by EU Treaties and the explored standard for review stemming from European 
and international human rights and labour standards. 
Annex 1 provides a detailed overview of the interdisciplinary methodology and full array of data-
gathering methods implemented during the research in pursuit of answering the above questions. 
Research consisted not only of desk research of the key legal and policy sources but also 15 semi-
structured interviews with representatives at the European institutions, international organisations and 
selected member states. This was complemented with an e-questionnaire that was answered by 61 
respondents representing civil society, trade unions and employers’ organisations across nine EU 
member states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the 
Netherlands.  
An additional methodological tool used was the Delphi method, which entailed a closed-door 
discussion with 13 experts on legal migration who identified main issues/challenges and discussed 
various policy options for the future of the EU in the area of legal migration (see Annex 1).  
As a guiding narrative, the Research Paper places special emphasis on the costs and benefits (impacts) 
as experienced by TCNs living and working in the EU, as well as those for receiving societies. It 
addresses the concept of ‘cost of non-Europe’ beyond whether there is a true common policy. It uses a 
notion of ‘Europe’ of which the question of whether current EU policy on legal migration adheres to the 
EU’s own constitutional law and values of the rule of law and fundamental rights is essential. The ‘cost 
of non-Europe' is not limited to secondary law. Thus, the Research Paper also covers broader EU action 
and cooperation to make sure the values of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights which 
are common to the EU and its Member States are upheld. It explores the extent to which we see ‘non-
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Europe’, and the costs that ‘non-Europe’ generates. The Research Paper moves in this way beyond the 
current state of play, which has too often tended to be ‘state-centric’ or focused mainly on ‘costs and 
benefits’, as framed by ministries of interior, and not on the main actors affected by EU legislation and 
(non)action – namely third-country nationals themselves and receiving societies more broadly.  
The Research Paper thus elaborates on costs resulting from current gaps and barriers as experienced by 
TCNs (individual costs) and those receiving Member States (economic costs). The policy options are 
embedded in the ongoing academic and policy debates over what actions the EU should take in the area 
of legal migration.61 The Research Paper reflects the feasibility and EU’s added value of these policy 
options, and shows the main cost and benefit drivers of each, though it does not intend to put a ‘price 
tag’ on any of them. More important is framing of the future of ‘legal migration’ and the EU. 
  
                                                        
61 See in particular S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (2014), “The next generation of EU Labour Migration Policy: 
Conclusions and Recommendations”, in S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds), Rethinking Attractiveness of EU 
Labour Immigration Policies: Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and Beyond, Brussels: CEPS; S. Carrera, 
A. Geddes and E. Guild (2017), “Conclusions an Recommendations: Towards A Fair EU Agenda Facilitating Legal 
Channels for Labour Mobility”, in S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds), Pathways to Legal Migration 
into the EU: Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, Brussels: CEPS.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF EU LEGAL MIGRATION POLICY 
 
 
1.1. The ambivalent building of a common legal migration policy 
The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty constituted a historic step in European cooperation on migration. This 
Treaty transferred migration policy from an intergovernmental method of cooperation (formerly known 
as ‘Third Pillar’ under the Treaty on the European Union) to shared competence between the European 
Community and the Member States. The ‘Europeanisation’ of migration policy occurred during a 
transitory period when all migration policy domains were subject to the co-decision procedure (with 
the European Parliament as co-legislator) and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) inside the Council, with 
the exception of ‘legal and economic migration’, which was governed by unanimity rule and 
consultation with the European Parliament until 2004.62 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Tampere Programme outlined a roadmap of policy priorities and 
concrete policy actions and deadlines for their achievement. The Programme covered the period 
between 1999 and 2004. It identified the need to build a common EU immigration policy that would be 
fair towards TCNs residing legally in the territory of EU Member States. The Programme also enshrined 
a notion of ‘integration’ mainly focused on ensuring rights and obligations to TCNs comparable to those 
of EU citizens and fostering non-discrimination and measures against racism and xenophobia. The 
European Council identified the need to formulate national legislation on the conditions for admission 
and residence of TCNs, “based on a shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments 
within the Union, as well as the situation in the countries of origin.”  
                                                        
62 Council Decision of 22 December 2004; 2004/927/EC; Official Journal L 396, 31.12.04, pp. 0045-0046. 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The EU sectoral approach to legal migration leads to unequal treatment among different 
administrative categories (statuses) of third-country nationals, and between all these workers and 
EU citizens.  
• The current state of EU legal migration policy institutionalises a hierarchy of rights, labour 
and living conditions that differ according to the extent to which the worker falls within a 
‘highly qualified/skilled’ status and is perceived to be ‘more useful’ to EU Member States’ 
economies, in comparison to other migrant worker statuses.  
• Such presumptions about EU’s attractiveness leads to institutionalised forms of differential 
treatment that on the one hand are deeply embedded in EU policy, but on the other hand – 
challenges the EU’s principles of non-discrimination and fairness.  
• The fragmentation that characterises EU policy, and the existence of parallel national schemes 
and systems, prevents the existence of a common level playing field of third-country worker 
rights and labour conditions in the EU.  
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On these bases, it requested the European Commission to put forward legislative proposals. The 
response by the European Commission to this call, as advanced in the 2000 Communication on a 
Community Immigration Policy,63 followed a ‘two–tier approach’. 
 
First, a proposal for an ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) which would be complementary to the 
adoption of an ordinary legislative framework.64 The OMC would consist of an EU coordination tool 
led by the Commission and allowing for the exchange of information (‘best practices’) and the 
promotion of gradual convergence between Member States’ labour migration policies. The Council 
would produce multi-annual guidelines that would be translated into ‘concrete actions’ in national 
action plans. They would be subject to an evaluation method (peer review) through the establishment 
of EU networks of national officials and ‘experts’ on an annual basis. The Commission would prepare 
annual synthesis reports on common ‘problems and concerns’, and identify areas where ‘EU solutions’ 
would be required to deal with the former.65  
Second, the enactment of EU legislation in the form of the 2001 Proposal for a Directive covering 
conditions of entry and residence for employment/self-employment of all categories of third-country 
nationals.66 The proposal aimed at laying down common definitions, criteria and procedures regarding 
the conditions of entry and residence, and a common catalogue of rights, to all TCNs holding a common 
EU residence permit for purposes of both paid employment and self-employed economic activities.67 
None of the two Commission initiatives was successful in the Council. Representatives of the ministries 
of interior did not manage to find any consensus on either of these proposals, which inextricably led to 
the formal withdrawal of the 2001 proposal for a directive. According to the UK House of Lords EU 
Select Committee, “The measure failed to make progress because of lack of support from the Member 
States, for whom the right to decide on who should be admitted for employment and in what numbers 
has always been a politically sensitive issue.”68 
That notwithstanding, rival national interests did not stall the institutional journey of EU labour and 
legal migration policies.69 The Commission launched a public consultation on the way forward with the 
                                                        
63 European Commission, Communication on a Community Immigration Policy COM(2000) 757, 22.11.2000. 
64 European Commission, Communication on an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration 
Policy, COM(2001) 387, Brussels, 11.7.2001.  
65 For a critical overview and analysis refer to S. Carrera (2008), In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between 
Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the EU, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
66 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employment activities, COM(2001) 386 final, Brussels, 11.7.2001. 
67 The proposal foresaw that holders of a “residence permit – worker” would enjoy the same treatment in substance 
as citizens of the Union at least with regard to certain basic rights (working conditions, access to vocational training, 
recognition of diploma, social security including healthcare, access to goods and services which are available to the 
public, including housing and trade union rights). See Article 11 of the proposal. The Proposal for Directive stated, 
”The latter catalogue of rights is aligned with the catalogue of rights proposed in Article 12 of the Commission 
proposal for a draft Directive on long-term resident third-country nationals but – in line with the principle that that 
rights of third-country nationals should be incremental with their length of stay – less exhaustive”. 
68 UK House of Lords, EU Select Committee, Economic Migration to the EU, 14th Report 2005-2006 Session, London, 
p. 31 (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/58/58.pdf). See also S. Carrera and M. 
Formisano (2005), “An EU Approach to Labour Migration – What is the Added Value and the Way Ahead?”, CEPS 
Working Document No. 232, CEPS, Brussels, October. 
69 S. Carrera, A. Geddes and E. Guild (2017), Conclusions and Recommendations: Towards a Fair Agenda 
Facilitating Legal Channels for Labour Mobility, in S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds), Pathways 
towards Legal Migration into the EU: Reappraising Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, CEPS Paperback, Brussels, pp. 
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publication in 2004 of a Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration. The Green 
Paper addressed the ‘added value’ of, and the most appropriate form for, EU rules governing the 
admission and residence of TCNs in the field of employment.70 Several respondents to the open 
consultation procedure expressed concerns about the suggested sectoral step, featuring a ‘worker-by-
worker approach’. At that time this included the European Parliament, which was of the opinion that 
“this legislation should define an overall regulatory framework of reference” (emphasis added).71 The 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) also expressed its concerns about the implementation 
of a ‘sectoral approach’ (geared towards highly qualified TCNs) as it would be discriminatory in 
nature.72  
Since then the Commission moved towards the implementation of what has been called in the academic 
literature a ‘partitioning strategy’, i.e. splitting its original ‘horizontal’ approach into several proposals 
covering different categories of third-country nationals.73 The resulting picture was outlined in the 2005 
Policy Plan on Legal Migration,74 which laid down the foundations of the current forms of EU’s legal 
and labour migration policy, which is explained in Section 1.3 below. The Commission presented two 
packages of proposals. The first one,  in 2007 covered highly qualified workers and a single permit for 
TCNs to reside and work in the EU, providing a common set of rights and the second one in 2010 - 
seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees. Such a sectoral approach has been identified by the 
literature as the official ‘kick-off’ of the emergence of a hierarchical, differentiated and obscure EU legal 
system on labour migration that accords a higher degree of rights and working conditions to third-
country nationals falling under the legal status of ‘highly qualified or skilled’.75 
 
1.2. The ‘Lisbonisation’ of EU Legal Migration Policy and the European Parliament’s Role 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 constituted a fundamental step in European integration 
on AFSJ. It consolidated the above-mentioned 2004 Green Paper moving EU cooperation on legal 
migration to the Community method and recognised the European Parliament’s role as ‘co-owner’ of 
EU migration policy agenda.76 The Treaty not only reconfirmed the shared competence between the EU 
and its Member States in legal migration. It also incorporated in its legal foundations the Tampere 
Programme’s milestones and principles.  
The EU legal migration acquis is based on Title V TFEU titled “AFSJ”. Article 67.2 TFEU establishes that 
the Union shall establish a common immigration policy “which is fair towards third country nationals”. 
                                                        
176-182. 
70 European Commission, Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration, COM(2004) 811 final, 
Brussels, 1.11.2005. See also Carrera and Formisano (2005), op. cit. 
71 European Parliament Resolution on an EU approach to managing economic migration (COM(2004)0811 – 
2005/2059(INI)), point 26. 
72 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing 
economic migration (COM(2004) 811 final) (2005/C 286/05), point 2.1.4 
73 A. Geddes and A. Niemann (2015), “Introduction: Conceptualising EU policy on labour migration”, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 523–535. 
74 European Commission, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669, Brussels, 21.12.2005. See also Carrera 
(2007). 
75 S. Carrera, A. Faure Atger, E. Guild and D. Kostakopoulou (2011), “Labour Immigration Policy in the EU: A 
Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 240, CEPS, Brussels.  
76 S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin (2013), “The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament: Assessing Progress, 
Shortcomings and Challenges for Democratic Accountability in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, Study 
for the European Parliament, DG IPOL, Brussels. 
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The precise legal basis for EU legal and economic immigration directives can be found in Article 79 
TFEU, which reaffirms the long-standing EU commitment to developing a common policy founded on 
the fair treatment paradigm. Article 79.2 TFEU calls on the EU to adopt measures including conditions 
of entry and residence, and the definition of the rights of TCNs legally residing in the EU, “including 
the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States”.  
As we will study in Chapter 2 of this Research Paper, the implementation of this provision must be read 
in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). The EU CFR enshrines fairness, non-
discrimination and equivalence of working conditions as fundamental rights applicable to every worker 
(irrespective of nationality and migration status), as well as international and regional human rights and 
labour standards. 
The Lisbon Treaty included a new Article 79.5 TFEU, which grants EU Member States exclusive 
competence to determine volumes of admission or quotas for purposes of employment and self-
employment. Nevertheless, this same article has left the door open for the EU to legislate all the 
remaining facets that characterise legal migration policies for economic or labour considerations.77 
Except in determining ‘volumes of admission’, Article 79 TFEU provides a window for the EU to move 
forward on the adoption of shared standards dealing with other administrative aspects of labour 
migration. As Peers et al. (2012) have highlighted, this provision “would be meaningless unless the EU 
had a competence to regulate such migration in the first place”.78 
While the literature has underlined the room for manoeuvre left to EU Member States during the 
transposition and implementation phases of the EU legal migration directives,79 the extent to which 
Member States’ competence on admission remains intact must be read carefully. The set of EU directives 
presented in Section 1.3 below provide a clear ‘ground floor’ of EU standards and norms, some of which 
present provisions benefiting from ‘direct effect’, and below which EU Member States cannot venture 
in their domestic policies. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg has helped 
in clarifying some their provisions in a number of judgments, further fine-tuning and clarifying the 
actual scope of the EU legal migration directives.  
This has been the case for instance with respect to ‘admission conditions’ or the extent to which these 
directives oblige Member States to grant a ‘right to admission’ after certain criteria are met by the 
applicant. In Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council the Court held that Member States are 
required to grant family reunion upon the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the Family 
Reunification Directive 2003/86.80 Similarly, in Case C-491/13 Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, the CJEU stated that the conditions for admission enshrined in Students Directive 2004/114 
were exhaustive and therefore did not allow any extra conditionality by Member States.81 
Furthermore, a less well-known – yet equally crucial – legal base in the area of labour migration is Article 
153 TFEU, which falls under the Title of “Social Policy”. Article 153.1 TFEU provides that with a view 
to achieving goals outlined in Article 151 TFEU, namely the promotion of employment, improved living 
and working conditions and combating social exclusion, the EU “shall support and complement the 
                                                        
77 Carrera, Geddes and Guild (2017), op. cit. 
78 S. Peers, V. Moreno-Lax, M. Garlick and E. Guild (2012), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): 
Second Revised Edition, Volume 2: EU Immigration Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 13. 
79 H. Verschueren (2016), “Employment and Social Security Rights of Third Country Labour Migrants under EU 
Law: An Incomplete Patchwork of Legal Protection”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 373-
408.  
80 Case C-540/03, European Parliament v Council, European Court of Justice judgment of 27.6.2006. 
81 Case C-491/13, Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, European Court of Justice judgment of 
10.09.2014.  
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activities of the Member States in the...(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally 
residing in Union territory” (emphasis added). Article 153.2 TFEU has served as the foundation of EU 
directives such as Directive 89/391 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health of workers at work, or Directive 2008/94 on the protection of employees in the event 
of insolvency of the employer. Both directives exclude from their material scope any differential 
treatment based on residence status. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the 2014 
Tümer Case confirmed that Directive 2008/94 is not limited to EU nationals and that it covers 
undocumented workers.82  
The democratic scrutiny of the enactment of a common EU legal migration policy through the 
recognition of the role of the European Parliament as co-legislator was not a result of the Lisbon Treaty, 
but preceded it to 2004. It was only then that EU Member States agreed to apply ‘in full’ the co-decision 
procedure – currently known as ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ in the Lisbon Treaty – to this policy 
area. Since then, the European Parliament (both the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee 
(LIBE) and the Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL)) has played a fundamental role as 
co-legislator in this domain.  
The European Parliament has consistently called for an overall regulatory framework.83 The 
Parliament’s kind of contributions have been reflected during the negotiations and the final forms of all 
the main EU directives covering labour migration. It is noticeable that during the negotiations the 
positions between the Commission, the Council (Ministries of Interior) representatives and the 
European Parliament were rather opposing, particularly as regards the equality of treatment provisions. 
This was the case in relation to the position held by the EMPL Committee during the negotiations of the 
proposal for a directive on ICTs. The interviews have revealed that the EMPL Committee took a more 
‘employment and social inclusion’ approach to this discussion, in comparison to LIBE, as the former was 
particularly, and consistently, concerned about the equality of treatment provisions in these directives. 
The EMPL Committee emphasised the need to reduce the differentiation of rights and inequality of 
treatment applicable to different categories of third-country workers, chiefly those for seasonal 
employment, in comparison to mobile EU citizens, native workers and highly qualified third-country 
workers.84 
  
                                                        
82 Case C-311/13, Tümer, EU:C:2014:23337; K. Groenendijk (2015), “Equal Treatment of Workers from third 
countries: The added value of the Single Permit Directive”, ERA Forum, Springer. 
83 European Parliament (2016), European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
84 J. Fudge and P. Herzfeld Olsson (2014), “The EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration Controls Meet 
Labour Rights”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 439-466; see also P. Minderhoud and T. 
Strik (eds) (2015), The Single Permit Directive: Central Themes and Problem Issues, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. 
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1.3. The main components of the EU sectoral approach to legal and labour migration 
Since 2004, the EU has adopted several sectoral EU directives covering the conditions for admission and 
residence, and the rights, of third-country nationals in the Union.85 The result is what Verschueren has 
qualified as a ‘patchwork’ of several EU legislative acts and instruments, each applying to different 
categories of TCNs.86 For the purposes of this Research Paper, we focus on the seven EU directives 
falling under the scope of ‘legal and labour immigration policy’ and Article 79 TFEU.  
As Figure 4 below illustrates, all seven directives provide provisions relevant for employment-related 
activities. However, only the following four EU directives on legal migration provide common rules 
and standards for the admission and residence of specific categories of third-country nationals: the EU 
Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC);87 the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive (2014/66/EU);88 the 
Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU);89 and the Students and Researchers Directive (2016/801).90 
The Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) does not provide for ‘first entry’ admission conditions.91  
Furthermore, the EU Directives on the long-term residence status (2003/109/EC)92 and family 
reunification (2003/86/EC),93 while not qualifying as legal acts covering access for employment-related 
reasons, provide certain clauses of direct relevance for work-related rights and conditions. The Directive 
for Family Reunification (2003/86/EC) provides a legal entry for TCN family members. It defines rights 
of family members and the rules for the sponsors, and – despite its many limitations – enshrines for the 
first time an EU right to family reunification. The Long-Term Residents Directive (2003/109/EC) allows 
TCNs who have legally and continuously resided in a Member State for five years to obtain “EU long-
term resident” status and to enjoy rights equivalent to those of EU citizens. 
 
                                                        
85 While falling outside the scope of this Research Paper, it is worth signalling that this ‘internal’ policy and legal 
framework has developed in parallel to third-country cooperation instruments and agreements, often denominated 
as the external dimensions of EU migration policy. This has added further complexity to the issue via the adoption 
of a series of EU international agreements, such as Association Agreements, or policy (non-legally binding) tools 
like the so-called ‘Mobility Partnerships’. See K. Eisele, 2014b. 
86 Verschueren (2016), op. cit. 
87 Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
highly qualified employment, 25 May 2009, OJ L 155, 18.6.2009, pp. 17–29. 
88 Directive 2014/66/EU on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of 
an intra-corporate transfer, 15 May 2014, OJ L 157, 27.5.2014, pp. 1–22. 
89 Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers, 26 February 2014, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 375–390. 
90 Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing, 11 
May 2016, OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, pp. 21–57. 
91 Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside 
and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally 
residing in a Member State, 13 December 2011, OJ L 343, 23.12.2011, pp. 1–9. 
92 Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 25 
November 2003, OJ L 16, 23.1.2004, pp. 44–53. 
93 Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, pp. 12–18  
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Figure 4. Typology of EU instruments on employment of third-country nationals and their rights  
 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
 
1.3.1. The EU Blue Card, Intra-Corporate Transferees and Researchers 
The EU Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC) aims to entitle highly qualified migrant workers with rights 
similar to those of EU citizens and provides the opportunity to obtain EU citizenship, though many gaps 
remain (see Chapter 2 of this Research Paper for a more detailed overview of this directive). It 
established a common fast-track and flexible procedure for the admission of those third-country 
nationals considered to be ‘highly qualified employees’ and their family members.  
The academic literature reflects concerns about the disparity of treatment resulting from the system 
devised in the EU Blue Card Directive. In the name of making the EU ‘more attractive’, the EU Blue 
Card Directive has been said to institutionalise an unjustified differential treatment between those few 
TCNs who meet the conditions for being a EU Blue Card Holder and the remaining third-country 
nationals, resulting in discrimination in labour rights and working conditions.94  
One of the political priorities of the Juncker Commission was the revision of the EU Blue Card Directive, 
as it was considered ‘ineffective’ in light of unsatisfactory Member States’ implementation and the very 
few total number of EU Blue Cards issued. The Commission presented a new legislative proposal in 
2016.95 Both the Commission and the European Parliament, following the findings of the Commission’s 
Impact Assessment,96 aimed to streamline the directive to increase its EU ‘added value’. The proposal’s 
                                                        
94 See for instance Frank and Spehar (2010); see also E. Guild (2011), “Equivocal Claims? Ambivalent Controls? 
Labour Migration Regimes in the European Union”, in E. Guild and S. Mantu (eds), Constructing and Imagining 
Labour Migration: Perspectives of Control from Five Continents, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 207–228; B. Fridriksdottir (2017), 
What Happened to Equality? The Construction of the Right to Equal Treatment of Third Country Nationals in European 
Union Law on Labour Migration, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 
95 European Commission (2016), Proposal for Directive, on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016. 
96 European Commission (2016), Communication on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (“EU 
Blue Card”), COM(2014) 287 final, Brussels, 22.5.2014; European Parliament (2015), European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Briefing Implementation Appraisal, The EU Blue Card Directive, December 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/558766/EPRS_BRI%282015%29558766_EN.pdf). 
Admission of Specific Categories of Third-Country Workers (Four 
Sectoral Directives: Blue Card, Seasonal, ICTs and 
Trainees/Researchers) 
Access to Employment Provisions in Family Reunification and 
Long-Term Residence Status Directives
Single Permit Directive (No admission conditions)
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main objective was to limit the running of parallel national schemes, which was previously identified 
by the academic literature as one of the main sources of inefficiency of the EU Blue Card Directive.97  
The new proposal also seeks to increase possibilities for intra-EU mobility and reduce the current 
admission and residency criteria. Both goals include, among other innovations: lowering salary 
threshold/levels, reducing options for conducting national labour market tests, shortening periods of 
notification and reducing administrative fees, and specific provisions for facilitating family member 
residence permits, access to the labour market and long-term residence status. 
At the time of writing the negotiations on the EU Blue Card Directive are ongoing and seem to be frozen 
on a number of essential aspects,98 including one of the revision EU Blue Card key objectives, i.e. the 
goal of increasing the ‘harmonising effect’ in key components of the EU Blue Card Scheme through the 
adoption of ‘an EU-wide admission system’. The Commission’s initiative would mean that, unlike the 
current EU Blue Card system, EU Member States would not be allowed to keep their parallel national 
schemes that target highly skilled and issue national permits. The goal would be to establish a ‘truly 
EU-wide scheme for highly qualified’, where Member States would be required to grant only an EU 
Blue Card and not a national permit. This is proven to be one of the most controversial aspects in the 
Council, with Member States wanting to keep their national schemes intact. 
Two other very important directives: the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive (2014/66/EU), which  
covers highly qualified TCNs (and their families) employed outside the EU by international 
corporations and allows for ‘transferring’ such workers to an EU Member State branch for a maximum 
of three years; the Students and Researchers Directive (2016/801), which covers the conditions of entry 
and residence of TCNs for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange 
schemes or educational projects and au pairing. The Students and Researchers Directive was a recast of 
Directives 2004/114/EC on students and 2005/71/EC on researchers, which were merged together. 
Researchers are understood to be ‘highly qualified workers’. This directive also covers au pairs but is 
understood as a cultural exchange programme rather than a legal channel for migrant domestic 
workers.  
In 2016, EU Member States issued approximately 56,000 permits (6.5% of all work-related permits) to 
the category of highly skilled workers that include EU schemes –  under Blue Card Directive (1% of all 
work-related permits), Researchers (1.3% of all work-related permits) and under national schemes for 
highly skilled (4.2% of all work-related permits) of all work-related permits to highly skilled workers 
and researchers using this EU scheme. 99 Most permits were issued by the Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden and France. While two EU directives – the EU Blue Card Directive and the Students 
and Researchers Directive – had been specifically developed to attract ‘highly skilled migrants’ to the 
EU, Figures 5 and 6 below illustrate that most EU Member States (with the exception of Germany and 
France) use their own national schemes for highly skilled migrants.  
It is important to highlight for the purpose of the Research Paper that the actual total number of third-
country nationals benefiting from these national highly skilled schemes is equally low in total numbers 
when compared to the substantially higher total number of permits issued for other ‘skill levels’ (see 
Figure 5). In the written comments drafted by the Commission in response to the final draft of this 
Research Paper it was added, that: “It is important to recognise here that several EU MS do not 
                                                        
97 K. Eisele (2013), “Why Come Here If I Can Go There? Assessing the ’Attractiveness’ of the EU Blue Card Directive 
for Highly Qualified Immigrants”, CEPS Working Document No. 60, Brussels. 
98 www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-revision-of-the-
blue-card-directive.  
99 Eurostat (2018) Eurostat Databasse, migr_resocc Table for 2016. (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-
and-managed-migration/data/database).  
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distinguish between different skill levels, so the data on national skilled workers is partial”.100 The 
European Commission’s 2016 Impact Assessment accompanying the new EU Blue Card proposal 
showed how “the very low overall numbers of permits issued to highly skilled foreign workers clearly 
show that neither the national schemes nor the EU Blue Card – and the two combined – are sufficiently 
effective in attracting highly skilled workers”.101  
Member States interviewed for the purpose of this Research Paper argued that national schemes better 
meet the needs of individual Member States. For instance, in the Netherlands – the largest receiving 
country for highly skilled migrants in the EU based on the number of issued residence permits – 
employers have to fulfil only one criterion to hire a highly skilled migrant – the wage threshold, which 
is lower than the Blue Card’s threshold, without additional requirements, such as a labour market test 
or skill recognition. Interviews have revealed that in the Netherlands employers willing to employ TCNs 
need to be registered as ‘Trusted Employers’ and can be checked by the relevant authorities.102 Similarly, 
Belgian and Polish authorities claimed they have adequate national schemes for meeting their labour 
market needs.103 Interviews with representatives from Portugal and Belgium revealed that they are 
more open to having a more harmonised EU scheme, provided that it would not be too burdensome on 
the applicants and domestic administrations.104 
 
 
Figure 5. Issued residence permits for highly skilled workers and researchers 
 
Source: Eurostat, migr_resocc. 
                                                        
100 European Commission (2018) Comments of DG HOME B1 Unit on this Research Paper, received on 11 of 
December, 2018, p. 4.  
101 Commission Staff Working Document (2016), Impact Assessment accompanying Proposal for Directive, on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, 
COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016, SWD(2016) 193 final, p. 7. 
102 Interview with Dutch Official, 12.03.2018.  
103 Interview with Belgium Official, 07.02.2018 and Interview with Polish Official, 26.03.2018. 
104 Interview with Belgium Official, 07.02.2018 and Interview with Portuguese Official, 12.02.2018. 
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Figure 6. Issued residence permits for highly skilled workers and researchers in 2016, by Member State 
 
Source: Eurostat, migr_resocc. 
1.3.2. Seasonal Workers  
The proposal for the EU Directive on Seasonal Workers initially aimed at “certain sectors, mainly 
agriculture, building and tourism, where many immigrants work illegally under precarious 
conditions.”105  In the negotiations, there were invoked certain prerequisites for the sector to be covered 
by the category of ‘seasonal work’. The sector has to include “well-defined jobs, normally fulfilling a 
traditional need in the Member State in question”.106 However, later it was decided to include a 
following definition:  
‘seasonal worker’ means a third-country national who retains his or her principal place of residence in a 
third country and stays legally and temporarily in the territory of a Member State to carry out an activity 
dependent on the passing of the seasons, under one or more fixed-term work contracts concluded directly 
between that third-country national and the employer established in that Member State.107 
Such definitions still provides a margin of appreciation for the  EU Member States to decide which are 
the sectors depending on ‘passing seasons’ and to exclude sectors such as construction and transport do 
not qualify under the category of ‘seasonal’ work. It was an issue of particular debate during the 
negotiations of the directive.  
The formal adoption of the directive took place over three and half years,108 which showed “Member 
States’ hesitance to open their labour markets for low skilled TCNs while recognizing the need for such 
workers”.109 According to the interviewees involved in these negotiations, consensus in the Council was 
                                                        
105 Proposal for a Directive of The European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379 final, Brussels, 13.7.2010.  
106 Ibid.  
107 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of 
entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, Article 3 
”Definitions”.  
108 Whereas the proposal for this directive on seasonal employment was tabled in July 2010, political agreement 
was achieved only in October 2013. 
109 C. Rijken (2014), “Preventing exploitation through the seasonal workers directive”, conference paper, UACES 
44th Annual Conference, Cork, 1-3 September (www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1401/rijken.pdf).  
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eventually reached after the public outcry over Bangladeshi strawberry pickers.110 Seasonal workers 
from Bangladesh  were shot by farm workers in Greece after they had demanded their pay, which was 
not received in some cases for more than six months – at least 27 were injured.111 This was just one of 
numerous cases of labour exploitation across the EU, including in countries with generally excellent 
human rights records, such as Sweden.112  
Looking at the aggregate numbers of issued permits for seasonal work (as classified by Eurostat) can be, 
however, misleading.113 For instance, in 2014-16, over 95% of all permits appear to have been issued by 
Poland.114 In an interview, a Polish official clarified that such permits are mainly issued to Ukrainian 
and Belarusian short-term migrants who fall under a specific national short-term migration scheme 
based on employer declarations (See Figure 7).115 In the written comments drafted by the Commission 
in response to the final draft of this Research Paper it was added, also that these numbers does not fall 
under Seasonal Workers Directive as “the Directive was adopted in 2014, deadline for transposition was 
September 2016, the first year of collection of statistics of authorisations issued under the Directive was 
2017 (they were published mid-2018).”116  
In 2016, apart from Poland, only Italy, Sweden, Spain, and France issued more than 1,000 seasonal work 
permits. Low take-up of the Seasonal Workers Directive by other Member States (only 12 EU countries 
have ever reported issuing a seasonal permit over 2008-16) relates to the low demand for such a scheme. 
For example, a Dutch official explained that seasonal work needs at the moment are satisfied by EU 
citizens who come from Central and Eastern Europe and therefore the Dutch quota for seasonal work is 
zero.117 A similar situation was reflected in Belgium and Poland, where seasonal needs in the 
agriculture, tourism and hospitality sectors are low.118 Such needs, however, were felt in Portugal, 
where tourism and agriculture are important sectors and depend on passing seasons.119 Moreover, 
Member States can regulate the admission of similar workers under their own national schemes. While 
parallel national schemes are not allowed under the Seasonal Workers Directive, Member States still 
resort to national rules in situations beyond the directive’s scope.  
 
                                                        
110 Interview with European Parliament, MEP active on legal migration  directives (1) ,  31.01.2018 and 
MEP active on legal migration directives (2) 28.02.2018. 
111 R. Patel, (2013), “Greek farm staff ‘shoot unpaid strawberry pickers’”, The Telegraph,  18 April 
(www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/10003992/Greek-farm-staff-shoot-unpaid-strawberry-
pickers.html).  
112 E. Geddie (2013) “The EU must do more to end the exploitation of seasonal workers”, Equal Times, 11 December 
(www.equaltimes.org/the-eu-must-do-more-to-end-the?lang=en#.Ww77eUiFOUk).  
113 As explained by Eurostat “Seasonal Workers data collection under Art 26 Directive 2014/36/EU” only began in 
2017 (see Eurostat, Residence permits (migr_res), Reference Metadata in Euro SDMX Metadata Structure (ESMS), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/migr_res_esms.htm).  
114 The authors highlight that it is not clear why Eurostat classifies these permits (which refer to a specific Polish 
scheme) under seasonal work, as Poland still has to transpose the Seasonal Workers Directive in 2018.  
115 Interview with Polish Official, 26.03.2018.  
116 European Commission (2018) Comments of DG HOME B1 Unit on this Research Paper, received on 11 of 
December, 2018, p. 5. 
117 Interview with Dutch Official, 12.03.2018. 
118 Interview with Belgium Official, 07.02.2018 and interview with Polish Official, 26.03.2018.  
119 Interview with Portuguese Official, 12.02.2018.  
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Figure 7. Issued residence permits for seasonal work 
 
Source: Eurostat, migr_resocc. 
 
1.3.3. Single Permit Directive  
The Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) establishes common EU rules for application for a single 
combined residence/employment permit. Most important, it contains equal treatment provisions for all 
third-country nationals who have this type of permit. It is referred to as a ‘framework’ or ‘horizontal’ 
directive because it covers third-country nationals who are also admitted to a Member State according 
to national migration law on various national schemes.  
In 2016, 22% of all issued permits fell under the Single Permit Directive.120 The number of permits varied 
across the EU (see Figure 8 below). The rather low number (if we expect that majority if not all permits 
to third country nationals to be issued via this scheme) of single permits could be linked to incorrect 
transposition and implementation of the directive. The countries that issue the highest percentage of 
single permits were among the first ones to comply – in Estonia, Latvia, France, Croatia and Sweden, 
single permits already represented over 80% of all issued permits. Those Member States with low 
percentages were, as of 2014-15, still receiving infringement notifications. Fifteen Member States were 
late in complying with the directive: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Spain, Slovenia and the Netherlands.  
As of 2015 the last infringement procedures were closed against Greece, Spain, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Spain, as they had eventually transposed the Single Permit Directive.121 As of 2017, Belgium remained 
the only Member State that failed to communicate the full transposition of the Single Permit Directive 
and was referred to the European Court of Justice.122 Interviews with a Belgian official revealed that 
                                                        
120 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single 
application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a 
Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State. 
121 European Commission, Database of Infringement Procedures in the area of Migration and Integration, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/eu-law-and-
monitoring/infringements_en?country=All&field_infringement_policy_tid=1628&field_infringement_number_ti
tle=/.   
122 European Commission (2017) Notification of Infringement to Belgium, No. 2014/0230 for failure to 
communicate national measures in full transposition of Directive 2011/98/EU - Single Permit, 13/07/2017. 
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issues arose due to the complex institutional set-up and separation of powers between federal, regional 
and communal levels: the federal level was responsible for residence permits and the regional level for 
work permits.123 The infringement procedures led to Belgium’s Sixth State Reform, which shifted the 
responsibilities for issuing single residence permits from the federal to the regional level.124 
Figure 8. Issued residence permits in 2016, by member state 
 
Source: Eurostat, migr_resfirst. 
                                                        
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1953_en.htm.  
123 Interview with Belgium Official, 07.02.2018.  
124 J. Maes (2017). 
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1.3. Codification and the ‘Fitness Check’ of EU legal migration policy 
The idea to adopt an ‘EU immigration code’ has been put forward by the Commission on several 
occasions. The first one was in the 2009 Communication on “An area of freedom, security and justice 
serving the citizen: Wider freedom in a safer environment”, which stipulated, 
The EU must strive for a uniform level of rights and obligations for legal immigrants comparable 
with that of European citizens. These rights, consolidated in an immigration code, and common rules 
to effectively manage family reunification are essential to maximise the positive effects of legal 
migration for the benefit of all stakeholders and will strengthen the Union’s competitiveness.125 
It reappeared in the Communication on “Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for 
Europe’s citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme” of April 2010,126 which 
stated, 
Further steps could be taken to codify and streamline the substantive conditions for admission, as 
well as of the rights of third country nationals. This would be a step towards a ‘single area of 
migration’, with the aim of facilitating intra-EU mobility of third country nationals, including 
through mutual recognition of national permits.127 
Despite these reiterated calls, an EU immigration code has not materialised. Member States’ hesitation 
to codify rules in this area have also by and large predominated. During the last eight years, no further 
reference to a ‘code’ has been made in any subsequent Commission policy document. The academic 
literature has however emphasised and recognised the positive effects that such consolidation and 
mainstreaming of the EU legal and labour migration acquis would entail. A code could provide not only 
a more ambitious harmonisation than the currently existing rules provide.128 It would have the potential 
to overcome the current sectoral nature of EU policy and seek to put into practice the EU fairness and 
non-discrimination principle through a more uniform level of rights and working conditions for all 
third-country nationals in light of international, regional and EU standards.129  
Instead, the Commission called for the above-mentioned ‘Legal Migration Fitness Check’, which is still 
currently in preparation. Still, some preliminary results can be highlighted based on publicly available 
                                                        
125 European Commission (2009), An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen: Wider freedom in a 
safer environment, COM(2009) 262, Brussels, 10.6.2009.  
126 European Commission (2010), Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens: Action 
Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, Brussels, 20.4.2010. 
127 Ibid., p. 4. 
128 S. Peers (2012), “An EU Immigration Code: Towards a Common Immigration Policy”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 33–61; S. Peers (2014), “An EU Immigration Code: Towards a Common 
Immigration Policy”, in S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds), Rethinking the Attractiveness of EU Labour 
Immigration Policies – Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and Beyond, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 
pp. 100–110. 
129 Kostakopoulou (2017), op. cit. 
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documents related to the ‘Fitness Check’,130 inputs and summaries of public consultations,131 as well as 
non-publicly disclosed information obtained during semi-structured interviews with European 
Commission and European Parliament representatives.132 When examining ‘internal coherency’ gaps in 
the EU legal migration acquis, the European Commission in its  preliminary finding of the Fitness Check 
has acknowledged that specific equal treatment provisions in each sectoral directive, as well as their 
specific restrictions, including the length of stay, re-entry, etc. leads to fragmentation and incoherences 
(see Chapter 3).  
The preliminary findings of the Commission’s Fitness Check confirm that the existing EU policy and 
legal setting dealing with the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs, and particularly those 
instruments covering employment-related aspects, are characterised by fragmentation, differentiation 
and multi-layered migratory statuses, with national schemes for highly skilled workers often running 
in parallel with EU Blue Card Scheme. The interviews confirmed that, this differentiation does not seem 
justified in all cases and sometimes seem to have been rather the result of negotiations with Member 
States in the Council of the EU.133 The interviewees representing European Parliament and International 
organisations went a step further, stating that there is a clear indication of the existence of unjustified 
differential treatment which amounts to unlawful discrimination against third-country nationals.134  
To conclude, one of the key findings emerging from this Chapter is that the EU sectoral approach to 
legal migration leads to inequality in the treatment of different administrative categories (statuses) of 
third-country workers, and between these workers and EU citizens. This leads to a ‘differential 
treatment by design’ in EU policy, according to which TCNs are subject to differential levels of labour 
standards and working conditions depending on whether they qualify and meet all the conditions for 
holding an EU highly qualified/skilled status. However, it was highlighted in the written comments 
drafted by the Commission in response to the final draft of this Research Paper that “this is generally 
not in line with the conclusions of the Fitness Check”.135 
This analysis begs the question as to whether the differential treatment which is left ‘by design’ in EU 
legal and labour migration policy is unjustified and is tantamount to unlawful discrimination. This is 
                                                        
130 European Commission (2015), “Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) – State of Play and 
Outlook – REFIT Scoreboard”, Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2015) 110 final, annexed to the 
Communication on Better Regulation for Better Results – An EU agenda, COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, 
19.5.2015; European Commission (2016), “Evaluation Roadmap – REFIT Legal Migration Fitness Check”, Working 
Document. (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/legal_migration/2016_home_199_fitnesscheck_legal_migration_en.pdf); European Commission 
(2017), “Fitness Check Legal Migration: Consultation Strategy”, Brussels, 01.02.2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/legal_migration/fitness_check_legal_migration_-
_consultation_strategy_1.2.2017_en.pdf).  
131 European Commission (2017), Official website for Public Consultation. 17.09.2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/consultation-european-unions-eu-legislation-legal-migration-non-eu-citizens-fitness-check-
eu_en); European Commission (2017), Legal Migration Fitness Check, Summary of Replies to the public 
consultation on legal migration by non-EU citizens (https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/legal-migration/summary_of_replies_en.pdf). 
132 Interviews with European Commission (1), (2), (3).  
133 Interviews with European Commission (1), (2), (3). 
134  Interview with International Labour Organisation 09.03.2018; Interview with UN Special 
Procedures/Rapporteur  23.02.2018. Interview with European Parliament, MEP active on legal migration  
directives (1) ,  31.01.2018 and MEP active on legal migration directives (2) 28.02.2018. 
135 European Commission (2018) Comments of DG HOME B1 Unit on this Research Paper, received on 11 of 
December, 2018, p. 5. 
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particularly crucial in cases where discrimination may become ‘systematic’ or institutional across EU 
Member States. Chapters 2 and 3 of this Research Paper examine the main benchmarks for conducting 
this ‘legality check’, and identify the main challenges and open questions that the current EU framework 
poses to international and regional human rights and labour standards.  
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CHAPTER 2:  INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND EU STANDARDS FOR 
ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL COSTS: IMPACTS ON RIGHTS AND LABOUR 
CONDITIONS OF THIRD-COUNTRY WORKERS 
 
 
Although this study covers ‘legal migration’ encompassing not only third country nationals coming for 
purposes of employment, but also for studies and family reunification. Nevertheless, the right to work 
and employment related conditions present us with the context for cross-comparison. Including the 
right to work for family members and for students that have graduated.  Therefore, labour related 
international, regional and EU standards are further elaborated. 
 
2.1. Key human rights and labour standards of migrant workers  
The lawfulness of inequality of treatment among TCNs, and between them and national workers, needs 
be determined in light of existing international, regional and EU human rights and labour standards.136 
One of the main principles of these standards is that of equality of treatment and non-discrimination 
regarding labour and working conditions among workers, and between foreign and national workers. 
Any limitation or derogation from that principle applied by States must be duly justified and 
proportionate, necessary and legitimate, both in goals and impacts. There are three major sources of 
standards that apply to every worker, including TCNs in the EU: 
First, international labour law: The International Labour Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) adopted a number of Conventions and Recommendations, which outline the 
minimum international standards in the area of labour rights. These international labour standards 
apply to TCNs unless they express otherwise.  
                                                        
136 This Chapter does not cover the well-developed international, regional and EU standards covering the rights of 
refugees, asylum seekers and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Equality of treatment and non-discrimination regarding labour and working conditions 
among workers, and between foreign and national workers, is a main principle in 
international, regional and EU human rights and labour standards. 
• Despite Member States’ varying ratification of international and regional instruments, these 
are considered sources of standards that can be employed as benchmarks for this study 
because they are designed to manage labour migration and ensure adequate protection for 
migrant workers. 
• Worker qualification under EU law takes precedence over immigration status at times of 
upholding the obligation to guarantee fair and just working conditions in the EU legal system. 
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Second, international human rights law: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and other international 
Covenants as well as the Universal Human Rights Declaration recognise a set of rights applicable to 
‘everyone’ under the effective jurisdiction of the country, including TCN workers and their family 
members. This includes the right to work, fair wages and adequate working conditions, and covers 
migrant workers.137 
Third, regional human rights law: This mainly relates to Council of Europe (CoE) standards, chiefly the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights, the (Revised) European Social Charter and the various human rights 
bodies monitoring the application of these instruments by States. This is the case, for instance, of the 
European Commission against Racism and Xenophobia (ECRI),138 whose main task is to combat racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance from the perspective of the protection 
of human rights, in the light of the ECHR, its additional protocols and related case law. The ECRI 
country monitoring mechanism includes amongst its themes national integration policies, including 
those concerning the labour market, from the perspective of non-discrimination. Other CoE instruments 
that are used as sources of standards for this Research Paper include the European Convention on 
Establishment and the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, which concern 
treatment of migrant workers authorised to work and reside in a CoE Member State and who are 
nationals of a CoE Member State party of the agreements. The European Convention on Establishment 
served as the basis for developing EU norms and other CoE standards in this field.139 
These human rights and international labour law standards are not just ‘aspirational’ in nature, or a 
question of subjective or personal choice. Member States have obliged themselves willingly to comply 
with a majority of these standards in their national employment and migration policies. The benchmarks 
presented in this Chapter also take into account clarifications or interpretations offered by Treaty bodies 
which, while not having a legally binding nature, constitute authoritative sources of international law 
for interpreting and assessing the legality of states parties’ domestic policies towards third-country 
nationals.  
                                                        
137 B. Frioriksdottir (2018), “Rights at Work”, in E. Guild, S. Grant and K. Groenendijk (eds), Human Rights of 
Migrants in the 21st Century, London: Routledge Focus, pp. 58-66. 
138 ECRI is a human rights body of CoE which monitors problems of racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance 
and discrimination on grounds such as “race”, national/ethnic origin, colour, citizenship, religion and language 
(racial discrimination); it prepares reports and issues recommendations to Member States. For more information 
refer to www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp. 
139 For more details see R. Cholewinski (2004), “The Legal Status of Migrants Admitted for Employment. A 
comparative study of law and practice in selected European States”, Committee of experts on the legal status and 
rights of immigrants, Council of Europe Publishing, p. 15. 
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Table 5. Overview of EU Member States’ (selected for the purpose of this study) participation 
 BE BG DE ES FR LT NL PL PT 
UN           
ICCPR R R R R R R R R R 
ICESRC R R R R R R R R R 
ICRMW N N N N N N N N N 
ILO          
Convention on Social Equality of Treatment – No. 118 N N R140 N R141 N N N142 N 
Convention on Equality of Treatment (Accident 
Compensation) – No. 19 R R R R R R R R R 
Convention on Maintenance of the Social Security 
Rights – No. 157 N N N R N N N N N 
Convention on Migration for Employment (Revised) – 
No. 97  R N R R
143 R N R N R 
Convention on Migrations in Abusive Conditions and 
the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and 
Treatment of Migrant Workers – No. 143 
N N N N N N N N R 
Convention on Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) – No. 111 R R R R R R R R R 
CoE          
European Convention on Social Security R N N R S N R N R 
European Agreement on Regulations Governing the 
Movement of Persons between Member States of the 
CoE 
R N R R R N R N R 
European Convention on Establishment R N R N S N R N  
European Social Charter (Revised) – CET 163 R R S S R R R S R 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers S N S R R N R N R 
4th Protocol ECHR  R R R R R R R R R 
12th Protocol ECHR S N S R N S R N R 
                                                        
140 Each Member State may accept the obligations of this Convention in respect of any one or more of the branches 
of social security for which it has in effective operation legislation covering its own nationals within its own 
territory (Article 2). For more information on the accepted branches by the different Member States, see 
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312263. 
141 Ibid.  
142 The Netherlands ratified the ILO  Convention on Social Equality of Treatment (No. 118) in 1964 and denounced 
it in 2004.  
143 France has excluded the provisions of Annex II. 
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Notes: R (Ratified); S (Signed); N (Not Signed).   Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
As Table 5 shows, the ratification of these international instruments varies among EU Member States, 
studied in the scope of this Research Paper (see Annex 1 Detailed methodology for the justification of 
this sample). A case in point is the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (also known as the Migrant Workers Convention) 
(ICRMW). None of the EU Member States to date has signed or ratified the International Convention of 
the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Family Members (see Table 5). However, as correctly pointed 
out by Guild et al. (2018), this does not mean that States can escape their pre-existing obligations to 
protect TCNs’ rights in light of other UN legally binding treaties whose scope cover non-nationals and 
migrant workers, such as the ICESCR,  or those laid down in ILO instruments. Furthermore, consistency 
with international standards is one of the criteria for good governance in migration, and the framework 
of international human rights and labour standards is the source for most policy measures that are 
designed to manage labour migration and ensure adequate protection for migrant workers.  Even 
countries of destination that are not ready to adopt the international and regional standards are urged 
to use these minimum norms when they are developing their national labour migration regulations.  
Therefore, even though not all of these international instruments have been widely ratified, they can 
still serve as a useful tool for benchmarking. 
In addition, Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), Article 19 on “The right of migrant 
workers and their families to protection and assistance” is the object of the greatest number of 
reservations. Ratifying parties had the possibility to accept separate provisions applicable to “legally 
residing” third-country nationals (see Table 6).  
Table 6. Acceptance of clauses of Article 19 of the European Social Charter (Revised) 
 BE BG DE ES FR LT NL PL PT 
Acceptance of Article 19 on ”The right of migrant 
workers and their families to protection and assistance” 
of the European Social Charter (Revised) clauses144 
11 0 N N 12 7 11 N 12 
Notes: Member States could choose out of total 12 clauses; N (Not Signed). 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
2.2. International and regional benchmarks as a framework for assessment  
The analysis provided below details the most relevant human rights and international labour law 
benchmarks, such as equal treatment, work authorisation, entry and re-entry conditions, access to secure 
residence status, social security coordination, family reunification and recognitions of qualifications. 
Whereas the equal treatment and non-discrimination benchmark is broader in nature and interlinked 
with non-discrimination and fairness principles in the EU law (see sub-chapter 2.3. Fairness and non-
discrimination at work and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), the remaining narrower 
benchmarks are seen as particularly important for highlighting the gaps and barriers arising due to the 
sectoral nature of legal migration policies as discussed in Chapter 1. These benchmarks further serve 
the gaps and barriers analysis in Chapter 3. Benchmarks are summarised in Table 7. See more extensive 
elaboration in Annex 2: Table 22  and detailed descriptions of each benchmark.  
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Table 7. Summary table of benchmarks established on the basis of international and regional standards 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
  
Area  Benchmarks 
Equal treatment  Equality of treatment, irrespective of skills, sector of employment, length of residence, and no less 
favourable treatment than nationals with regards to: 
• Remuneration and working conditions 
• membership of trade unions and collective bargaining 
• social security 
• employment taxes, dues or contributions 
• hygiene, safety and medical assistance 
• recreation and welfare measures 
• vocational or technical training 
Entry and  
Re-entry 
conditions  
• Facilitated entry into the territory for the purpose of temporary visits 
• Encouraging circular and return migration and reintegration into the country of origin 
• Granting seasonal workers priority for subsequent admission  
Work 
authorisation  
       
• Access to employment in all industries and occupations with max. restriction of 1 or 2 
years  
• Granting seasonal workers the possibilities for subsequent other remunerated activities 
• Loss or termination of employment should not constitute a sole ground for withdrawal 
of residence or work permit. 
• Possibility to find alternative work in case of loss or termination of employment. 
• Possibility for involuntarily unemployed job seekers to enjoy residence right during the 
period in which they seek employment.  
Residence 
status  
• Right to free movement and choice of residence 
• Facilitation of the prolonged or permanent residence 
Social security  
coordination  
• Export of benefits 
• Maintenance of the acquired rights  
• Totalisation of periods of insurance, employment or residence and of assimilated 
periods for the purpose of the acquisition, maintenance or recovery of rights and for the 
calculation of benefits 
• Reimbursement of social security contributions 
Family 
reunification  
• Obligation to facilitate family reunion 
• Family reunion of seasonal migrants and “special purpose workers”  
Recognition of  
qualifications  
• Regulations concerning recognition of occupational qualifications, including certificates 
and diplomas 
• Recognition and accreditation of migrant workers’ skills and qualifications  
• Measures to assist migrant workers and their families on the occasion of their final 
return to their State of origin:  
o  information about equivalence accorded to occupational qualifications 
obtained abroad and any tests to be passed to secure their official recognition;  
o equivalence accorded to educational qualifications, so that migrant workers' 
children can be admitted to schools without down-grading 
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2.2.1. Equal treatment and non-discrimination at work as international and regional standards 
All the international and regional human rights and labour standards put equality of treatment and 
non-decimation with national workers at the heart of the ‘rights at work’ of TCNs (see Annex 4 for an 
overview of the employed benchmarks). Our starting point is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which in its Article 23 proclaims that everyone should have the right to work, free 
choice of employment, just and favourable conditions of work, equal pay for equal work without being 
discriminated against, and the right to form and join trade unions.  
The equality principle also appears in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which recalls in Article 26 the obligation of equality (and equal protection) before the law and non-
discrimination, which is deemed a central component in the international framework of human rights 
protection, including with respect to human rights at work by any individual.145 
The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), in its Part III, Article 6, 
enshrines that State parties recognise and will safeguard the right of work (“which includes the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts”). Article 7 
ICESC lays down the recognition by states parties of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable work conditions.146 The body responsible for the interpretation and monitoring of ICESC, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has issued important General Comments 
clarifying the scope of the ICESC rights. 
In General Comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work,147 the 
Committee reiterated, “The right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work…without distinction of any kind”. The General Comment clarifies that the reference to 
“everyone” highlights the fact that this right applies to all workers in all settings, regardless of whether 
they are migrant workers and including “domestic workers, self-employed workers, agricultural 
workers, refugee workers and unpaid workers”.148 It highlighted that the actual importance of this right 
is yet to be fully realised, with “[d]iscrimination, inequality and a lack of assured rest and leisure 
conditions plagu[ing] many of the world’s workers.”149 Importantly, with reference to the specific 
                                                        
145 See in this respect the Human Rights Committee (1989), General Comment No. 18, Non-Discrimination, para. 
12, which states that ”when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the requirement of article 
26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the application of the principle of non-
discrimination contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant”. 
146 These include, according to Article 7 ICESC, ”(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, 
with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular 
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) 
Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure 
and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public 
holidays”. 
147 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2016), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 23 on the right to just and favourable conditions of work (Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 27 April. Refer also to General Comment No. 18, adopted on 
24 November 2005, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Right to 
Work, 6 February 2006, which in paragraph 18 states, ”The principle of non-discrimination as set out in article 2.2 
of the Covenant and in article 7 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families should apply in relation to employment opportunities for migrant 
workers and their families.” 
148 Para. 5. 
149 Para. 3, which continues, ”The increasing complexity of work contracts, such as short-term and zero-hour 
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situation of migrant workers, General Comment No. 23 pointed out that violations of the right to just 
and favourable conditions of work can occur through the adoption of labour migration policies that 
increase the vulnerability of migrant workers to exploitation. It concluded that migrant workers are: 
…vulnerable to exploitation, long working hours, unfair wages and dangerous and unhealthy working 
environments. Such vulnerability is increased by abusive labour practices that give the employer control 
over the migrant worker’s residence status or that tie migrant workers to a specific employer. If they do not speak 
the national language(s), they might be less aware of their rights and unable to access grievance mechanisms. 
Undocumented workers often fear reprisals from employers and eventual expulsion if they seek to 
complain about working conditions. Laws and policies should ensure that migrant workers enjoy treatment 
that is no less favourable than that of national workers in relation to remuneration and conditions of work (emphasis 
added).150 
A specific feature of the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families is that it, in Article 7, excludes ‘nationality’ among the justified 
or permissible grounds for differential treatment. In 2013 General Comment No. 2 on the rights of 
migrant workers,151 the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) reiterated the central role played by 
the principle of non-discrimination in all international human rights instruments and the UN Charter. 
It then described a central benchmark for assessing the lawfulness of deferential treatment between 
nationals and TCNs in rights at work, according to which  
…any differential treatment based on nationality or migration status amounts to discrimination unless the 
reasons for such differentiation are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim under the Convention, are 
necessary in the specific circumstances, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (emphasis added).152 
Equality of treatment constitutes a central guiding paradigm in ILO standards. These are specifically 
based on two ILO Conventions specifically protecting migrant workers, the Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)153 and the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive 
Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, 1975 (No. 
143),154 as well as the accompanying Migration for Employment Recommendation (Revised), 1949 (No. 
86)155 and ILO Recommendation concerning Migrant Workers, 1975 (No. 151).156 These instruments 
contain express provisions on equality of treatment, irrespective of skills, sector of employment, length 
of residence, and no less favourable treatment than nationals (see Annex 4 for a quick overview of the 
                                                        
contracts, and non-standard forms of employment, as well as an erosion of national and international labour 
standards, collective bargaining and working conditions, have resulted in insufficient protection of just and 
favourable conditions of work.” 
150 Pp. 12-13. 
151 UN Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (2013), 
General comment No. 2 on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of their families, 
28 August, para. 18. 
152 The CMW referred here to the Human Rights Committee (1989), general comment No. 18 on non-discrimination, 
para. 13; and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 20 on the right to 
education, para. 13. 
153 See Article 6 of Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) (Entry into force: 22 January 
1952), adopted at the 32nd ILC session (1 July 1949) in Geneva. Ratified by only 10 of 28 Member States.  
154 Article 10 of Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of 
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Entry into force: 9 December 1978), adopted at the 60th ILC 
session (24 June 1975) in Geneva. Ratified by only 5 of 28 EU Member States.  
155 Article 17 of Recommendation concerning Migration for Employment, No. 86 (Revised 1949), adopted at the 
32nd ILC session (1 July 1949) in Geneva. 
156 Article 2 of Migrant Workers Recommendation, No. 151, adopted at the 60th ILC session (24 June 1975) in 
Geneva.  
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employed standards as benchmarks). According to these instruments, equality of treatment with respect 
to migrant workers in a regular situation should be provided regarding the following matters:  
  
• remuneration and working conditions, including hours of work, rest periods, annual 
holidays with pay, occupational safety and occupational health measures;  
• membership of trade unions and enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining; 
• accommodation; 
• social security; 
• employment taxes, dues or contributions payable to the person employed; 
• hygiene, safety and medical assistance; 
• recreation and welfare measures; 
• vocational or technical training. 
 
The ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) should also be taken 
into consideration.157 Its purpose is to protect all persons against discrimination in employment and 
occupation on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, 
with the possibility of extending its protection to discrimination on the basis of other grounds.158 
According to this Convention, each Member State for which this Convention is in force undertakes to 
declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national 
conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment with respect to employment and 
occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof.159 It forms one of the 
fundamental principles and rights at work, and while it does not expressly prohibit nationality 
discrimination, it has been used by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Convention and 
Recommendations to protect migrant workers from related forms of discrimination, such as those on 
the grounds of sex, race, ethnicity, etc.160 
It is important to underline that the ILO has acknowledged the challenges posed by the current EU 
sector-by-sector approach to legal and labour migration in light of these international labour standards. 
The ILO Committee of Experts Report, “Promoting Fair Migration”, to the International Labour 
Conference in 2016, stated that many States indicated a differentiation in immigration law and practice 
between highly qualified/skilled workers and those engaged in medium and low-skill work. EU 
Member States distinguished between “migrant workers falling within the EU Blue Card Directive, 
allowing high skilled workers to work and live within the EU; and an often limited quota of seasonal 
workers granted temporary authorization to work in particular sectors”.161 
                                                        
157 Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (Entry into force: 15 June 
1960), adoption at the 42nd ILC session (25 June 1958) in Geneva. Ratified by all EU Member States.  
158 International Labour Conference (2012) General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at 
work in light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of 2008, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution), 
Report III (Part 1B), International Labour Office, Geneva, p. 307 
159 Article 2 of Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. 
160 International Labour Conference (2012), op. cit., pp. 324-326. 
161 International Labour Office (ILO) (2016), General Survey concerning the migrant workers instruments, Report 
of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour 
Conference, 105th Session, Geneva, 22 February, para. 106; see also International Labour Office (ILO) (2014), “Fair 
Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda”, Report of the Director General, International Labour Conference, 103rd 
Session, Geneva. 
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Similarly, in a previous Technical Note prepared on the Seasonal Migrants Directive, the ILO 
emphasised, “While it would prefer to see the establishment of a horizontal framework – which would 
be more in line with the approach taken by relevant International Labour Standards, including the 
specific instruments protecting migrant workers – nevertheless it welcomes the Commission’s initiatives 
to simplify administrative admission procedures and reduce the ‘rights’ gaps’ between third-countries 
nationals and EU citizens”.162 It emphasised the importance of a robust application by the Seasonal 
Workers Directive of the key principle of equality of treatment regarding working conditions and social 
security, in light of ILO standards and other regional human rights instruments. The same Technical 
Note acknowledged that by opting for a sectoral approach, the European Commission had failed to 
acknowledge and uphold internationally agreed labour standards, and stated,  
Unfortunately, the Commission’s impact assessment elaborated as background to the proposed seasonal 
workers Directive (SEC(2010) 887 of 13 July 2010) does not include any reference to International Labour 
Standards. All EU Member States have ratified the core labour standards conventions and many of the 
other ILO conventions classified by ILO as up to date. A number of EU Member States have ratified the 
specific ILO conventions dealing with migrant workers…163 
The principle of non-discrimination is also enshrined in ‘regional human rights standards’ in the context 
of the CoE. Article 14 ECHR prescribes that the human rights and freedoms provided by the Convention 
must be delivered in compliance with the principle of non-discrimination, which includes, among other 
grounds, national or social origin. The 2005 Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR provides for a general 
prohibition of discrimination on “any right provided by law”, not just rights envisaged in the ECHR. At 
the time of writing, and as outlined in Table 5 above, the 12th Protocol has been ratified by three EU 
Member States under analysis in this Research Paper (Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands), and signed 
by another three (Belgium, Germany and Lithuania). The ECtHR has interpreted in numerous cases the 
scope of application of Article 14 ECHR, and its relationship with other ECHR rights and freedoms,164 
and it has confirmed that nationality discrimination falls within the scope of Article 14 ECHR. 
The ECHR comes along the 1961 European Social Charter (ESC),165 which guarantees fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the field of economic and social rights to nationals of CoE Member States as well 
as foreigners “lawfully residing or working regularly in the territory of a CoE state party”. Through a 
supervisory mechanism based on a system of collective complaints and national reports, the European 
Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) seeks to guarantee that ESC standards are correctly implemented 
and observed by states’ parties of the ESC. The ECSR ascertains whether countries have honoured the 
undertakings set out in the Charter. Of particular relevance is Article E of the European Social Charter 
(Revised) (ESC(r)), which prohibits discrimination. According to the ECSR, the “difference in treatment 
between people in comparable situations constitutes discrimination in breach of the revised Charter if 
it does not pursue a legitimate aim and is not based on objective and reasonable grounds”.166 
                                                        
162 ILO (2010), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379 ILO Note based 
on International Labour Standards with reference to relevant regional standards, Geneva 
(www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-
brussels/documents/genericdocument/wcms_168539.pdf). 
163 Ibid. 
164 For an overview refer to B. Frioriksdottir (2017), What Happened to Equality? The Construction of the Right to Equal 
Treatment of Third Country Nationals in European Union Law on Labour Migration, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, in 
particular Chapter 2, Section 2.3, pp; 69-76.  
165 The ESC has been signed by all 47 Member States of the Council of Europe and ratified by 43 of them. For more 
information see www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter. 
166 See ECSR, Syndicat national des professions du tourisme v. France, Complaint No. 6/1999, merits, 10 October 2000, 
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As mentioned in the introduction of this Research Paper, the UN Global Compact on Migration, in its 
second draft version published in May 2018,167 identifies as one of its objectives the facilitation of “fair 
and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work”. Under this objective, the 
Global Compact on Migration refers to the priority ascribed by states parties to review existing policies, 
ensure “fair and ethical recruitment mechanisms”, and “protect all migrant workers against all forms of 
exploitation and abuse in order to guarantee decent work and maximize the socioeconomic 
contributions of migrants in both their countries of origin and destination”.168 The Global Compact on 
Migration identifies as central the need to promote by states the signature, ratification, accession and 
implementation of relevant international instruments related to international labour mobility, labour 
rights and decent work conditions. It also calls for better ensuring that international human rights and 
labour law is observed in practice through more effective enforcement and monitoring (via for instance 
labour inspectors) of these norms. 
 
2.2.2. Work authorisation  
The benchmarks related to work authorisation aim to assess whether workers can change their employer 
with a maximum restriction of two years based on Article 14 (a) ILO Migrant Workers Convention (143) 
and Article 52 (3a) ICRMW, as well as whether loss or termination of employment constitutes the sole 
ground for withdrawal of the migrant worker’s authorisation of residence or work permit. In addition, 
they evaluate the possibility for migrant workers to find alternative work in case of loss or termination 
of employment. It also includes the possibility for seasonal workers to take up other remunerated 
activities in cases where they have already been employed on the territory of the Member State for a 
significant period (see Annex 4 for an overview of the employed standards as benchmarks).169  
 
2.2.3. Entry and re-entry conditions  
The employed benchmark framework provides for several standards in regards to entry and re-entry 
conditions. These include whether there is a possibility for facilitated entry for temporary visits170 and 
circulation-friendly visa policies for TCNs and policies to encourage circular and return migration171 
(Vankova, 2016). In addition, another standard pertains to the possibility of granting priority to seasonal 
workers, who have been employed on the territory of a Member State for a significant period, over other 
workers who seek admission to that State.172 These benchmarks are summarised in Annex 4, which 
provides an opportunity for a quick overview.  
These benchmarks are in line with the latest (second) draft of the UN Global Compact on Migration.173 
The Compact promotes the development of flexible rights-based and gender-responsive labour mobility 
                                                        
para. 25. In: Y. Ktistakis (2013) Protecting Migrants under the European Convention of Human Rights and the European 
Social Charter: A Handbook for Legal Practitioners (2nd Edition), Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 69-70. 
(https://rm.coe.int/168007ff59).  
167 UN Global Compact on Migration, in its second draft version available at 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180528_draft_rev_2_final_1.pdf. 
168 Para. 21. 
169 Based on Article 59 (2) ICRMW. 
170 Based on Article 1 of the European Convention on Establishment. 
171 Based on ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, Principle 15, Guideline 15.8.  
172 Based on Article 59 (2) of the ICRMW. 
173 Available at https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180528_draft_rev_2_final_1.pdf. 
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schemes for migrants at all skills levels, including temporary, seasonal, circular, and fast-track 
programmes in areas of labour shortages, in accordance with local labour market needs and skills 
supply. It recommends doing so by establishing flexible and non-discriminatory visa regimes, such as 
permanent and temporary work visas, multiple-entry visas, student visas, business visitor visas and 
visas for investors and entrepreneurs, and by allowing flexible visa status conversions.   
 
2.2.4. Choice of residence and access to secure residence status  
Another important benchmark employed by this Research Paper aims to explore whether migrants in 
regular status have the opportunity to qualify for a prolonged or permanent residence status, which is 
one of the benchmarks applied to this policy area.174 This standard is derived from Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Establishment. In addition, this benchmark considers whether migrants have 
the right to mobility and choice of residence within the destination country (see Annex 4 for more 
details).175 
 
2.2.5. Social security coordination  
Along with the benchmark on equal treatment covering social security rights described above, the study 
also uses benchmarks in the field of social security coordination based on, among other things, the 
European Convention on Social Security, the Convention on Social Equality of Treatment (No. 118) and 
the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention (No. 19) (see annex X). The ECHR is 
another important source of standards that must be considered in the field of social security. Despite 
the fact that it does not stipulate a right to social security per se and it does not contain any social security 
coordination provisions, the case law of the ECtHR shows that several articles of the ECHR have been 
used by applicants to challenge national provisions on social security. It demonstrates that the 
distinction based on nationality in the field of social security must be justified by very robust 
reasoning.176   
This benchmark aims to assess what kind of benefits can be exported, e.g. in the context of temporary 
or circular migration, and whether the general principles of social security coordination are covered: 
maintenance of the acquired rights and rights in course of acquisition under their legislation; totalisation 
of periods of insurance, employment or residence and of assimilated periods for the purpose of the 
acquisition, maintenance or recovery of rights and for the calculation of benefits; and equality of 
treatment (see annex 4).177 In addition, it aims to assess whether reimbursement of social security 
contributions is possible.178 
                                                        
174 Based on Article 2, European Convention on Establishment.  
175 Based on Article 12 (1) ICCPR, Article 39 ICRMW, Article 2 (1) of the Fourth protocol of ECHR.  
176 See ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria, Judgment of 16 September 1996, Application No. 17371/90, paras 42-50. For a 
detailed overview, see H. Verschueren (1997), “EC social security co-ordination excluding third-country nationals: 
still in line with fundamental rights after the Gaygusuz judgment”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 991-
1017. For further case law analysis, see also C.H. Slingenberg (2015), "Social security in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights", in F. Pennings and G. Vonk (eds), Research Handbook on European Social Security Law, 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 62-64.  
177 For more details, see Z. Vankova, (2016), “EU Circular Migration Policies: Dead or Alive? Developing a Rights-
based Benchmark Framework for Policy Assessment”, Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 30(4), 
pp.332-352. 
178 In line with Article 27 (2) of ICRMW and ILO Migrant Workers Recommendation, 1975 (No. 151), para. 
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2.2.6. Family reunification  
This relates to whether migrant workers, including seasonal workers and other temporary migrants, 
can reunite with their family members under EU law instruments in the field of legal migration. This 
benchmark is based on Article 13 (1) of the ILO Migrant Workers Convention (No. 143), which requests 
contracting States “to take all necessary measures which fall within its competence and collaborate with 
other Members to facilitate the reunification of the families of all migrant workers legally residing on its 
territory”. In addition, the ILO Migrant Worker Recommendation No. 151 contains only one 
prerequisite for family reunification, which is that “the worker has, for his family, appropriate 
accommodation which meets the standards normally applicable to nationals of the country of 
employment”.179 Moreover, ILO members are called upon to allow the family reunion of seasonal 
migrants and “special purpose workers” who are legally resident in the country (see annex 4 for a 
summary of employed benchmarks).180  
Among the Council of Europe instruments, Article 8 of the ECHR guarantees the right to respect for 
private and family life. Article 8 (2) ECHR, however, provides that “there shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The case law of the ECtHR concerning Article 
8 and admission of family migrants is relatively scant. In this regard the Court has consistently ruled181 
that in general there is no interference with the right to respect for family life if it is possible for the 
family to live elsewhere,182 including when the case involves children that have been left behind. As the 
Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration acknowledges, the ECtHR’s 
approach in cases involving children left behind “largely depends on the specific circumstances of each 
particular case”.183 One circumstance in which the Court seems to find that insurmountable obstacles to 
settling in the country of origin exist, is where the applicant has started a family in the host country and 
other children have been born and brought up in his/her country of origin.184 
Article 19(6) of the (Revised) European Social Charter and Article 12 (1) of the European Convention on 
the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ECMW) provides specific measures on family reunification for 
lawfully resident migrant workers from other contracting parties.185 For instance, Article 12 (1) of the 
ECMW stipulates that the waiting period for family reunification shall not exceed 12 months. According 
                                                        
34(1)(c)(ii).  
179 Migrant Workers Recommendation, 1975 (No. 151), para. 13(2). 
180 ILO (1997), Migrant Worker Recommendation No 151, Annex 1, para. 6.1. 
181 See ECtHR, Ahmut v the Netherlands, Judgment of 28 November 1996, Application, No. 21702/93 and ECtHR, 
Gül v. Switzerland, Judgment of 19 February 1996, Application No. 23218/94. 
182 S. Peers (2016), EU Justice and Home Affairs Law. Volume I: EU Immigration and Asylum Law, Fourth edn., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 333.  
183 European Court of Human Rights and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), Handbook on 
European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 
133. 
184 C. Murphy (2013), Immigration, Integration and the Law. The Intersection of Domestic, EU and International Legal 
Regimes, London: Routledge, p. 314. 
185  N. Baruah and R. Cholewinski (2006), Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies in 
Countries of Origin and Destination, OSCE, IOM and ILO, 2006, p.149. 
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to the European Committee of Social Rights, which examines whether states parties are compliant with 
the provisions of the European Social Charter (ESC):186  
 
• a waiting period of more than one year is not compliant with the ESC; 187  
• family reunification must be possible for children 18- to 21-years-old;188 
• a requirement for suitable housing should not be so restrictive as to prevent family 
reunification;189  
• migrant workers who have a sufficient income to provide for their family members should not 
be automatically denied the right to family reunification on the basis of the origin of such 
income, insofar as they are legally entitled to benefits they may receive;190  
• pre-departure or in-country integration requirements for family members that must be satisfied 
in order to be allowed to enter the country or to be granted a residence permit constitutes a 
restriction that is likely to deprive the obligation enshrined in Article 19 (6) of its substance and 
is thus not compliant with the provisions of the ESC.191 
 
2.2.7. Recognition of qualifications 
This benchmark aims to assess the provisions on procedures for recognition of qualifications in the EU 
legal migration acquis. Article 14 (b) of Convention No. 143 provides that States may “after appropriate 
consultation with the representative organizations of employers and workers, make regulations 
concerning recognition of occupational qualifications acquired outside its territory, including 
certificates and diplomas”. The same provision is also included in Recommendation No. 151, paragraph 
6. Furthermore, Guideline 12.6 to Principle 12192 of the ILO’s Multilateral Framework on Labour 
Migration states that “promoting the recognition and accreditation of migrant workers’ skills and 
qualifications and, where that is not possible, providing a means to have their skills and qualifications 
recognized” contributes to an orderly and equitable process of labour migration (see Annex 4 for an 
overview of employed benchmarks).193  
                                                        
186 States parties submit annual reports on their implementation of the Charter in law and in practice, on the basis 
of which the Committee decides whether the countries concerned are in conformity with the Charter. Source: 
www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter/national-reports. 
187 European Committee of Social Rights (2006), Conclusions XVIII-1 - Greece - Article 19-6, document number 
XVIII 1/def/GRC/19/6/EN. 
188 Ibid. and European Committee of Social Rights (2006), Conclusions XVIII-1 - Austria - Article 19-6, document 
number XVIII-1/def/AUT/19/6/EN. 
189 European Committee of Social Rights (2011), Conclusions 2011 - Belgium - Article 19-6, document number 
2011/def/BEL/19/6/EN.  
190 European Court of Human Rights and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), op. cit., p. 134. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Principle 12: An orderly and equitable process of labour migration should be promoted in both origin and 
destination countries to guide men and women migrant workers through all stages of migration, in particular, 
planning and preparing for labour migration, transit, arrival and reception, return and reintegration. 
193 ILO (2006),  ”Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-
based approach to labour migration”, ILO, Geneva, p.24 and Article 14 of ILO Convention No. 143. 
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In addition, the ECMW contains a provision concerning the obligation to provide information to 
migrants returning home. Article 30 states that “to enable migrant workers to know, before they set out 
on their return journey, the conditions on which they will be able to resettle in their State of origin, this 
State shall communicate to the receiving State, which shall keep available for those who request it, 
information regarding in particular: (5th bullet) equivalence accorded to occupational qualifications 
obtained abroad and any tests to be passed to secure their official recognition”. 
2.3. Fairness and non-discrimination at work and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Title V TFEU, and EU secondary legislation implementing its provisions, must also be read in light of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR) to which the Lisbon Treaty conferred the same legally 
binding value as the Treaties. Some of the rights included in the EU CFR are applicable to ‘everyone’ 
irrespective of immigration administrative status. Nevertheless, Article 15.3 stipulates, “Nationals of 
third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working 
conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.” Therefore, equivalence is limited to those TCNs 
who are authorised to work. This would appear to contradict the broader language in Article 31 EU 
CFR.   
Article 15.3 may therefore provide a narrower personal scope of protection limited to ‘authorised TCNs’. 
That notwithstanding, a broader interpretation can be in any case established on the above-mentioned 
international and regional standards studied in Section 2.2. This is in line with Article 53 EU CFR which 
stipulates, “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised by Union law and international law and by 
international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party”. 
While the notion of ‘equivalence’ may be contested and subject to interpretation in relation to its 
difference from ‘equality’, Article 31 EU CFR may be more definitive. It may also help us in giving 
substance to the notion of ‘fairness’ advanced by the TFEU, particularly in the context of employment 
or labour relations. Article 31 EU CFR deals with “Fair and Just Working Conditions” and states, “Every 
worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity.” It 
continues, “Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest 
periods and to an annual period of paid leave.”  
It is noticeable here that the Charter uses the notion of ‘every worker’ with no consideration of the 
immigration or residence status of the person involved. This corresponds with the prevailing approach 
previously identified in international and regional human rights and labour standards. The qualification 
of worker takes therefore preference over immigration status at times of upholding the obligation to 
guarantee fair and just working conditions in the EU legal system. In addition, and importantly, Article 
45 EU CFR, which deals with free movement and residence, offers the possibility to grant free movement 
and residence to TCNs who are legally residing in the EU. 
This is also consistent with Article 20 EU CFR which stipulates the equality before the law principle to 
anyone (including TCNs) residing in the EU. It is in this context that restrictions to the principle of non-
discrimination and equality of treatment between TCNs legally residing in the EU must be duly justified 
by State authorities. Furthermore, Article 21 EU CFR provides for the general principle of non-
discrimination, which includes ethnic or social origin among the prohibited grounds. Article 21.2 EU 
CFR stipulates that any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited within the scope of 
the EU legal system and law “without prejudice of the special provisions of those treaties”. It has been 
argued in the academic literature that the sharp distinction currently made by the EU between mobile 
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EU citizens and legally residing TCNs may no longer hold true to the same extent.194 This may be 
particularly the case in respect of working and residency conditions and intra EU-mobility of TCNs 
residing and working in the EU.  
  
                                                        
194 C. Kilpatrick (2014), “Article 21: Non-Discrimination”, in S. Peers et al. (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 579-604. 
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CHAPTER 3: GAPS AND BARRIERS IN AND ACROSS THE DIFFERENT EU 
LEGAL AND POLICY MEASURES 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the gaps and barriers identified in the EU legislative instruments related to legal 
and labour migration. For the purposes of this Research Paper the notion of ‘gaps’ refers to the 
incoherencies or differentials between the rights of different categories of TCNs in the existing sectoral 
and fragmented legal framework (the gaps in the law). This notion also covers relevant issues not 
covered by EU law and policy. When it comes to ‘barriers’, this chapter highlights how the practical 
challenges in exercising rights stemming from the EU sectoral approach and the implementation of the 
different EU legal migration instruments prevent the EU from meeting the international, regional and 
EU equal treatment standards employed as benchmarks in the Research Paper. 
The chapter focuses on the gaps and barriers in and across the four sectoral ‘first admission’ directives 
covering:195 Seasonal Workers, highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), Intra-corporate Transferees 
(ICTs) and Students and Researchers. The analysis also draws comparisons with the Single Permit 
                                                        
195 The term is borrowed from C. Barnard (2016), The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, (Fifth Edition), 
Oxford:Oxford University Press. Could free movement of persons be confined to free movement of workers in any 
Brexit deal?, Blog Post, Centre for European Legal Studies (https://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/brexitfree-
movement-persons-and-new-legal-order/catherine-barnard-could-free-movement-persons-be).  
KEY FINDINGS 
• The Research Paper identified numerous gaps between the instruments regulating the status 
of different categories of workers (see summary Table 8).  
• Differential treatment as institutionalised by the EU sectoral approach amounts to unlawful 
discrimination in light of the Research Paper’s benchmarks, as it is not always justified.  
• There is a clear role for the EU to contribute to promoting and ensuring a common level 
playing field of international and regional human rights and labour standards protection 
(non-discrimination among workers) which otherwise could undermine effectiveness of EU 
secondary law on labour immigration. 
• High-skilled workers (Blue Card holders, ICTs and researchers) benefit from the most 
extensive rights. 
• Many barriers are identified which stem from the interplay of transposition of EU law and 
national procedures/instruments.  
• The benchmarks assessment shows that the EU is still some way off developing a fair labour 
migration policy. 
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Directive as well as those on the right to family reunification and long-term residence where relevant.196 
Annex 17 provides two practical case studies illustrating the gaps and barriers examined in this Chapter. 
Table 8. Summary table of gaps and barriers analysed in chapter 3 
Benchmark Area  Gaps  Barriers 
Equal treatment  Gaps to Equal treatment (G1) 
• Equal treatment to nationals with 
regard to remuneration, and 
working conditions 
• Restrictions and derogations with 
regard to education and vocational 
training 
• Social security restrictions 
Barriers to equal treatment (B1)  
• Lack of implementation and 
enforcement at the national level 
• Unfair remuneration and working 
conditions 
Entry and Re-
entry 
conditions 
(circular 
migration) 
Gaps to entry (G2): by design inherent 
to the sectoral directives – certain 
categories are left out;   
 
Gaps with regards to different re-
entry options (G2): 
• Circular migration restrictions 
Barriers with regards to entry: (B2) 
• Requirement for migrants to apply 
from outside the EU  
• Labour market tests  
• Requirement to provide address  
 
Barriers with regards to different re-
entry and circular migration options 
under the Directives (B3): 
• Applying the ‘cooling off’ periods. 
• Penalising for longer absences 
Work 
authorisation  
Gaps concerning change of employer 
(G3): 
• Changes of employer are limited or 
subject to prior authorisation. 
• ICTD permit holders are bound to 
their employer. 
 
Gaps concerning consequence of 
unemployment (G4): 
• Unemployment leads to permit 
withdrawal, unless BC holder;  
• Lack of possibility to seek alternative 
work, unless BC holder. 
Barriers concerning change of 
employer (B4): 
• Fear of loss of employment and 
dependency from employer.  
• Different enforcement capacity of the 
labour inspectorates at the national 
level. 
 
Barriers concerning consequence of 
unemployment (B5): 
• Different provision of rights at 
national level due to the lack of 
explicit provisions in this regard. 
                                                        
196 This chapter builds on Z. Vankova (forthcoming), “EU's approach to Circular Migration in the context of the 
Eastern Partnership Neighbourhood”, in S. Carrera, L. Den Hertog, D. Kostakopoulou and M. Panizzon (eds), The 
EU External Policies on Migration, Borders and Asylum. Policy Transfers or Intersecting Policy Universes?, Leiden: Brill 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
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Residence 
status and 
mobility with 
the 
EU/Member 
State 
Gaps concerning mobility and choice 
of residence (G5): 
• SWD does not provide sufficient 
guarantees to address employer-
organised accommodation. 
Gaps concerning residence status 
(G6): 
• ICTs (ICTD) and seasonal workers 
(SWD), as well as other TCNs 
residing on temporary and formally 
limited permits excluded from access 
to LTR. 
Gaps concerning intra- EU mobility 
(G7): 
• ICTD and SRD allow for temporary 
mobility, whereas LTRD, ICTD, 
BCD, SRD allow long-term mobility. 
Legal gaps in many cases are leading to 
practical obstacles, therefore the 
barriers are not further discussed in this 
area.  
Social security 
coordination  
Gaps concerning social security 
coordination (G8): 
• Provisions on export of benefits differ 
between the Directives and there are 
no provisions in that regard in the 
LTRD and FRD.  
• The Directives do not contain other 
social security coordination 
principles such as aggregation of 
periods of insurance, employment 
and residence. 
Barriers concerning social security 
coordination (B6): 
• Coordination of social security at the 
national level is subject to conclusion 
of bilateral agreements between MS 
and third countries, which provide for 
the actual entitlements. Their number 
varies from MS to MS. 
Family 
reunification  
Gaps concerning family reunification 
(G9): 
• No right: seasonal workers, students, 
temporary workers with permits for 
less than one year 
• Rules for FR: for workers with 
residence permit valid for one year 
or more and for LTR in the first MS 
• Privileged rules: Blue Card Holders, 
researchers and ICT  
• Free admission: family members of 
LTR TCN admitted in first MS free 
to move with the LTR TCN to the 
second MS. 
Barriers concerning family 
reunification (B7): 
• Narrow definition of ‘family 
members’ and wide discretion to 
Member States   
• Long waiting periods 
• Prior integration requirements 
• Restrictions for family members to 
work 
Recognition of 
qualifications  
Gaps concerning recognition of 
qualifications (G10): 
• Equal treatment only once 
authorisation has been obtained, but 
not before 
• Limited recognition of qualifications 
vs.  skills 
Barriers (B8): 
• Long waiting periods, in particular 
for regulated professions  
 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
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The analysis of gaps left by existing EU legal migration acquis is further substantiated by the empirical 
research findings. We employ the data gathered through the e-questionnaire, interviews and Delphi 
method discussion conducted for the purposes of this Research Paper (see Annex 1 for a detailed 
methodological note). The analysis also makes use of data in implementation reports carried out by the 
European Commission. The chapter concludes with an assessment using the benchmarks developed in 
Chapter 2, and provides two case studies of how the trajectories of third-country nationals (TCNs) 
accepted under the Seasonal Work Directive would differ from those under the Blue Card scheme, thus 
showing how such gaps and barriers have implications for individual rights at work.   
3.1. Key gaps and barriers 
Gaps  
The EU sectoral approach on legal migration studied in Chapter 1 entails the use of decisive features 
such as skills qualifications, salary thresholds or types of sectors on which EU legal statuses are assigned, 
granting differential treatment and rights. Such an approach has institutionalised the differences among 
third-country worker statuses and leads to a fragmentation of rights and working conditions across 
categories of TCNs: ‘more rights and labour standards’ for those obtaining the EU Blue Card, ICT or 
researcher permits; and ‘less rights and labour standards’ for those holding the EU Seasonal Worker’s 
Permit. The variances of rights at work have become even more evident during the phases of national 
implementation, where there have been different national interpretations of the exact scope of the EU 
rights granted by these directives. 
Barriers 
In the transposition and implementation, there are further divergences as to the extent to which Member 
States actually make use of and apply these EU directives. The fragmentation that is already present in 
the ‘law in the books’ is thus further exacerbated in the ‘law in action’. Moreover, the actual transposition 
by Member States of several directives is very recent or still awaited. The flexibility granted to Member 
States in the transposition and implementation means that there is a considerable element of ‘non-
Europe’ in this field, producing individual and economic costs. It leaves the individual in a weak 
position, as the EU and its Member States have competing interests in employing TCNs.197 It became 
even more apparent in the current negotiations over the revision of the Blue Card, where different 
Member States’ interests stand in the way of an approach based on fairness, and therefore hinders TCN 
rights. 
 
3.1.1. Gaps and barriers with regards to equal treatment  
Gaps to equal treatment (G 1) 
The fairness and quasi-equality of treatment paradigm appears in the main body of the various EU legal 
migration directives.198 A majority of these directives include among their goals and legal provisions 
the “equality of treatment of third country nationals in respect to Member States’ nationals”. This 
‘equality’ is however subject to a set of differentiated restrictions or conditions which have been linked 
                                                        
197 Carrera, S., Faure Atger, A., Guild, E. & Kostakopoulou, D. (2011), “Labour Immigration Policy in the EU: A 
Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 240, April 2011. 
198 The term “EU legal migration directives” is used when referring to the first admissions directives, the Single 
Permit Directive, the Family Reunification Directive and the Long-Term Residence Directive. 
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to particular categories of TCN workers, and the length of regular stay or residence ascribed to the 
former.  
From all the EU legal migration directives only the Family Reunification Directive does not include any 
provisions on equality of treatment. However, TCNs with such status who are allowed to work, benefit 
from the broader scope of the Single Permit Directive. Another gap in this field concerns the ICTs who 
are guaranteed equal treatment with regards to the terms and conditions of employment with posted 
workers under Directive 96/71/EC.199 
All ‘first admission’ directives except the ICT provide for equal treatment with nationals concerning 
working conditions including pay and dismissal, as well as health and safety requirements at the 
workplace.200 The Seasonal Workers Directive, as well as one of the recitals of the preamble of the Single 
Permit Directive,201 clarifies that the term “working conditions” in addition also covers at least working 
hours/time and leave/holidays. As already indicated above, the ICTs are entitled to equal treatment 
with posted workers (which are EU or TCN nationals working temporarily in another Member State),202 
except with regard to remuneration where equal treatment with nationals is one of the admission 
criteria.203   
Migrants covered by the different legal instruments are entitled to equal treatment with regards to 
freedom of association and affiliation, except for family migrants under the Family Reunification 
Directive. However, if they have the right to work, they still benefit from the equal treatment provisions 
of the Single Permit Directive. The Seasonal Workers Directive contains an equal treatment provision, 
which explicitly covers the right to strike and take industrial actions.  
The ICTs Directive does not provide for equal treatment with regards to education and vocational 
training. The rest of the ‘first admissions’ directives contain optional restrictions to equal treatment that 
Member States may apply regarding “study and maintenance grants and loans or other grants and 
loans”.204 In addition, the Seasonal Workers Directive and the Single Permit Directive allow possible 
derogations to equal treatment concerning education and vocational training, which is directly linked 
to the specific employment activity.205  
Finally, the Single Permit Directive provides for additional optional restrictions to equal treatment that 
Member States can make use of by limiting their application to those TCNs who are in employment or 
who have been employed and who are registered as unemployed; excluding TCNs who have been 
admitted to their territory as students under Directive 2004/114/EC; and laying down specific 
prerequisites including language proficiency and the payment of tuition fees, in accordance with 
national law, with respect to access to university and post-secondary education.206  
In contrast, long-term residents enjoy equal treatment with nationals in this field, including study grants 
in accordance with national law. Member States, however, may restrict this to cases where the registered 
                                                        
199 See Article 3 of Directive 96/71/EC. 
200 Article 14 (1) (a) BCD; Article 12 (1) (a) SPD; Article 22 (1) SRD; Article 23 (1) (a) SWD. Long-term residents also 
enjoy equal treatment in this area under Article 11 (1) (a).  
201 See recital 22 of the Preamble of SPD. 
202 Article 18 (1) ICTD. 
203 Article 5 (4) (b) ICTD. 
204 Article 14 (2) BCD; Article 23 (2)(ii) SWD; Article 12 (2) (iii) SPD; Article 22 (1) (a) SRD. Only the BCD gives an 
indication as to what the “other grants and loans” are for, namely secondary and higher education and vocational 
training. 
205 Article 23 (2)(ii) SWD; Article 12 (2) (iv) SPD. 
206 Article 12 (2) (a) SPD. 
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or usual place of residence of the long-term resident, or that of family members, lies within the territory 
of the Member State concerned.207 Family members under the Family Reunification Directive have the 
same access to education and vocational training as the sponsor.208  
All ‘first admissions’ directives contain equal treatment clauses in regards to branches of social security, 
as defined in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.209 Except for the Blue Card Directive, however, 
all other ‘first admissions’ directives allow Member States to restrict equal treatment in the field of social 
security, mostly with regards to family benefits.210 Finally, the Long-term Residence Directive could 
provide for less protection than workers covered by the Single Permit Directive, because Article 11 (4) 
allows Member States to limit equal treatment with regards to social assistance and social protection to 
core benefits.211  
The directives also legislate different provisions in respect of the export of benefits. Blue Card holders 
are entitled to portability of statutory old age pensions, “at the rate applied by virtue of the law of the 
debtor Member State(s) when moving to a third country.”212 According to this provision, Member States 
are required to pay pensions to former Blue Card holders when they move to a third country, even when 
there is no bilateral social security agreement between the respective two countries.213 However, due to 
the fact that this is an equal treatment clause, the only requirement is that the Member State provides 
for this type of social security export for its own nationals. Furthermore, Blue Card holders can benefit 
also from Article 12 (4) of the Single Permit Directive, which additionally allows for a wider export of 
invalidity and death pensions.214 
The rest of the categories of migrants covered by the ICTs Directive,215 the Students and Researchers 
Directive216 and the Single Permit Directive217 are entitled to export of old-age, invalidity and death 
statutory pensions under the same conditions and rates as for nationals of the Member State when they 
move abroad. The wording of the last paragraph of Article 23 (1) of the Seasonal Workers Directive, 
however, contains an entitlement for seasonal workers or the survivors of such workers residing in a 
third country to statutory pensions only.  
According to Verschueren, seasonal workers cannot benefit from invalidity and death pensions because 
neither the Seasonal Workers Directive nor the Single Permit Directive, which excludes seasonal 
workers from its scope, provide for any entitlement in this regard for these migrant workers.218 Whether 
these workers could benefit from such pensions will depend on the implementation of the directive in 
national law, since in some cases statutory pensions could also cover invalidity and survivors’ benefits. 
In contrast, the Long-term Residence Directive does not contain any provisions on export of benefits.   
                                                        
207 Article 11 (2) LTRD. 
208 Article 14 (1). 
209 Article 23 (1) (d) SWD; Article 14 (1) (e) BCD; Article 18 (2) (c) ICTD; Article 12 (1) (e) SPD; Article 22 (1) SRD. 
210 Article 18 (3) ICTD; Article 22 (2) (b) and (c) SRD; Article 23 (2) (i) SWD. Article 12 (2) (b) SPD. Concerning the 
latter, see also C-449/16 - Martinez Silva, ECLI:EU:C:2017:485. 
211 H. Verschueren (2016), “Employment and Social Security Rights of Third-Country Labour Migrants under EU 
Law: An Incomplete Patchwork of Legal Protection”, European Journal of Migration and Law, No. 18, pp. 375-408 
212 Article 14 (1) (f) BCD. 
213 Verschueren (2016), op. cit. 
214 Ibid.  
215 Article 18 (2) (d) ICTD. 
216 Article 22 (1) SRD. 
217 Article 12 (4) SPD. 
218 Verschueren (2016), op. cit. 
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The Single Permit Directive, the Seasonal Workers Directive, the Students and Researchers Directive, 
the Blue Card Directive and the Intra-corporate Transferees Directive all provide for equal treatment 
with nationals in relation to the “recognition of diplomas, certificates and other professional 
qualifications in accordance with the relevant national procedures”.219 The equal treatment provisions 
in these directives mean that the different categories of migrants can benefit from the existing national 
procedures.  
E-questionnaire respondents, representing trade unions and employers’ organisations, were asked 
about their perception of whether EU legislation in the area of legal migration has enhanced ‘equal 
treatment’ (see  
Figure 9 below). None of them responded positively in light of the inequality treatment among different 
categories and across different Member States (Yes – 0 respondents). Views among survey respondents 
were divided however as to whether the EU has managed to approximate the statuses across the EU 
along the different perceived levels of skills (five respondents), that great differences still remain across 
the EU (five respondents) or that actually discriminatory practices (on prohibited grounds) are reflected 
or inherent in national immigration rules and practices (six respondents).  
Figure 9. EU legal migration aquis contribution in creating fair common level playing field as perceived by social 
partners 
  
Source: E-questionnaire, February–April 2018.  
 
                                                        
219 Article 23 (1)(h) of the SWD, Article 12 (1) (d) of the SRD, Article 14 (1) (d) of the BCD, Article 18 (2) (b) of the 
ICTD, Article 12 (1) (d) of the SPD. 
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Q: In your opinion, do current EU legal migration policies provide a fair common 
level playing field accross the EU in terms of labour rights?
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A respondent representing a workers’ organisation/trade union in Belgium clarified that the EU 
directives aimed at highly qualified migrant workers (EU Blue Card and ICTs Directives) provide “high 
potentials and the equal treatment issues and protection of labour rights are better than for instance 
those provided for in the Seasonal Workers Directive.”220 The same respondent pointed out that ‘laws 
on the books’ and ‘laws in the reality’ may be different based on experiences with the EU Posted 
Workers Directive. This instrument concerns mobile EU citizens and thus is beyond the scope of the 
current assessment, but it demonstrates that the EU currently allows that, through “the possibility of 
posting, lower and mid-skilled workers are less well treated than national workers.”221 
The Delphi method discussion implemented in this Research Paper brought to light important findings 
regarding the EU value added in ensuring equal treatment and upholding international human rights 
and labour standards of all TCNs. This was seen to be an essential cornerstone for creating a fair 
common level playing field across the EU in compliance with EU standards and Treaty principles.  
The Delphi method participants mentioned that equal and fair treatment is essential not only in order 
to ensure better internal coherency in the current EU legal migration acquis (Figure 10 and Table 9 Table 
1), but also in order to ensure external consistency with international and EU human rights principles 
and labour standards. This ‘internal-external consistency’ was identified to be of central importance in 
terms of the EU’s legitimacy, image and role in negotiating the UN Global Compacts on Migration.222 
According to the Delphi method participants, the EU’s external and internal legal migration policies 
need to be well-aligned so as to have credibility ‘at home’ – among and ‘outside’ Member States – and 
in the international arena.223 Similarly, it was seen that internal and external coherence, and upholding 
non-discrimination standards on rights at work, adds to the EU’s global attractiveness.  
Figure 10. Delphi method voting on the greatest EU value added in the area of legal migration 
 
Source: Authors, 2018, based on the Delphi method discussion on 9 March 2018, Brussels.  
                                                        
220 A respondent, representing a workers’ organisation/trade union in Belgium, e-questionnaire, February-April 
2018.  
221 A respondent, representing a workers’ organisation/trade union in Belgium, e-questionnaire, February-April 
2018. 
222 Delphi method discussion on 9 March 2018, Brussels. 
223 Delphi method discussion on 9 March 2018, Brussels. 
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Table 9. Delphi method discussion on equal treatment 
Pros Cons Conditions 
• Adds to equality & 
upholds rights of all people 
(including nationals & 
TCNs) 
• Strengthens EU role in 
standard-setting 
• Provides grounds for 
approximation   
• Tackles unfair business 
practices 
• High expectations 
• Difference of the law 
in the books and the 
law in practice 
• Problems with poor 
minimum standards  
• Should be 
understood as both 
process and goal 
• Should not remain 
bureaucratic tricks   
• Should extend to all 
areas of life 
Source: Authors, 2018, based on the Delphi method discussion on 9 March 2018, Brussels.  
 
3.1.2. Gaps in terms of EU competence in the area of employment 
One of the gaps mentioned in the Delphi discussion was the lack of EU competence in the area of labour 
issues. This however stands at odds with the current state of play of EU competence in migration and 
social inclusion, which is highlighted in Chapter 1 of this Research Paper. A Bulgarian trade union 
member responding to the survey said,  
“The problem is that European migration policy is being dealt with outside European labour 
policy. But they are interconnected. If the EU fails to provide decent working conditions and 
wages in all Member States, this will inevitably affect the migrants from third countries.”224  
The EU Employer Sanctions Directive (2009/52/EC) establishes minimum standards across the EU on 
sanctions and measures against employers of irregularly-staying TCNs. In particular, Article 6 of the 
Employers Sanctions Directive (2009/52/EC) obliges employers to pay back the wages for 
undocumented migrants. Nevertheless, our research shows that due to the lack of prospects for 
regularising status, many abusive employers are not duly reported as Directive 2009/52/EC does not 
protect the residence status of the victim, nor does it allow finding a new employment, so as to enable 
the agency of the TCNs. 
Four European Parliament interviewees were convinced about the need to treat the discourse about and 
policy approach to legal migration as an issue of employment rather than of ‘home affairs’.225 They also 
referred to the Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach 
to migration.226 At the moment legal migration is treated as an issue of ‘security’, where a ‘ministries of 
interior’ (prevention and policing) approach has too often prevailed over one focused on ‘labour and 
social affairs’ and fair and non-discriminatory working conditions.227 Two European Parliament 
interviewees demonstrated that this dynamic is also seen in the European Parliament. The issues on 
legal migration have been only marginally covered by the EP EMPL Committee, which is still 
                                                        
224 A respondent, representing a workers’ organisation/trade union in Bulgaria, e-questionnaire, February-April 
2018. 
225 Interviews with European Parliament (1), (2), (3), (4). 
226 European Parliament (2016), Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for 
a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
227 Interviews with European Parliament (1), (2), (3).  
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responsible for the Equal Treatment issues (Article 79.2.b TFEU), and instead have fallen mainly under 
the mandate of the LIBE Committee, which is mainly responsible for negotiations on entry and 
residency conditions (Article 79.2.a TFEU).228 Similar dynamics can be expected to happen at national 
levels. However, as one interviewee highlighted, sometimes ministries of interior have been more open 
to EU proposals than ministries of social affairs and labour, which see themselves as “protecting labour 
market from social dumping”.229 
 
3.1.3. Gaps in terms of EU non-discrimination legislation and policies 
A recent study published by the EU Agency on Fundamental Rights (FRA) highlights that in light of 
greater perceived discrimination and hate crime incidents by TCNs in the EU, there is an important gap 
to be filled in the EU legislation which at the moment allows discrimination on the basis of nationality.230 
The FRA study emphasises that 
 
“while migrants are protected from discrimination on the basis of ethnic or racial origin, in 16 
Member States they are not protected against discrimination on the basis of their nationality or 
migrant, refugee or foreigner status. Given that fundamental rights and equality are the basis of 
the EU and among the shared values common to the Member States (Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and Article 21 of the Charter), this may function as an obstacle to the 
enjoyment of equality and fundamental rights.”231   
 
The Delphi discussion participants confirmed the need for the EU to devise more targeted measures 
that tackle specific forms of discrimination arising due to EU migratory status and the lack of effective 
options to uphold and enforce rights and working conditions attached to each of them.232 Currently 
available legislative tools are the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), extending to all areas of life, 
and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), extending to all grounds of discrimination, 
including nationality and migration status. There are also two separate documents covering the issues 
on gender discrimination, such as the Access to Goods and Services Directive (2004/113/EC), 
addressing direct and indirect discrimination based on gender, and Council Directive 79/7/EEC on the 
progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social 
security. Table 10 showcases the gaps left by EU directives, in particular when it comes to discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality (as discussed in Chapter 2).  
  
                                                        
228 Interviews with European Parliament (1), (2).  
229 Interview with Polish official.  
230 FRA (2017), “Together in the EU: Promoting the participation of migrants and their descendants”, Study, Vienna, 
March (http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/migrant-participation). 
231 Ibid. 
232 Delphi method discussion on 9 March 2018, Brussels. 
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Table 10. Grounds for discrimination and affected policy areas, with EU directives that address them 
 Education Social protection Employment Access to goods 
and services 
Gender  79/7/EEC 2006/54/EC 2004/113/EC 
Race 2000/43/EC 2000/43/EC 2000/43/EC 2000/43/EC 
Religion   2000/78/EC  
Disability   2000/78/EC  
Age   2000/78/EC  
Sexual 
orientation 
  2000/78/EC  
Nationality     
Source: Based on EPRS (2017), “At Glance: EU measures against discrimination”, Brussels, April 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/603887/EPRS_ATA(2017)603887_EN.pdf ).  
 
There is a lack of possibilities for addressing multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination within 
the context of employment and other life areas as illustrated in Table 10 above. The EU’s added value 
in this respect has been confirmed by another EPRS study in the area of equality, which also called for 
filling not only legislative but enforcement gaps.233 This Research Paper finds that the absence of the 
Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive, proposed by the Commission and pending within the Council 
since 2008, adds to gaps and barriers in the EU’s law to address intersectional forms of discrimination. 
Also, as nationality is not included among the grounds in the Race Directive, this leads to a protection 
gap for TCNs, further fragmenting their rights across the EU.234  
As mentioned in Chapter 2 on EU principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘equivalence’, certain differential treatment 
of EU Member Sate nationals and TCNs can be justified as proportional and necessary for the pursued 
aims. Nevertheless, it is important to bring into account discriminatory impacts of such provisions. As 
Brouwer and De Vries (2015) highlight, absence of grounds of nationality in the Racial Equality Directive 
as well as in Article 18 of TFEU should not be a ‘carte blanche’ to discriminate against TCNs: 
“[I]t is time to (re)interpret Article 18 TFEU so as to apply also to TCNs [third-country nationals] 
...to allow TCNs to rely on this provision where they are treated differently on account of their 
nationality in any area falling within the scope of the EU treaties.”235 
The current Research Paper indicates that the very institutionalised and systemic nature of differential 
treatment of TCNs, depending on the first entry directive according to which they are admitted, has 
implications for their bargaining power, possibility to defend labour rights and fundamental rights in 
the receiving society.  
                                                        
233 Fachathaler et al. (2018). 
234 FRA (2017), op. cit. 
235 E. Brouwer and K. de Vries (2015), “Third-country nationals and discrimination on the ground of nationality: 
Article 18 TFEU in the context of Article 14 ECHR and EU migration law: Time for a new approach”, in M. van den 
Brink, S. Burri and J. Goldschmidt (eds), Equality and Human Rights: Nothing but Trouble?, Utrecht: Netherlands 
Institute of Human Rights (SIM), pp. 123–146. In FRA (2017) Second European Union Minorities and 
Discrimination Survey, main results.  
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3.1.4. Gaps in terms of accessing justice 
The literature has underlined how having effective recourse to the justice system constitutes a 
particularly crucial element for ensuring the protection of one’s fundamental and labour rights.236 The 
2016 FRA MIDIS II survey indicated that overall reporting of discrimination cases had decreased since 
FRA MIDIS I, which took place in 2008. The FRA study highlights that “EU-MIDIS I revealed that only 
a small proportion of respondents (18 %) reported incidents of discrimination they had experienced in 
the 12 months preceding that survey. EU-MIDIS II results show that the situation has not improved. To 
the contrary: only 12 % of respondents who felt discriminated against reported the most recent 
incident.”237  
Nevertheless, in the context of third-country workers, particularly undocumented migrant workers, the 
role of rights and ‘the justice system’ are often seen as ‘a last resort’, as it may lead to termination of 
employment and subsequent expulsion from the country. In addition, it may also be a costly option, 
where only those with sufficient resources could benefit and invest in access to justice.238 However, the 
EU’s Victims of Crime Directive (2012/29/EU) constitutes a positive example of addressing this ‘justice 
gap’. This directive establishes minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of 
crime, including hate crime. A more effective operationalisation of the Victims of Crime Directive 
(2012/29/EU) and providing possibilities for civil society to provide first legal information and 
cooperate with legal aid services could facilitate improved access to justice for TCNs falling under the 
scope of EU legal migration directives.  
The EU Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) was mentioned by a Delphi method discussant representing 
academia as transforming a directive of ‘shame’ into a directive of ‘rights’, highlighting in particular the 
right to access justice.239 Article 13.4 of the Returns Directive obliges Member States to provide legal aid 
free of charge in such cases.240 Several Delphi method discussants from civil society referred to the 
possibility that the threat of undocumented migrant workers being returned is often used by employers 
to intimidate and discourage their employees from seeking justice.241 However, as illustrated in our 
subsequent analysis, the threat is also present for those whose residence status is firmly tied to an 
employment contract, and thus the termination of employment would result in losing the right to reside 
in the EU, such as those under Seasonal Work Permit. 
Barriers to equal treatment (B1) 
The Delphi method discussion identified the lack of equal treatment among TCNs and their potential 
exploitation in the labour markets as a key challenge to the EU’s internal and external credibility, and 
that concrete efforts should be employed to address such gaps. It should be stressed, however, that this 
is more an issue of lacking implementation and enforcement at the national level in Member States, and 
thus a barrier rather than a gap in EU law because all relevant legal migration directives and the Charter 
(see Articles 15 (3), 30 and 31) grant equal treatment to nationals with regard to remuneration and to 
most of them concerning other working conditions. 
                                                        
236 FRA (2017) Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, main results.  
237 Ibid, p. 15. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Delphi method discussion, 9 March 2018, Brussels. 
240 Article 13, para. 4, states, “Member States shall ensure that the necessary legal assistance and/or representation 
is granted on request free of charge in accordance with relevant national legislation or rules regarding legal aid, 
and may provide that such free legal assistance and/or representation is subject to conditions as set out in Article 
15(3) to (6) of Directive 2005/85/EC.” 
241 Delphi method discussion, 9 March 2018, Brussels. 
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3.1.2. Gaps and barriers with regards to entry re-entry and circular migration  
Gaps to entry, re-entry circular migration (G2) 
Circular migration has been defined by the European Commission as “ a form of migration that is 
managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries”242. Of 
the ‘first admissions’ directives, the Blue Card Directive sets the highest standard regarding the 
possibility for rights-based circular migration as opposed to time-bound temporary migration schemes 
resembling a guest-worker model. This means that the Blue Card Directive allows for facilitated re-entry 
conditions after absences from the territory of the host Member State. In addition, it means that Blue 
Card holders have the flexibility to “move back and forth” between their country of origin and the host 
Member State and at the same time keep adding residence periods that would qualify towards 
permanent residence.243  
With regards to seasonal workers, the EU’s approach is to provide for short-term stays coupled with re-
entry conditions. Since the transposition of the directive was due by 30 September 2016, there is still no 
comprehensive information for assessing what kind of measures have been put in place in national law 
and whether they contribute to circulation-friendly policies.  
ICTs can be given an option to re-enter after the end of the maximum duration of the last transfer, but 
Member States have a margin of appreciation to impose a gap period of up to six months (the so-called 
‘cooling off period’) between the end of the last three-year transfer and a new transfer application, which 
can decrease the motivation of migrants to re-enter.244 Therefore, whether this directive could be used 
to facilitate re-entry is in the hands of Member States.245 Because of the possibility of applying a cooling 
off period, interviewed representatives of an IT company in Bulgaria shared that this instrument is not 
attractive to them and thus they had transferred their employees to Blue Card or national permits.  
The Students and Researchers Directive does not stipulate any explicit facilitated re-entry conditions, 
which means that researchers need to reapply according to the general admission procedure246 and 
potentially make use of the visa facilitation instruments and visa-free regimes, if applicable. This is 
considered a wide gap, since these professionals are a very mobile group.247  
The Long-Term Residence Directive provides possibilities for circular migration and re-entry of settled 
TCNs after a certain period of time. In cases when holders of an EU long-term residence permit want to 
go back to their countries of origin for longer than 12 months, they are able to do that and keep their 
                                                        
242 Euroepan Commission (2007), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on circular migration and 
mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries, COM/2007/0248 final, Brussels, 16.5.2007, 
p. 8. 
243 See Article 16 (3) stating that for the purpose of calculating the five-year period of legal and continuous residence 
in the EU required for the EU long-term residence status, periods of absence from the territory of the EU shall not 
interrupt this period if they are shorter than 12 consecutive months and do not exceed in total 18 months within 
the required five-year period. 
244 Article 12 (2) ICTD. 
245 According to an interim overview of the implementation of the directive presented by the European Commission 
during a seminar at Radboud University on 10 November 2017, Member States seem to make use of this provision.  
246 Articles 7 and 8 SRD. 
247 See for instance A. Fernandez-Zubieta, A. Geuna and C. Lawson (2015), “What do We Know of the Mobility of 
Research Scientists and of its Impact on Scientific Production”, LEI&BRICK Working Paper 08/2015, pp. 3-9; see 
also Weert (2013), “Support for Continued Data Collection and Analysis Concerning Mobility Patterns and Career 
Paths of Researchers”, European Commission, DG RTD, Brussels, pp. 16-18. 
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permits only if the host Member State allows for longer periods of absence.248 Furthermore, in some 
Member States, the periods of absence are not unconditional.249 Here again, Blue Card holders can 
benefit from more favourable provisions and more rights. By way of derogation from Article 9 (1) (c) of 
the Long-Term Residence Directive, Member States are required to extend the period of absence from 
the territory of the EU, which is permitted for an EU long-term residence status holder, to 24 consecutive 
months for Blue Card holders.250 Empirical data shows that the limited period of absence seriously 
hinders geographical mobility and circular migration because of the potential risk of loss of status.251  
Barriers to entry (B2) 
The access to the EU labour market for TCNs coming to the EU is “subject to a wide diversity of 
conditions, requirements, and restrictions”.252 How easy or difficult it is to gain access to the EU labour 
market depends again on the profile and ‘legal status’ of the TCNs irrespective of their actual skills and 
qualifications, which in turn is a direct result of the sectoral approach to labour migration developed at 
the EU level.  
There are myriad obligatory conditions for admission related to a work contract or binding job offer, 
sufficient resources, sickness insurance, as well as optional requirements. Even the Blue Card holders 
that the EU wishes to attract face fairly restrictive admission conditions.253 For instance, most Member 
States use the option of Article 5(2) of the Blue Card Directive and require the applicant to provide an 
address in the Member State, which according to the data gathered on the basis of focus groups with 
Blue Card holders in Bulgaria is an additional barrier and can add to the burdensome entry application 
procedure when migrants are applying from outside the EU.254   
Currently, the Blue Card, Students and Researchers and ICTs directives contain wide discretion for the 
use of ‘threat to public policy, public security or public health’.255 Moreover, the European Commission 
proposed narrowing the possibilities of using blanket application of refusal on the grounds of ‘threat to 
public policy, public security or public health’ and to use it only for non-renewal and withdrawal in a 
                                                        
248 Article 9 (1) (c) LTRD. 
249 D. Vanheule, Mortelmans, A., Maes, M., & Foblets, M.-C. (2011), Temporary and Circular Migration in Belgium: 
empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in EU Member States, Belgian National Contact 
Point, Brussels. 
250 Article 16 (4) BCD. 
251 Z. Vankova (2017), “Implementing the EU's Circular Migration Approach: Legal and Migrant Perspectives on 
Entry and Re-Entry Conditions in Bulgaria and Poland”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Research 
Paper No. RSCAS 2017/34, European University Institute, Fiesole. 
252 Carrera, S., Guild, E., & Eisele, K. (2014) (eds.), Rethinking the Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration Policies – 
Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and beyond, CEPS Paperback, Brussels.  
253 European Commission (2016), Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly skilled employment and repealing Directive 2009/50/EC Strasbourg, SWD(2016) 193 final, 
PART 1/6, 7.6.2016, pp. 4, 6-8.   
254 European Commission (2014), Communication on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, 
COM(2014) 287 final, Brussels, 22.5.2014; Vankova (2017). 
255 See for instance Article 5 (1) (f) BCD, Article 7 (6) SRD, Article 5 (8) ICTD. On the wide discretion given to the 
Member States in the public security aspect, see C-544/15 Fahimian, ECLI:EU:C:2017:255. On ”public order”, see C-
240/17 – E, ECLI:EU:C:2018:8. 
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proportionate manner and when linked with the “specific circumstances of the case and respect [for] 
the principle of proportionality”.256  
The uneven use of the Blue Card Directive is striking, with Germany responsible for the large majority 
of issued Blue Cards.257 The Blue Card Impact Assessment concluded that such a situation is a result of 
different economic needs but also of the existence of “the national parallel schemes for attracting highly 
qualified TCN[s] that compete with the EU Blue Card and with each other.”258 The European Parliament 
saw it as “an incentive for Member States to invest and utilise the EU Blue Card.”259 In any case, the 
numbers of first residence permits issued by Member States for reasons of employment far outnumber 
those of the Blue Card, showing its limited overall application thus far.260  
In addition, the existence of parallel EU and national highly skilled/qualified schemes creates an overly 
complex landscape of rules, statuses and procedures. Member States have wide margin of appreciation 
- due to ample of the ‘may’ clauses in current BCD there are “not only 25 national schemes but also 25 
very different EU Blue Card approaches adding diversity to the migration policies addressing the highly 
skilled”.261 As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this Research Paper, so far Member States have opposed 
abolishing national schemes in the negotiations in the Council.262 
Regarding all ‘first admissions’ migration directives, Member States retain the power to determine the 
volumes of admission, as set out in Article 79 (5) TFEU.263 This means that they are free to set quotas of 
admission and reject applications when these quotas are reached. This, however, does not apply to 
admitted family members under the Family Reunification Directive. Furthermore, Member States can 
impose a labour market test requirement, which could also serve as a basis for rejecting the 
application.264 Most Member States have imposed such a test even on Blue Card holders,265 who are 
migrant workers considered to be in demand and “desired”. Nevertheless, for the Blue Card admissions, 
an Impact Assessment study concluded that refusal rates on labour market tests appeared to be low.266 
With regard to admitted family members under the Family Reunification Directive, the labour market 
                                                        
256 Article 7, para. 4. of European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled 
employment, COM/2016/0378 final - 2016/0176 (COD), Strasbourg, 7.6.2016.  
257 Eurostat data shows that in 2015, Germany issued 14,620 of the 17,106 overall Blue Cards issued by the Member 
States. 
258 European Commission (2016), op. cit., p. 24.  
259 European Parliament (2017), Explanatory Remarks on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
skilled employment (COM(2016)0378 – C8-0213/2016 – 2016/0176(COD)), 28 June.  
260 Eurostat data shows that in 2015, Member States issued 707,598 first residence permits for employment 
purposes. This of course includes not only high-skilled workers. 
261 European Commission (2016), op. cit. 
262 For the state of play in the negotiations, see European Parliament (2017), European Parliamentary Research 
Service, Briefing EU Legislation in Progress, Revision of the Blue Card Directive 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603942/EPRS_BRI(2017)603942_EN.pdf). 
263 The term “first admissions directives” is borrowed from Barnard (2016) and in this text refers to the Seasonal 
Workers Directive, Blue Card Directive, the Intra-corporate Transferees Directive and the Students and Researchers 
Directive. 
264 See Article 8 (3) SWD and Article 8 (2) BCD. Member States cannot apply a labour market test to intra-corporate 
transferees, unless required by an Act of Accession. See Recital 21 of ICTD Preamble.  
265 European Commission (2014). 
266 European Commission (2016), op. cit., Annex 7 Analysis Related to Variations of the Admission Conditions of 
the EU Blue Card, p. 196.   
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test is possible only during the first year.267 It can also serve as a barrier to accessing a second Member 
State under the Long-Term Residence Directive.268 The OECD has highlighted that labour market tests 
vary across Member States, thereby creating a context characterised by a lack of clarity and simplicity.269 
According to its report, there is scope for the EU to clarify the nature of labour market tests and ensure 
equal consideration of all EU/EAA nationals and residing TCNs with full access to the labour market.270 
Barriers to re-entry as part of circular migration (B3) 
Even though the Blue Card Directive provides opportunities for rights-based circular migration, 
Member States have discretion to restrict in their national law the periods of absences from their 
territories to specific cases only, which is considered a barrier.271 Furthermore, the failure of the Blue 
Card Directive to support the EU in its competition for global talent and attract highly qualified/skilled 
TCNs, as well as empirical legal research on the implementation of the Directive, shows that even 
though this instrument provides for flexibility of the migration trajectory and rights-based circular 
migration, it has not been used widely due to the restrictive admission conditions and differing 
implementation at national level.272  
Delphi discussion participants indicated that it is important to have ‘circular migration’ as an option, 
not as an obligation, through minimising bureaucratic hurdles for entry and exit. As Graeme Hugo 
highlights, ‘circular migration’ is not a panacea itself. In order to be a ‘triple-win’ – for migrants and 
sending and receiving countries – it should be managed well, for instance by reducing individual 
mobility costs by enabling dual citizenship and portability of social benefits and minimising the 
disruption of family life.273 Similarly, Solé et al. (2016) concludes that circular migration should be seen 
not as simple movement back and forth but as within the additional layers of policies on “return 
management, xenophobic attitudes, welfare system stability, limitations of nation-states and so on”.274 
 
3.1.3. Gaps and barriers concerning work authorisation  
Work authorisation is an important policy area to consider with regards to TCNs in the EU. Very often 
their initial work permits bind them to a specific employer, sector and region for a period of time, during 
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274 C. Solé, S. Parella, T.S. Martí and S. Nita (2016), “Concluding Remarks”, in C. Solé, S. Parella, T. Martí and S. 
Nita (eds), Impact of Circular Migration on Human, Political and Civil Rights, United Nations University Series on 
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which they cannot change them. This can pose two types of problems for migrants. In case of job loss, 
TCNs may be inclined to either overstay in the receiving country or leave for their home country earlier 
than their work permits allow. In addition, the impossibility of changing their employment can increase 
their risk of exploitation and abuse.275 
Gaps concerning change of employer (G3) and barriers (B4) 
The EU Blue Card Directive and the Seasonal Workers Directive explicitly provide for changing 
employers.276 For seasonal workers, Member States must alow once to change employer, but retain 
discretion on how many further changes to allow within the authorised period.277 Within the first two 
years changes of employer for EU Blue Card holders are subject to prior authorisation of the competent 
authorities of the Member State of residence, in accordance with national procedures.278 There is a 
difference in treatment in this regard concerning the ICTs Directive and the Students and Researchers 
Directive. The possibility to change employers is only implicitly provided for researchers279 and ICTs 
are bound to their employer during the whole period of their transfer.280 In contrast, long-term residents 
are entitled to free access to employment and the right to switch employers in line with Article 11 (1) 
(a).   
Gaps concerning consequences of unemployment (G4) and barriers (B5) 
Of the ‘first admission’ directives, only the Blue Card Directive explicitly stipulates, in Article 13 (1), 
that unemployment does not automatically lead to the withdrawal of the permit, unless the period of 
unemployment exceeds three consecutive months and occurs more than once during the validity of the 
permit. In the case of seasonal workers, taking into consideration the possibility to change employers 
within the authorised period, this should implicitly mean that the sole fact of unemployment could not 
lead to withdrawal if the worker secures another job with another employer within a reasonable time.281 
Not allowing for a reasonable period to look for another job would take away the effet utile of Article 
15(3) of the Blue Card Directive and thus be incompatible with the EU law principle of effectiveness. 
The length of the reasonable time, according to the Court, has to be defined in national law. In the case 
of ICTs, unemployment would lead to the withdrawal of the permit,282 while the Students and 
Researchers Directive does not legislate in this regard. However, this means that only the Blue Card 
Directive explicitly provides for the possibility to find alternative work in case of loss of employment 
and this is considered a gap with regards to the rest of the sectoral ‘first admissions’ directives. 
 
                                                        
275 See N. Baruah and R. Cholewinski (2006), "Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies in 
Countries of Origin and Destination", Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International 
Organization for Migration and the International Labour Office, p. 115. 
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277 See Article 15 (4) SWD. 
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3.1.4. Gaps and barriers concerning choice of residence and access to secure residence status and 
intra-EU mobility 
Gaps in choice of residence (G 5) 
All ‘first admissions’ directives allow for mobility within the Member States and choice of residence. 
Technically, only seasonal workers could be limited to a certain extent concerning their choice of 
residence in cases when it is arranged by the employer.283 Even though the directive contains safeguards 
ensuring that the accommodation provided by the employer guarantees an adequate standard of living 
and meets the general health and safety standards of the respective Member State, it does not address 
employer-organised accommodation, which could lead to abuse and dependency and is considered a 
gap.284  
The Long-Term Residence Directive provides for the general rules on the access to this status. TCNs 
who have resided “legally and continuously” within the host Member State’s territory for five years 
immediately prior to the submission of the relevant application have the right to long-term residence 
status.285 Periods of absence from the host Member State which are shorter than six consecutive months 
and do not exceed 10 months in total within the five-year period are not considered an interruption and 
should be taken into account for its calculation.286 Prior residence “solely on temporary grounds” or 
where the residence permit had been “formally limited” is not calculated into the five-year period.287  
Gaps in secure residence status (G 6) 
A wide gap between different categories of migrants arises from the Long-Term Residence Directive’s 
exclusion from its scope of TCNs who reside on such “temporary” or “formally limited permits”,288 such 
as ICTs, seasonal workers and students. Nevertheless, the CJEU ruled in Justitie v. Singh C-502/10 that 
Member States must not automatically exclude persons on such temporary permits from EU long-term 
residence, since any resident with at least five years’ legal residence is a de facto permanent resident 
deserving equal rights and opportunities under the law.289  
Therefore, the only option for these two categories of migrants is to change to another national or EU 
permit that would allow them to accumulate residence periods for long-term residence status. On the 
other hand, EU Blue Card holders have facilitated access to permanent residence290 and the Revision 
Directive might give them even greater access to this EU permit.291 Access to long-term residence for 
researchers is implicitly provided in the Students and Researchers Directive292, which can be considered 
another gap, between SRD and BCD.   
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In addition, language courses, as an integration condition for long-term residence, have to be 
proportionate and accessible for TCNs.293 As CJEU clarified in P and S v. Commissie Sociale Zekerheid Breda 
C-579/13, the costs of the language course and accessibility of study materials cannot constitute an 
undue obstacle; for example, denying free courses to migrants and imposing fines for non-attendance 
is seen to contravene EU law. In the earlier case Commission v. Netherlands C-508/10, the CJEU clarified 
that course cost should not be disproportionately higher than the ordinary fees for renewing personal 
documents, such as an identification card or passport.294  
Gaps in intra-EU mobility (G7) 
Most of the legal migration directives incorporate certain versions reflecting Article 45 EU CFR in 
respect of intra-EU mobility of legally residing TCNs. Two types of intra-EU mobility are provided, 
presenting different policy objectives where the notion of ‘temporariness’ is relevant. Firstly, the goal of 
the Blue Card Directive and the Long-Term Residence Directive is for the person to move to a second 
Member State, find a job and settle there. Therefore, these two directives contain a residence requirement 
in the first Member State: 18 months of residence for Blue Card holders295 and for long-term residents,296 
after they have obtained the status, which means after five years. Secondly, the objective of intra-EU 
mobility in other directives, such as the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive or the Students and 
Researchers Directive, aims to facilitate a temporary movement to a second Member State and thus these 
directives do not require a prior residence.  
Depending on the specific directive, intra-EU mobility also appears under the guises of short-term or 
long-term mobility, which often depends on the exact length of residence that is foreseen in the second 
Member State. With regards to researchers, the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive297 and Students 
and Researchers Directive298 provide for both types of mobility. The Long-Term Residence Directive 
and Blue Card Directive envisage only long-term mobility.  
Here also, depending on the category of TCN and TCN worker the procedural and substantive 
requirements applicable to the exercise of intra-EU mobility, and the criteria applicable to their family 
members, vary substantially. With regards to family members, long-term residents,299 Blue Card 
holders,300 ICTs exercising long-term mobility301 and researchers302 are entitled to bring their family 
members when moving to a second Member State. However, from these four categories only the family 
members of long-term residents are required to have already resided with the sponsor in the first 
Member State in order to be able to move to a second Member State.  
Intra-EU mobility is foreseen for Blue Card holders, who can accrue years of residence within different 
Member States with a view to obtaining long-term residence in the EU. The European Commission, in 
revising the Blue Card to enhance intra-EU mobility, proposed lowering the number of years required 
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to obtain long-term residence status from five to three. Automatic recognition of Blue Cards issued by 
other Member States and having a single scheme for highly qualified TCNs were also proposals for 
enhancing intra-EU mobility.303 For example, European Parliament representatives and the European 
Commission official mentioned during interviews that gaps left by current legislation hinders intra-EU 
mobility, and particularly, the mobility of seasonal workers.304 The Blue Card Revision proposal 
contains the possibility of allowing to ‘upgrade’ from ‘seasonal’ to ‘Blue Card’ status. Interviewee from 
the Council of the EU has highlighted that even though such clause would apply to a small number of 
people, it was received negatively within the Council.305  
Interviewees representing international organisations highlighted that barriers to intra-EU mobility also 
stem from the lack of uniformity of international human rights and labour standards across the Union.306 
The latter was also confirmed by e-questionnaire respondents. One-third of them chose labour 
exploitation and general lack of legal access to the EU’s labour market as the most important gaps and 
barriers to address. Restricted intra-EU mobility and restricted possibilities for family members to work 
in the EU were seen at the lower end of the priority list (see Figure 11 below).  
Figure 11. E-questionnaire respondents’ views on the main gaps and barriers in labour conditions 
 
Source: E-questionnaire, February-April 2018.  
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304 Interview with European Commission (2); European Parliament (1)(2)(3). 
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Barriers to intra-EU mobility seem to result not only from different sectoral directives. These barriers 
are also attitudinal and social. For example, e-questionnaire respondents reiterated that the lack of legal 
entry access and high perceived risks of discrimination hinder living conditions (see Figure 12). Such 
attitudinal barriers add barriers not only to intra-EU mobility but also to the EU’s perceived 
(un)attractiveness. 
Figure 12. E-questionnaire respondents’ views on the main gaps and barriers in living conditions 
 
Source: E-questionnaire, February-April 2018.  
Interviews with national officials confirmed that in reality there are still major bureaucratic barriers, as 
TCNs need to reapply for residence permits and fulfil other migration control procedures when moving 
to another Member State.307 Interviewees representing EU institutions noted that Member States are not 
very keen to recognise EU Blue Cards and single residence permits issued by another Member State.308 
Delphi method discussants suggested that certain conditions for enhancing trust among different actors 
are needed – they mentioned transparency of the procedures and information sharing as the key 
condition for mutual trust to enhance legal migration policies.309 
3.1.5. Gaps and barriers concerning social security coordination 
Gaps (G8) 
Legal migration directives are relevant to TCNs’ social security rights but are not instruments that 
coordinate social security systems, thus the existence of social security coordination agreements 
between Member States and third countries. One can understand the actual entitlements for TCNs in 
practice only by examining these agreements in detail.310  
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Barriers (B6) 
The Delphi method discussion added that there is lack of clarity and coordination among Member States 
on social protection issues, particularly in relation to portability of rights and family benefits.311 
Interviews conducted with European Parliament representatives provided concrete examples of the 
difficulties and persistent inequalities and barriers for TCNs to enjoy social security contributions, 
including at which rate of currency they should be paid.312 
3.1.6. Gaps and barriers concerning the right to family reunification   
Gaps (G9) 
The Family Reunification Directive goes further than the universal human rights instruments and the 
case law of the ECtHR, and stipulates a right to entry and residence for nuclear family members.313 
However, it reserves this right only for migrants who, according to the Member States, have prospects 
of settling on the basis of permanent residence. Therefore, a wide gap exists because the directive 
excludes temporary and seasonal migrants, whose permits are for a specific purpose, with limited 
validity of less than one year and no possibility of renewal.314  
How easy or hard it is to reunite with the family depends very much on the category in which the 
migrant fits and in which Member State he or she wants to reunite with the rest of the family. Blue Card 
holders, ICTs and researchers are definitely categories that have the most-facilitated access on the basis 
of derogations to the Family Reunification Directive.315 They are exempted from requirements such as 
having reasonable prospects of obtaining the right to permanent residence, the waiting period 
requirement and the labour market test for admitted family members.  
Barriers (B7) 
The Family Reunification Directive permits a number of derogations, which can be seen as barriers to 
family reunification. Article 4 (5) of the Directive allows Member States to require the sponsor and 
his/her spouse to be of a minimum age, which is typically 21, before the spouse is able to join him/her. 
This requirement may only be used to ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages in 
Member States.316 The Commission’s Report on the directive’s implementation showed that most 
Member States make use of this optional provision.317 Moreover, several Member States apply the age 
threshold.318 The directive provides a narrow definition of the family members and their rights. 
COFACE Families Europe, in their response to the Commission’s ‘Fitness Check’, observes that EU rules 
ignore the diversity of family composition, thus “EU rules are made for a single type of family and the 
right to family life for those persons living in different family forms can be unachievable under the 
current legislation.”319   
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For example, children and most often female spouses become dependent on their sponsors’ status, for 
example to get long-term residence in the EU. The European Parliament has acknowledged this issue in 
the context of asylum, as “the integration process and rights of women and girls are undermined when 
their legal status is dependent upon their spouse”.320 Similar challenges are present for TCN spouses 
using family reunification avenues, where ‘dependency’ by design affects women more than men.321 As 
a result migrant women are more likely to suffer from the lack of access to their rights, including sexual 
and reproductive rights, and to experience heightened risks of various types of exploitation, including 
by the spouse.322  
As civil society evidence indicates, this makes migrant women and girls more vulnerable, especially in 
domestic violence situations, as they often risk losing residence status.323 In addition, income inequality 
adds to this dynamic: “In the case of sex, for example, discrimination resulting in lower pay not only 
leads to lower income, but also higher economic dependence on the spouse/partner, placing the 
individual at increased risk of intimate partner violence.”324 In addition, some Member States impose 
limitations on family members to access the labour market. Other Member States impose pre-departure 
‘integration tests’ that can be costly or impractical for many persons willing to reunite with their family 
members.325  
Applications for family reunification must be submitted and examined when family members reside 
outside the territory of the Member State in which the sponsor resides.326 Nevertheless, “in appropriate 
circumstances” Member States can derogate from this rule and also accept applications that have been 
submitted when the family members are already in the territory of the Member State concerned.327 
Member States have discretion to determine in which situations they will allow for these types of 
applications. Peers et al. (2012) comment that this provision could be interpreted to mean that Member 
States are not required to always permit in-country applications, yet they are free to set higher standards 
for family reunification, which do not necessarily need to be compatible with the provisions of the 
Family Reunification Directive.328  
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September 2017, URL. 
320 European Parliament resolution of 8 March 2016 on the situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the 
EU (2015/2325(INI)), para. H. 
321 M. Morokvasic (2008), “Femmes et genre dans l'étude des migrations: un regard rétrospectif”, in J. Falquet, A. 
Rabaud, J. Friedman and F. Scrinzi (eds), Femmes, genre, migrations et mondialisation: un état des problématiques, Paris: 
CEDREF, Université Paris Diderot-Paris, p. 7. 
322 L. Hoctor, A. Lamačková and K. Thomasen (2017), “Women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights in 
Europe”, Issue paper by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, December. 
323 ENAR (2010), ”Gender and Migration”, Factsheet 42, February.  
324 T. Fachathaler, M. Fernandes, A. Markowska, N. Meurens, L. Rossi & J. Van Caeneghem, (2018), Study for the 
European Parliament, ”The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Equality and the Fight against Racism and 
Xenophobia”, by Milieu Ltd for the European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels, 2018.  
325 For more details on these additional requirements see, K. Groenendijk (2011), “Pre-departure Integration 
Strategies in the European Union: Integration or Immigration Policy?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 
13, No. 1. See also T. Strik (2013), “Integration tests: helping or hindering integration?”, Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Displaced Persons, Doc. 1336, 4 December. 
326 Article 5 (3) of the FRD. 
327 Article 5 (3), second paragraph, of the FRD. 
328 Peers et al. (2012), p. 258. 
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In addition, before authorising the entry of family members, Member States have the discretion to 
impose additional requirements.329 These requirements concern public policy, public security or public 
health,330 “normal” accommodation,331 sickness insurance,332 “stable and regular resources”333 and 
integration requirements,334 as well as a waiting period.335 Integration requirements can be applied to 
family members of Blue Card holders, ICTs and researchers only after they have entered the Member 
State. These additional requirements can cause serious delay to family reunification and disrupt family 
life. To prevent it, the European Commission, in its Guidance for the application of Directive 
2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, encourages Member States to keep waiting periods “as 
short as strictly necessary”.336 
Despite the discretion awarded to Member States when implementing obligatory integration 
requirements, their national interpretation and implementation are subject to EU rule of law and 
fundamental rights scrutiny.337 According to the CJEU case law, such measures should aim to facilitate 
and promote family reunification and not unlawfully pursue migration control goals that aim to filter 
and limit family reunification.338 These types of mandatory policies need to allow for individualised 
case-by-case assessment in view of specific circumstances, such as “age, illiteracy, level of education, 
economic situation or health”,339 and must comply with the Charter.340 Restrictions must be interpreted 
narrowly and should not make the exercise of the rights guaranteed by EU migration law too difficult 
to exercise in practice. Such mandatory civic integration policies should be proportional and the 
proportionality test criteria should cover their accessibility, design and organisation.341 The principle of 
proportionality requires the conditions of application of such a requirement to not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve those aims. 
 
 
                                                        
329 For more details, see European Commission (2014), Communication on Guidance for application of Directive 
2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, COM (2014) 210 final, Brussels, 3 April. 
330 Article 6 of the FRD. 
331 Article 7 (1) (a) of the FRD. 
332 Article 7 (1) (b) of the FRD. 
333 Article 7 (1) (c) of the FRD. On that article, see Case C-558/14 Khachab, ECLI:EU:C:2016:285. 
334 Article 7 (2) of the FRD. For more information, see S. Carrera (2016), “Civic Integration Exams in EU Immigration 
Law. What Integration is Not in European Law”, in H. Verschueren (ed), Residence, Employment and Social Rights of 
Mobile Persons. On How EU Law Defines Where They Belong, Antwerp, Cambridge: Intersentia; K. Gorenendijk (2012), 
“Integration of immigrants in the EU: The old or the new way?”, in Y. Pascouau and T. Strik (eds), Which integration 
policies for migrants? Interaction between the EU and its member states, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers; Y. Pascouau 
(2011), “Mandatory Integration Provisions in EC and EU Member States”, in S. Bonjour, A. Rea and D. Jacobs (eds), 
The Others in Europe, Brussels: Université de Bruxelles. 
335 Article 8 of the FRD. 
336 European Commission (2014), Communication on Guidance for application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the 
right to family reunification, COM (2014) 210 final, Brussels, 3 April, p. 17.  
337 Carrera (2016), op. cit., p. 150. 
338 Case C-578/08 Chakroun, ECLI:EU:C:2010:117, para. 43. Case C-153/14 K and A, ECLI:EU:C:2015:453, para. 57.  
339 Case C-153/14 K and A, ECLI:EU:C:2015:453, para. 58.  
340 See Case C-153/14 K and A, ECLI:EU:C:2015:453, para. 53. This is also in line with Article 17 of the Family 
Reunification Directive.  
341 Case C-153/14 K and A, ECLI:EU:C:2015:453, paras 56-58 and paras 69 and 71 on the fees. Case C-579/13 P and 
S, ECLI:EU:C:2015:369, para. 49. See also para. 54 on the amount of a fine penalising failure to comply.  
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3.1.7. Gaps and barriers concerning recognition of qualifications 
Gap (G 10)  
Despite the existence of EU instruments in the field of recognition of qualifications, research shows that 
the recognition systems continue to differ depending on which country is in charge of the recognition 
procedure.342 Furthermore, equal treatment under the directives applies only when the migrants have 
already received their authorisation to enter.  
Barrier (B8) 
A specific type of administrative barrier is experienced by migrants working in regulated professions. 
As a result, in some Member States, they were forced to undertake ‘medium to low qualified’ jobs in 
order to support themselves during the long and cumbersome process of recognition of qualification, 
very often requiring the passing of exams and language tests.343 Therefore, risks of de-qualification, at 
least during an initial period, are higher among this category of persons. Therefore, the European 
Parliament called for “the speedy validation and recognition of documents attesting the relevant 
higher education qualifications and higher professional skills to be verified” (emphasis original).344 
3.2. Assessment against the benchmarks  
The presented analysis of the gaps and barriers across the legal migration instruments shows that they 
raise issues of differential or unequal treatment ‘by design’ on the basis of the worker-by-worker and 
sectoral approach and differential treatment of EU Blue Card holders, who are granted better and ‘fairer’ 
working and living conditions than ICTs, researchers and seasonal workers. Despite the fact that EU 
directives contain specific equal treatment provisions, Member States are still allowed to apply 
restrictions to certain categories of TCNs which are lower for EU Blue Card holders. Therefore, the 
benchmark for equality of treatment demonstrates that first admission directives allow for differentiated 
treatment of the different categories of migrant workers under EU law on the basis of skills, sector of 
employment and length of residence, and between citizens and TCNs. This differentiation appears 
unjustified in all cases and leads to discrimination because it seems to be driven by factors such as 
economic interests of the Member States during the negotiations of these instruments (Annex 3: Table 
23 for an overview).   
The assessment of the benchmarks in the area of work authorisation shows that only the Blue Card 
Directive and the Seasonal Workers Directive explicitly provide for change of employer, subject to 
specific limitations. In reality, seasonal workers have more limitations on changing their employers than 
Blue Card Holders (see Annex 3, Gaps 3 (G3)). This possibility is implicitly provided for researchers. 
ICTs, however, are tied to their employer. Even if one argues that ICTs are a special case of temporary 
posted workers and different treatment is justified, the added value of EU law in the field of legal 
migration could be in providing a more consistent approach to the implementation of this labour 
standard concerning the possibility of changing employers.  
                                                        
342 Z. Vankova (2018), “Circular migration from the Eastern partnership countries to the EU – the rights of migrant 
workers in Bulgaria and Poland”, PhD dissertation, Maastricht University, funded under the FP7-PEOPLE-2013-
ITN call of the Marie Curie Actions — Initial Training Networks funding scheme (Project number – 608417). 
343 Ibid. 
344 European Parliament (2017), Explanatory Remarks of the on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes 
of highly skilled employment (COM(2016)0378 – C8-0213/2016 – 2016/0176(COD)), 28 June. 
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Furthermore, the analysed instruments do not explicitly legislate for change of occupation, which is a 
direct result of the EU’s sectoral approach to labour migration. This means that depending on the 
transposition into national law, only the Blue Card Directive could fulfil the benchmark in the area of 
work authorisation pertaining to free access to employment in all industries and occupations with a 
maximum restriction of two years. This also means that seasonal workers cannot look for alternative 
employment other than seasonal work as defined by the respective Member States, as the majority of 
Member States require leaving the country in order to change ‘the legal migration purpose’. Allowing 
for such a possibility without being obliged to leave the country is another benchmark in this policy 
area (see Annex 4). However, Member States can provide more favourable provisions to TCNs who 
come as seasonal workers on the basis of bilateral agreements (Article 4 of the Seasonal Workers 
Directive).345 The application of bilateral agreements in the field of labour migration is in line with 
International Labour Standards.346 Moreover, only the Blue Card Directive explicitly provides that 
unemployment does not automatically lead to permit withdrawal (unless said employment is for more 
than three months), making it the only legal instrument fulfilling this benchmark in the field of work 
authorisation (see Annex 3, Gaps 4 (G4)).  
Facilitation of circular and return migration policies is another benchmark employed by this Research 
Paper. The analysis shows that Blue Card holders are the only category which can benefit from extensive 
circular migration-friendly policy options that allow for absences from the territory of the Member State 
while accumulating residence periods for access to long-term residence (see Barrier 3 (B3) in Annex 3). 
Furthermore, circular migration cannot commence without a visa application (unless migrants are 
exempt on the basis of their nationality) and depends on entry conditions. The Research Paper 
demonstrated that there are numerous barriers in this area related to application procedures, labour 
market tests and other requirements.    
The Research Paper also assessed whether migrants have a right to free movement and choice of 
residence within the Member State where one is lawfully resident. The assessment of this benchmark 
showed that all first admissions directives provide for mobility and choice of residence. The Seasonal 
Workers Directive, however, falls short of providing sufficient guarantees to address employer-
organised accommodation (see Gap 5 (G5) in Annex 3). Furthermore, of the first admissions directives, 
the Blue Card Directive and the Students and Researchers Directive (even though implicitly), are the 
only two instruments that fulfil the benchmark for the facilitation of prolonged or permanent residence 
(see Gaps 6 (G6) in Annex 3). In addition, The Research Paper identified different regimes of intra-EU 
mobility provided for the different categories of migrants (see Gaps 7 (G7) in Annex 3). 
Comparing the requirements for different categories of migrant workers, it becomes evident that there 
are currently four different regimes for family reunification (see Gaps 9 (G9) in Annex 3) and facilitation 
of these policies also depends very much on the skill level of the migrant. All highly qualified/skilled 
categories (Blue Card holders, ICTs and researchers), depending on their contracts, could enter and stay 
on temporary permits, which means that the temporary stay is not the leading factor when allowing for 
this right. Despite the fact that seasonal work concerns a temporary stay, these workers are the only 
migrant worker category excluded from the scope of the Family Reunification Directive and the right to 
family reunion, along with other temporary permit holders under national law. This is not in line with 
                                                        
345 There is still no available data on the application of the directive in different Member States and the use of 
bilateral agreements by different Member States.  
346 ILO (2010), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379, ILO Note based 
on International Labour Standards with reference to relevant regional standards, p. 6 
(www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-
brussels/documents/genericdocument/wcms_168539.pdf). 
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ILO standards. Therefore, the benchmark on obligations to facilitate family reunion can be considered 
only partially fulfilled. In addition, the Family Reunification Directive allows Member States to impose 
additional requirements, which can delay family reunification and disrupt family life. The CJEU has on 
several occasions underlined the need for Member States to apply the directives consistently with 
fundamental rights norms.347  
The assessment of the benchmarks in the field of social security coordination and recognition of 
qualifications (see Annex 3 and Annex 4) shows that the current EU legal migration acquis does not 
remedy barriers in the field of recognition of qualifications and social security coordination related to 
the developed national instruments in the Member States. These barriers, however, concern all 
categories of workers. The Research Paper demonstrates that the first admissions directives are relevant 
to the social security rights of TCNs but are not instruments that coordinate social security systems (see 
Gaps 8 (G8 in Annex 3). For instance, these directives do not contain any provisions on aggregation of 
periods of insurance, employment and residence. For migrant workers this could mean that even in 
cases where they have fulfilled such periods in their home country, they might not be able to bring these 
into account in order to obtain the right to social security benefits that, according to the national 
legislation of the host Member State, depend on having fulfilled such waiting periods.348 Furthermore, 
none of the legal migration instruments provide for the reimbursement of social security contributions, 
which is another benchmark in this policy area.This Research Paper finds that the EU Single Permit 
Directive does not sufficiently address the gaps and barriers introduced by the ‘first entry’ directives. 
For example, t`he first admissions directives also fall short of fulfilling the benchmarks in the field of 
recognition of qualifications (see annex 4), and gaps and barriers persist especially when it comes to 
regulated professions (see Annex 3, Gaps 10 (G10) and Barrier 8 (B8). The presented analysis and 
benchmarks assessment shows that the conclusion drawn in 2011 by Peers is still valid: “the EU is still 
some way off developing a fair and comprehensive policy on legal immigration”.349 There is a clear role 
for the EU to contribute to promoting and ensuring a common level playing field of international and 
regional human rights and labour standards protection (non-discrimination among workers); 
otherwise, effectiveness of EU secondary law on legal migration could be undermined. 
.  
                                                        
347 See for example on the Family Reunification Directive: CJEU, Grand Chamber, Case C-540/03, European 
Parliament v. Council, ECR 2006 I-5809, 27.06.2006. 
348 See also H. Verschueren (forthcoming), “Employment and Social Security Rights of Third-Country Nationals 
under EU Labour Migration Directives”, European Journal of Social Security. 
349 Peers (2011), p. 499. 
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CHAPTER 4.  GAPS AND BARRIERS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON 
INDIVIDUALS 
 
 
 
Negative public attitudes toward migration in general and TCNs in particular, discrimination in 
employment and labour exploitation are relevant to the cost of non-Europe in migration as they are both 
-  barriers and individual impacts. In our analysis, negative public attitudes, discrimination and labour 
exploitation result from current gaps and barriers identified in Chapter 3. This Chapter builds on 
qualitative and quantitative evidence to use in econometric analysis (Chapter 5) and status quo 
assessment (Chapter 6).  
KEY FINDINGS 
• EU Member States that have a higher percentage of third-country nationals (TCNs) seem to 
be more positive towards immigration from third countries for employment. On the 
contrary, those EU Member States that are less exposed to the migration, though their 
nationals are more likely to use intra-EU mobility, remain most restrictive towards 
immigration from third countries.  
• The trend of very low numbers of EU Blue Cards issued to nationals of Sub-Saharan African 
countries and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). As of 2016 only2.2% of all granted 
Blue Card declarations were issued to nationals of Sub-Saharan African countries. There has 
been assessments of the ’brain drain’ phenomenon that EU legal migration channels could 
potentially cause in the Least Developed Countries. However not so much attention has 
been paid to the impacts of possible direct, indirect and institutional forms of discrimination 
and  other obstacles when persons from LDCs or Sub-Saharan African countries are trying 
to access EU and Member States’ legal migration channels.  
• This chapter further demonstrates how gaps and barriers in equal treatment increase the 
likelihood of discrimination in employment and society. The self-reported experiences of 
discrimination show that one-third of North Africans and one-fourth of Roma and sub-
Saharan Africans continue to experience discrimination against their ethnic or migration 
background. For a majority of them, discrimination is a recurring experience in various parts 
of life, though particularly in the area of employment.  
• Gaps and barriers regarding the secure residence status and the impossibility of changing 
employer, obstacles to establishing protection or being protected by trade unions, are likely 
to increase labour exploitation as bargaining power diminishes. The case study of migrant 
domestic workers illustrates the very precarious situation of persons who are not covered 
by any of the sectoral directives.  
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4.1. Public attitudes to third-country nationals 
Though the current research focuses only on the migration of TCNs to the EU, public attitudes cannot 
be understood without taking into consideration the intra-EU mobility of EU citizens. This was reflected 
in interviews with Dutch and Belgian officials.350 Europeans are highly positive toward mobility of EU 
citizens. Even in those EU Member States whose electorates responded with net negative attitudes to 
immigration by EU nationals in 2014 (Cyprus, Slovakia, Italy, Latvia and Czech Republic), by November 
2017, every single EU Member State responded with an overall positive reaction to immigration by EU 
nationals (see Figure 13, in blue). Every Member State also showed an increase in positivity during the 
period from 2014 to 207 except for Romania and Croatia, where positivity towards intra-EU mobility 
decreased, possibly due pending full membership in the Schengen area (see Figure 13, in blue).  
Conversely, Europeans report that immigration of TCNs evokes a far more negative response. In Figure 
13, in green, we see that by November 2017 only six of the EU’s 28 electorates reported a positive feeling 
towards immigration by non-EU nationals – Sweden, Spain, Ireland, the UK, Portugal and Luxemburg 
therefore remained exceptions from the rule. From 2014 to 2017 Europeans did not increase their 
favourability towards immigration of TCNs in the same way that they did to intra-EU mobility by EU 
citizens. Moreover, in 16 of the 28 Member States (or 57%) has become more negative. Having said that, 
the European Union average, when weighting by Member State population, has become more positive 
(as larger Member States are more in favour), although still more than 15% of the population feels 
negativity toward TCN immigration. 
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned 2017 Eurostat findings may have changed in the meantime as 
negative attitudes towards mobile EU nationals seems to have played a large part in the Brexit campaign 
and in French and Dutch elections. The use of traditional and social media in the latter campaigns seems 
to have challenged positive views towards mobility of EU citizens and migration in general. A recent 
study has shown that 10 weeks prior to the Brexit vote 99 front-page leads on immigration appeared in 
the main newspapers (78 of which – 79% -- were published in Leave-supporting outlets).  Therefore, it 
is likely that net positivity, for example in the UK, declined. 
                                                        
350 Interview with Dutch official, 12 March 2018; Interview with Belgium Official, 7 February 2018. 
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Figure 13. Comparison of net positivity towards immigration of third-country nationals and EU citizens  
   
Notes: Q1. “Please tell me whether ‘Immigration of people from outside of the EU’ (green) and ‘inside EU’ (blue) evokes 
a positive or negative feeling for you”. Per cent responding “very positive” and “fairly positive” minus percept 
responding “fairly negative” and “very negative”.  
Source: Eurobarometer, November 2014, November 2017. 
 
A small migrant population (Annex 4: Figure 26) as well as negative net migration (Annex 4 : Figure 27) 
can be also associated and correlated with the most negative attitudes towards migration. Exceptions 
here are Portugal, Spain and Ireland, which are rather positive on migration – these countries have a 
long, well-articulated and internalised emigration history. On the contrary, Member States in Central 
and Eastern Europe, before joining EU, had little exposure to global migration, with the exception of 
migration within the Soviet Union and satellite countries. Some academics, such as Ivan Kratsev, 
suggest the following interesting explanation for the emergence of the Visegrad block, which opposes 
EU level reforms in the area of migration and asylum: fears in this region are not based on actual 
Net positivity to third-country nationals Net positivity to EU citizens 
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experiences of migration but rather on the rise of nationalism and exploited fears of the one-nation state 
disappearing.351 
We can see to what extent Europeans see various criteria as relevant when deciding which TCNs should 
be accepted and which should be excluded. The pattern is fairly clear: around 80% of Europeans see 
commitment to the national way of life as important (between 6 and 10 on the 0-10 scale) (see Annex 4: 
Figure 28). Similarly, around 75% see the ability to speak the local language as important, while around 
70% see having relevant work skills and high education qualifications as important, respectively. By 
contrast, less than 25% see coming from a Christian background as important and less than 15% see 
being white as important. Other academics such as Taras and Green suggest that post-2004 accession 
Member States whose nationals just recently became mobile may themselves act as ‘gate keepers’, 
insisting on stricter individual or categorical criteria (being white, Christian, etc.) for TCNs to come to 
their country.352 
In Figure 14 we see the results to the question, “When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits 
and services?” in 14 countries that were surveyed in 2008 and 2016 by the European Social Survey. The 
countries are placed in descending order according to the proportion in 2008 of those who responded 
either that immigrants should only receive social benefits once they become citizens or that they never 
should, i.e. the proportion of the population who believe that labour market participation should not 
endow EU citizens and TCNs with equal rights. Slovenia and the Czech Republic were the only 
countries in which a majority (in both cases very slim) of citizens gave one of these two responses in 
both 2008 and 2016 (though in Slovenia strict views were declining, whereas in the Czech Republic 
especially the “Never” answers increased). In both years, a majority of citizens of Finland, the UK, 
Norway, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, France, Ireland and Switzerland responded that labour market 
participation for at least a year was sufficient to receive social benefits. This was also the case in Estonia 
in 2016 and the Netherlands in 2008.  
In terms of change over the eight years, in 11 of the 14 countries, the proportion of respondents increased 
who said that labour market participation or less was sufficient to receive social benefits. The only 
exceptions were the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland. Overall, a political trend exists, with 
Central Eastern European countries more likely to be desirous of restrictions on social benefits, though 
the trend is not absolute (see the Netherlands and Finland). This is also reflected in the current 
negotiations on the Revision of the Blue Card, where Visegrad countries are keeping a more restrictive 
approach. Again, it is important to highlight that in terms of single permits for TCNs (with the exception 
of Poland), these are countries that do not receive many TCNs and, as showed above, their net migration 
is negative. The Dutch and Finnish examples are interesting, as these countries experience more intra-
EU mobility of EU citizens than of TCNs who fill vacancies. Thus full rights upon receiving citizenship 
of a Member State may signal a cautious stance on intra-EU mobility of EU citizens. 
 
                                                        
351 Kratsev (2017).  
352 R. Taras (2012), Islamophobia and Xenophobia in Europe, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 89-90. E.T. 
Green (2007), “Guarding the gates of Europe: A typological analysis of immigration attitudes across 21 countries”, 
International Journal of Psychology, 14 November (https://doi.org/10.1080/00207590600852454).  
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Figure 14. “When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?”  
 
Source: European Social Survey, 2008, 2016. 
 
Negative public attitudes to migration of TCNs may be an indirect outcome of the EU’s complex and 
fragmented legal migration system. The lack of clarity in rules and statuses became easy targets for 
manipulation in the media, for example on social protection schemes – Who benefits under what 
conditions?353 Overall, positivity of mobility among EU citizens could on the other hand be attributed 
to the EU Citizens Rights or Free Movement Directive (2004/58/EC), in which the rights of EU citizens 
and their family members are clearly laid out. The CJEU has not been hesitant to add clarity and 
interpret provisions as to broaden the rights of EU citizens in light of EU values and general principles. 
For example, in Coman (Case C-673/16), the CJEU upheld the right of family reunification with same-
sex spouses, by interpreting “spouse” in gender-neutral terms. See also Annex 4:  for the attitudes of 
European citizens over the impacts of immigration.  
4.2. Experiences of discrimination in employment  
Discrimination on pre-existent biases can be translated in the interpersonal forms of discrimination (for 
example at work place) or take a more systemic shapes (selectivity rationales embedded and reinforced 
in policy making).  
                                                        
353 Moore and Ramsay (2017), op. cit. 
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The EU legal migration avenues seem to be most limited towards certain regions, such as sub-Saharan 
Africa or the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).  due to the absence of bi-lateral or multilateral 
agreements, .  The European Parliament LIBE and EMPL Committees joint report has highlighted that:  
 
“According to the Communication of the Commission on the Implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC in 2014, only 2,1% of the beneficiaries of the EU Blue Card during the first phase of 
the implementation in 2012 came from Sub-Saharan Africa. This may indicate implicit racial bias 
applied preventing certain types of workers to access to some more favourable statuses and 
therefore enjoying equal treatment with other workers or other family members. The lack of 
diversity among the EU Blue Card holders may reflect national policies and practices which can 
perpetuate forms of direct, indirect or institutional discrimination towards new candidates.”354 
 
Recent Eurostat statistics of Blue Card decisions granted by citizenship confirms a trend of extremely 
low numbers of Blue Card holders from this region.During 2016 there were only 455 decisions to grant 
Blue Card to citizens of sub-Saharan Africa355  out of total 20.979 decisions to grant Blue Card. This 
amounts to only 2.2% of all granted decisions in 2016.356  
The Commission’s Impact Assessment also acknowledged the very low numbers of Blue Card 
applicants coming from LDCs, as “[i]n 2013, 188 out of 12 963 Blue Cards (1,45 %) were granted to 
citizens of LDCs.”357  
However, the Commission’s Impact Assessmend focused on the ‘brain drain’ impact that the EU Blue 
Card Directive could have on LDCs. The Commission highlighted higher risks of negative ‘brain drain’ 
impacts on LDCs, providing the following reasoning:  
 
Even though it is hard to estimate the real benefits or damages of 'brain drain' it can be assumed 
that small LDCs 95 close to powerful economic regions are more likely to suffer from 'brain 
drain' than larger countries. This type of emigration may put the state’s economy at risk, and 
more directly, may affect the education system as well as the healthcare and engineering 
sector.358   
 
Therefore, the Commission’s Impact Assessment showed the strikingly low numbers of Blue Card 
applicants from LDCs that ”the potential negative impacts of brain drain are likely limited for these 
                                                        
354 European Parliament (2017) Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment 
(COM(2016)0378 – C8-0213/2016 – 2016/0176(COD)), Rapporteurs: Claude Moraes (Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) Jean Lambert, (Committee on Employment and Social Affaires), 28 June, 
Brussels.  
355 ’Sub-Saharan Africa’ counted as 46 African countries, excluding Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan 
and Tunisia and Western Sahara.  
356 Eurostat (2018) Table EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship [migr_resbc1], last update: 
30-10-2018. (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database). 
357 Commission Staff Working Document (2016), Part 6 of the Impact Assessment accompanying Proposal for 
Directive, on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled 
employment, COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016, SWD(2016) 193 final, p. 31. 
358 Ibid. 
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countries”359, not problematising  further why these numbers are so low, and how it affects the potential 
for development.  In the field of development, remittances are generally seen as one of the relevant 
sources of income for populations in developing countries and providing some of positive potentials, if 
managed properly. For example, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) highlights 
that:  
 
 The evidence suggests that remittances contribute to poverty reduction and improved health 
care and education, and constitute a significant source of external financing whose availability, 
if managed through appropriate policies, could prove particularly valuable for capital-scarce 
LDCs.360 
 
To counter these negative effects, UNCTAD proposes a new international support mechanism aimed at 
enabling highly skilled members of LDC diasporas to contribute to specialized knowledge transfer and 
to channel investment to their home countries. While six EU Member States (BE, CY, DE, EL, LU and 
MT) have opted in for the right to refuse an application for an EU Blue Card in order  to ensure ethical 
recruitment with the purpose of avoiding "brain drain"  as provided by the BCD Art. 8(4), however so 
far none of the EU Member States into agreements with Third Countries as provided by BCD Art. 3 (3) 
regarding ethical recruitment. 361 The Commission’s Impact Assessment has not problematised this gap 
either.  
While ’brain drain’ is an important phenomenon to be considered in designing EU legal migration 
acquis, it is highly questionable whether low numbers of people were the result of ethical recruitment 
policies. The verylow numbers for TCN from LDCs or Sub-Saharan African countries could be result of 
barriers and obstacles, such as those related to non-recognition of diplomas and qualifications (as 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this Research Paper) and also the higher likelihood of direct, indirect or 
institutional discrimination in accessing such schemes. Inability to access legal, safe and orderly 
channels relates to the ’brain waste’ phenomenon – for example, the costs as lost remittances due to 
qualified nationals working underqualified or undeclared work, falling into irregularity and becoming 
victims of human trafficking. 
Another systemic form of discrimination could be identified in diference of treatment of EU nationals 
vis-avis third country nationals. All EU nationals have a right to equal treatment/non-discrimination 
with regard to employment in Member States, while only certain types of TCN migrant workers are 
protected and only at certain stages in the employment life cycle. The discriminatory outcomes resulting 
from this picture need to be taken into account to establish the link. For example, the overrepresentation 
of TCN among overqualified workers, in comparison with the EU nationals, signals that there is a 
discriminatory outcome, that can not always be justified by lack of language skills or other objective 
criterias.  
The differential treatment of TCN in the EU legal migration acquis may be exerbated by discriminatory 
atitudes, which may place additional barriers in ensuring ‘equal treatment’. Negative bias towards 
persons of different ethnic origin, nationality, religion, skin colour are likely to translate to the 
                                                        
359 Ibid. 
360 UNCTAD (2012) The Least Developed Countries Report 2012: Harnessing Remittances and Diaspora 
Knowledge to Build Productive Capacities, UNCTAD/LDC/2012, UN Publications.  
361 Commission Staff Working Document (2016), Part 6 of the Impact Assessment accompanying Proposal for 
Directive, on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled 
employment, COM(2016) 378, Brussels, 7.6.2016, SWD(2016) 193 final, p. 30.  
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discrimination in the workplace. Some national studies also link workplace discrimination to the 
economic crisis; however, this effect appears to have diminished compared with previous economic 
crises. The risk of discrimination is higher for migrant workers than EU nationals, in particular, in the 
sectors that are more vulnerable to lay off during recession periods. The literature also frequently 
highlights that low-skilled migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to workplace discrimination.362 
At the same time, such workplaces, like seasonal work have lower labour rights protection standards.  
Another facet of discrimination identified in this Research Paper in the area of legal migration relates 
more generally to extensive qualitative evidence illustrating discrimination in employment and the 
workplace of third-country workers, in comparison to national workers. The fact that TCNs are more 
exposed to discriminatory practices in the labour market was also pointed out in the e-questionnaire 
results (see Figure 15) and during the Delphi method discussion. FRA Director Michael O’Flaherty 
highlighted that “immigrants, descendants of immigrants, and minority ethnic groups continue to face 
widespread discrimination across the EU and in all areas of life – most often when seeking 
employment.”363 
The situation of respondents with North African background and respondents with sub-Saharan 
African background continues to indicate the highest levels of discrimination based on ethnic or 
immigrant background. This is the case both in the five years before the survey (at 45% and 39%, 
respectively) and in the 12 months before the survey (at 31% and 24%, respectively). Those of sub-
Saharan African background mostly experience discrimination based on their physical appearance, 
while immigrants and descendants of immigrants from North Africa and Turkey more often face 
discrimination based on their names.”364 
In addition, EU-MIDIS II as well as EU MIDIS I respondents describe discrimination as a recurring 
experience in various fields of life, though particularly in the area of employment. FRA MIDIS II survey 
main findings indicate that respondents of ethnic and/or immigrant background regularly feel 
discriminated against at work and when looking for work (Figure 15). FRA highlights: “Of the 
respondents who indicated having felt discriminated against because of their ethnic and/or immigrant 
background at work, 9% said they experienced it on a daily basis. Meanwhile, 13% said they felt 
discriminated against more than 10 times in the 12 months preceding the survey.”365 
 
                                                        
362 European Parliament (2014). 
363 FRA (2017), Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, Main results, p. 3. 
364 Ibid., p. 13. 
365 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Figure 15. FRA MIDIS II findings in the area of discrimination in employment  
 
Source : FRA, EU-MIDIS II, 2016.  
4.3. Experiences of labour exploitation 
The structural gaps in power relationships between employers and employees, nationals and migrants, 
in the absence of effective oversight and monitoring, still result in severe cases of exploitation and other 
types of abuse, including sexual assaults and rapes of migrant seasonal workers.366 The structural gaps 
were identified by Amnesty International to define labour policies as abusive when the policies by 
design give the employer control over the migrant worker’s residence status and/or when they tie 
migrant workers to a specific employer.367 For example, in Italy, “The non-payment of wages or 
arbitrary wage deductions, which are common instances, are often justified by the employer as 
payments for his/her ‘cooperation’ in the process to obtain documents.”368 
Interviews for this research confirmed that empowerment of migrant workers, such as by ensuring 
equal treatment, was seen of paramount importance when negotiating the Seasonal Workers Directive, 
                                                        
366 Info Migrants (2018), ”Female seasonal workers exploited and raped in Spain” translated from ANSA, 28 May  
(www.infomigrants.net/en/post/9502/female-seasonal-workers-exploited-and-raped-in-spain).  
367 Amnesty International (2014), “Abusive labour migration policies”, submission to the UN Committee on 
Migrant workers’ day of general discussion on workplace exploitation and workplace protection, 7 April 
(www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/Discussions/2014/AI_DGD2014.pdf).  
368 Ibid., p. 10.  
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although the European Parliament managed to enshrine it only after public reactions to the 
mistreatment of migrant workers in the agricultural sector.369 The Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Commission indicates that Seasonal Workers Directive promises some protection for migrant workers, 
such as labour-related rights and access to a “high level of healthcare”.370 Nevertheless, the willingness 
to properly transpose and implement it at national level was controversial:  
The directive has not sufficiently addressed the specifics of seasonal workers and the role of 
temporary work agencies and disregards difficulties to inform seasonal workers on their rights. 
Additionally, it lacks clear obligations to actually monitor the implementation and secure effective 
implementation. Similar to the comments in the second evaluation of the sanctions directive it 
includes the risk of having a formal implementation of a directive without the intended effect.371 
Nevertheless, those not falling into any categories for first admissions directives and also falling outside 
national legal migration categories remain not covered by Single Permit Directive, such as those in 
precarious medium- and low-skilled jobs such as construction and transport, and particularly in the 
domestic work sector, are even more at risk of labour exploitation due to the absence of safeguards. For 
example, the global survey conducted by the ILO372 shows that TCNs are often over-represented in so-
called ‘non-standard jobs’, irrespective of their actual qualifications and skills, including domestic work, 
other parts of the service industry and construction. Those sectors may experience ‘social dumping’, 
particularly in wages, and increased labour market segmentation, with low-skilled and low-paid jobs 
becoming the exclusive domain of migrants.  
According to ILO estimates, in 2013 globally, migrant domestic workers accounted for 7.7% of all 
employed international migrants, and 17.2% of all domestic workers were international migrants.373 
These sectors may experience social dumping, particularly in wages, and increased labour market 
segmentation, with low-skilled and low-paid jobs becoming the exclusive domain of migrants.374 
Migrant men are disproportionately represented in temporary and temporary agency work in 
construction. Migrant women are over-represented in part-time, temporary and temporary agency 
work in domestic care, hotel and restaurant services, and in the cleaning sector. The ILO states that 
migrant workers experience great pressure to find work quickly in order to repay migration costs, and 
incur high costs while waiting for suitable standard job. They are also ready to work under less 
favourable conditions than native-born workers and accept non-standard jobs. Migrant women are 
prevalent in non-standard jobs in the domestic work sector, where the risks of labour exploitation and 
sexual abuse are higher (see Annex 8: Box 3. Case study: Third-country nationals in domestic work 
sector and Box 4. Case study: Discrimination of immigrants in the labour market).  
                                                        
369 Interviews with European Parliament, 21 February 2018 and 31 January 2018.  
370 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379 final, Brussels, 13.7.2010, p. 5.  
371 C. Rijken (2014), “Preventing exploitation through the seasonal workers directive”, conference paper, UACES 
44th Annual Conference, Cork, 1-3 September (www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1401/rijken.pdf).  
372 ILO (2017), “Addressing governance challenges in a changing labour migration landscape”, Report IV, Non-
Standard Employment Around The World, Understanding Challenging, Shaping Prospects, ILO, Geneva, 
373 ILO (2015), Global Estimates on Migrant Workers: Results and Methodology, ILO, Geneva. 
(http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_436343/lang--en/index.htm).  
374 ILO (2014), “Skills mismatch in Europe: Statistics brief”, Geneva, p. 12.; G. Lemaître (2014), “The demography 
of occupational change and skill use among immigrants and the native-born”, in OECD (ed.), Matching Economic 
Migration with Labour Market Needs, Paris: OECD. 
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CHAPTER 5: GAPS AND BARRIERS: ECONOMIC IMPACTS AT INDIVIDUAL 
AND SOCIETAL LEVEL  
  
 
 
 
This chapter examines the economic costs of the gaps and barriers in the EU legal and labour migration 
policies and their effects on inequalities in working conditions and socio-economic outcomes between 
TCNs and EU nationals. The economic analysis is structured in three steps: First, we compare outcomes 
of TCNs residing in the EU to those of EU nationals. Among EU nationals we distinguish between a) 
the nationals of their country of residence and b) ‘mobile EU nationals’ – EU nationals who currently 
reside in another Member State. We focus on employment, job characteristics, health, well-being, and 
intra-EU mobility (sub-chapter 5.1.). Second, we evaluate to what extent legal gaps and barriers related 
to the status of a ‘third-country national worker’ can explain the documented differences in outcomes 
between TCNs and EU nationals (sub-chapter 5.2.). This evaluation draws on the original econometric 
analysis. As a third step (sub-chapter 5.3.), we use the results of the analysis to translate the impact of 
gaps and barriers into qualitative estimates of impacts at the individual level (from a TCNs’ perspective) 
and societal level (Member States’ perspective). They are subsequently quantified in Chapter 6.  
KEY FINDINGS 
• Legal gaps and barriers (restricted access to the labour market, restrictions on job mobility, 
re-entry and circular migration, insecure residence status) can indeed explain some 
differences in economic outcomes between third-country nationals (TCNs) and mobile EU 
citizens with similar observable characteristics.   
• Restricted access to the labour market limits employment opportunities of TCNs in the EU. 
Even though the labour market restrictions usually apply in the first year(s) since arrival to 
the EU, they can leave a longer-term scarring effect and lower later labour market 
attachment.  
• A combination of legal gaps and barriers increases the likelihood for TCNs to work part-
time and results in lower incidence of having a permanent contract. Moreover, for TCN 
men, legal gaps and barriers can explain part of the wage gap (vis-à-vis mobile EU citizens 
with similar characteristics).  
• TCNs consider barriers to recognition of qualifications the main obstacle to getting a job 
matching their skills. These barriers are more formidable for TCNs than for mobile EU 
citizens.  
• Barriers to intra-EU mobility indeed make TCNs less mobile compared to EU nationals. 
This might have negative implications for adjustment to changes in economic conditions, 
knowledge flows within the EU, and for EU attractiveness to skilled immigrants.  
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5.1 Differences in outcomes between third-country nationals and EU nationals 
The starting point of the analysis is to investigate differences in various outcomes between TCNs and 
EU nationals. Differences in employment rates, wages, work and life conditions between TCNs and 
comparable EU nationals may point to the fact that the former, due to their administrative status, face 
legal gaps and barriers resulting in both individual and economic costs. We specifically compare 
outcomes of TCNs not only with those of the native population, but also with outcomes of mobile EU 
nationals (EU nationals having exercised their right to move and residing in another Member State). 
This allows us to filter out possible effects of gaps and barriers related to a ‘foreign national’ status in 
general.  
The objective of this descriptive exercise is to complement the legal analysis of gaps and barriers 
stemming from the current EU approach to legal migration policies (see Chapter 3) with quantitative 
analysis. We employ two representative and harmonised data sets: Eurostat Labour Force Survey - Ad-
hoc Modules on Migration in 2008 and 2014 (EU LFS) and the European Social Survey (ESS). Both data 
sets cover respondents across the EU and contain individual-level data on a rich set of socio-economic 
indicators. More information about data sets, methodology of the econometric analysis, and 
corresponding regression tables can be found in the Annex 5.  
 
5.1.1. Approach to descriptive analysis  
In the analysis to follow, we focus on individuals of prime working age (20-55) who live in one of the 
Member States in the year of a survey.375 We always compare outcomes between TCNs and EU nationals 
while controlling for age, attained education, country of residence and survey year. In this way, we 
calculate conditional differences in outcomes, i.e. by comparing individuals with similar observable 
characteristics.  
In addition to nationality, we also always distinguish by gender. A number of studies have emphasised 
that in particular women TCNs struggle to integrate in labour markets in many EU Member States.376 
Therefore, it is important to understand to what extent legal gaps and barriers related to the ‘third-
country national’ status can explain such poorer performance of women. A plausible explanation is that 
women are more likely than men to enter the EU for family reunification reasons: among TCNs, 55% of 
women are family migrants compared to 27% of men.377 Based on the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 above, 
which highlighted the challenges faced by family migrants in the EU, it is then likely that economic 
effects of legal gaps and practical barriers are particularly strong for women TCNs. 
Figure 16 - Figure 18 and Annex 5: Table 28 - Annex 5: Table 31 in Annex 5 of this Research Paper report 
the calculated conditional differences between TCNs, mobile EU citizens and the native population in 
units of the analysed outcome. For example, employment rate is measured as a share of employed 
individuals (in percent of the population group). Hence, the bars in figures will show by how many 
percentage points employment rates among TCNs and mobile EU citizens differ from those of the native 
population with the same observable characteristics. Statistically significant results are in boldface.378 
                                                        
375 We limit the sample to the individuals in the prime working age in order to focus on gaps and barriers 
experienced by working individuals. The results for older individuals (over 55) are likely to be confounded by, 
among other things, different pension schedules between TCNs and other individuals.    
376 See, for instance, Barslund et al. (2017),  MEDAM (2017), Tanay et al. (2016). 
377 EU LFS Ad-hoc Module on Migration (2014). 
378 Statistically significant results are different from zero with at least 90% confidence.   
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For simplicity of exposition, we refer to point estimates, standard errors are provided in corresponding 
tables in the Annex 5. 
 
5.1.2. Differences in work-related outcomes  
Figure 16 illustrates conditional differences in work-related outcomes: employment rate, monthly pay, 
and job characteristics. Even when controlling for gender, age, and education, foreign nationals (both 
from third countries and EU mobile nationals) differ from the native population across almost all 
considered work-related outcomes. Moreover, there are statistically significant differences in outcomes 
between TCNs and mobile EU citizens.  
Figure 16 Conditional differences in work-related outcomes between third-country nationals and mobile EU nationals 
(nationals, referred to as ‘native population’ in the text, is a reference group) 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018 using EU LFS, 2008 and 2014 waves.  
Note: Statistically significant results are in boldface. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member 
State in the years of survey. Numbers below column titles show the average of an outcome for the native population 
(nationals of their country of residence). All reported differences are conditional on gender, age group, education, country 
of residence and interview year. Data on overqualification and monthly pay are available only for 2014. Corresponding 
table: Annex 5: Table 28.  
 
For men, the employment rates of TCNs are 5 percentage points lower compared to those of the native 
population and of mobile EU citizens. Conditional on being employed, men TCNs are also more likely 
to be overqualified for their job and to work part-time and less likely to have a permanent job and exert 
supervisory responsibilities. Reported wage income of men TCNs is lower by about 1 decile (roughly 
equivalent to €2,000 per year) when compared to the native population of the same age and education 
and by about 0.7 decile when compared to mobile EU nationals.379  
                                                        
379 The EU LFS reports monthly (take-home) pay from the main job in deciles. To proxy monetary equivalents, we 
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At the same time, we do not detect any significant differences for men TCNs in reported atypical work. 
Annex 5: Table 29 shows whether the results are driven by sorting of men TCNs to different industries 
and occupations. Were this the case, once we control for industry and occupation, the differences in 
outcomes would disappear. Yet the results show that such sorting only partially explains the wage gap 
and the differences in contract duration or supervisory responsibilities between men TCNs and EU 
nationals.  
For women, the largest difference relates to employment rates: women TCNs are 16 percentage points 
less likely to be employed than native women and 13.5 percentage points less likely to be employed 
than mobile EU women. Conditional on employment, there are still substantial differences relative to 
the native women in terms of wage income, overqualification, contract duration, supervisory 
responsibilities, and part-time and atypical work. However, the differences between women TCNs and 
mobile EU women are less stark in terms of both statistical significance and magnitudes. This could be 
explained by the fact that harsher barriers at the entry to the labour market make it unfeasible (or less 
worthwhile) for women TCNs to pursue a job of low quality. The presence of barriers at entry also leads 
to more concentration of women TCNs (relative to men TCNs) in specific occupations. Annex 5: Table 
29 shows that if we control for occupation and industry of work, differences between women TCNs and 
mobile EU women disappear.  
5.1.3. Differences in life quality  
We further use the ESS data to investigate whether TCNs are different from EU nationals in terms of 
‘life quality’. Figure 17 presents the results; as in the previous analysis, we control for gender, age, 
education, country of residence and year of the survey.  
Figure 17. Conditional differences in life quality between third-country nationals and mobile EU citizens (nationals, 
referred to as ‘native population’ in the text, is a reference group) 
 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018 using ESS, 2002-2016 waves.  
                                                        
made use of the EU-SweLC data (ilc_di01 dataset, Eurostat) on income distribution and computed the difference 
between the 5th and 4th income percentiles in the EU.  
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Note: Statistically significant results are in boldface. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member 
State in the years of survey. Numbers below column titles show the average of an outcome for the native population 
(nationals of their country of residence). All reported differences are conditional on gender, age group, education, country 
of residence and interview year. In the data, we cannot directly observe nationality of respondents, but know if an 
individual is a national of the country of residence. If an individual is not national of his/her country of residence, we 
proxy his/her nationality by the country of birth. Corresponding table: Annex 5: Table 30.  
 
The results give a somewhat mixed picture. For instance, TCNs report lower health380 and lower 
happiness than mobile EU nationals, however, these differences are very small in magnitude and not 
statistically significant. There are, however, striking differences between TCNs and EU nationals in 
terms of self-reported experiences of discrimination. Men TCNs are 18 percentage points more likely to 
feel discriminated than both the native population and mobile EU nationals. Women TCNs are almost 
15 percentage points more likely to report discrimination than native women (9 percentage points more 
likely if compared to similar mobile EU women). Moreover, the difference in perceived discrimination 
does not significantly decrease when the sample is limited to employed individuals. While perceived 
discrimination is a self-reported indicator, such great differences, particularly among workers and 
potential workers, are alarming. For instance, the recent FRA MIDIS II study highlighted recurrent 
experiences of discrimination where? of whom? (See Chapter 4). In addition, the tolerance to unequal 
treatment of employees and a lack of sensitivity to discrimination observed in Chapter 4 indicate the 
complex social configuration of this phenomenon, which often takes the form of indirect and 
intersectional discrimination.381   
The potential economic impact of discrimination was thoroughly analysed in the comprehensive 
European Parliament (EPRS) Study on the Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Equality and the Fight 
against Racism and Xenophobia.382 Annex 17 summarizes the available evidence on discrimination of 
immigrants in the labour market (see Box 4 in Annex 8 of this Research Paper). While the presented 
evidence relates more generally to discrimination against immigrants (who can be defined either by 
country of birth, ethnic background or nationality), the policy implications are important for defining 
EU legal migration policies toward TCNs. Specicially, wage discrimination against vulnerable groups 
can be influenced by institutional factors such as or instance collective wage bargaining could diminish 
wage discrimination against immigrants, while higher accessibility to trade unions and professional 
organisations for immigrants may improve awareness of their rights. 
5.1.4. Differences in intra-EU mobility 
Lastly, we investigate to what extent TCNs are different from the EU nationals in terms of their intra-
EU mobility.383 While EU nationals enjoy free labour mobility within the EU, TCNs face a number of 
legal barriers, which increase their intra-EU mobility costs. For the purpose of this analysis, we define 
intra-EU mobility as including situations when an EU national a) lived in a different EU Member State 
one year before the survey; b) currently resides and works in two different EU Member States.  
As Figure 18 shows, TCNs indeed have lower intra-EU mobility rates compared to EU nationals with 
the same observable characteristics (age, gender, education and industry of work). These results might 
appear at odds with the work of Jauer et al., who find that TCNs and nationals of new EU Member 
                                                        
380 On average, foreign nationals report slightly better health than the native population. This reflects, however, 
positive selection for migration: migrants tend to be in general healthier than non-migrants. 
381 FRA (2017). 
382 Fachathaler et al. (2018). 
383 In contrast to previous analysis, we do not distinguish here between the native population and mobile EU 
nationals.  
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States were more likely to be mobile during the 2008-09 crisis than the native population (nationals) of 
Eurozone countries.384 Although the results of Jauer et al. study are not directly comparable with Figure 
18,385 they are important as they show that mobility does represent an important adjustment mechanism 
to economic shocks in the EU, including for TCNs.  
Figure 18. Annual intra-EU mobility rates and conditional differences in intra-EU mobility between third-country nationals and 
EU nationals 
 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018, using EU LFS, 2008 and 2014 waves.  
Note: Statistically significant results are in boldface. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member 
State in the years of survey. Annual intra-EU mobility rate represents the likelihood that a given individual either resided 
in another EU Member State one year before the survey or currently works in an EU Member State different the reported 
country of residence. All reported differences are conditional on gender, age group, education, industry of work, 
countries of residence (current and one year ago) interacted with time effects. Corresponding table: Annex 5: Table 31. 
 
While differences between TCNs and EU nationals are present for individuals of all skill groups, 
mobility of low- and medium-skilled individuals appears to be particularly constrained (relative to the 
average mobility rate within these skill groups). Hypothetically, were the gaps fully eliminated, it would 
mean additional 11,000 low-skilled, 15,000 medium-skilled and 8,000 highly skilled TCNs exercising 
intra-EU mobility in a given year.386  
                                                        
384 Jauer et al. (2018). 
385 First, Jauer et al. (2018) define mobility solely as a change of country of residence, whereas we use a broader 
definition that defines individuals as mobile if they change a country of residence (only 27% of cases in our data) 
or work in a different Member State. Second, Jauer et al. (2018) can only observe aggregated net migration flows, 
whereas we can account for individual characteristics such as age, gender, education and industry of work, which 
are important determinants of mobility. Third, Jauer et al. (2018) focus on mobility during the crisis period when 
TCNs are often more likely to lose jobs than the native population and, hence, have lower opportunity costs of 
moving to another country.  
386 These numbers are obtained by multiplying the total number of TCNs in each skill group by their respective 
mobility gap. Data source on the population of TCNs: lfsa_pganws (Eurostat, 2018). Data source on education 
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The above results highlight that, relative to EU nationals, TCNs, on average, perform worse in the labour 
market, hold jobs of lower quality, report higher discrimination and are less mobile within the EU. The 
observed differences can be driven by multiple reasons. On the one hand, differences can arise due to 
still unobserved productivity factors: language skills, quality of obtained education, and country-
specific work and social experience. Missing country-specific human capital can contribute to the 
concentration of TCNs in lower job positions and less well-paid occupations. On the other hand, TCNs 
experience legal gaps and barriers, linked to their administrative status, which often restrict the 
employment opportunities and bargaining power.  
For instance, lower employment rates of TCNs can be associated with restricted access to the labour 
market, which appears to be particularly harsh on women TCNs. Lower quality of jobs (i.e. lower wage 
income, higher incidence of overqualification, shorter contract duration and fewer supervisory 
responsibilities) can be the consequence of insecure residence status, lower job and geographic mobility, 
and consequently lower bargaining power of TCNs. The presence of these gaps and barriers might also 
discourage TCNs from improving their human capital and ‘trap’ them in low-income jobs. The next 
section of this chapter aims at establishing causal links between legal gaps and barriers and outcomes 
of TCNs in the EU.  
5.2. The impact of legal gaps and barriers associated with ‘third-country national’ status 
This section consists of two parts. First, we use the EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration that explicitly 
asked respondents about obstacles they face in EU labour markets. We then estimate to what extent 
these self-reported obstacles are associated with work-related outcomes among TCNs. Second, we aim 
at establishing the causal impact of extending rights for TCNs (to those of EU nationals). To that end, 
we exploit the quasi-experimental setting (further explained below) created after the EU enlargements 
in 2004 and 2007. While this section does not evaluate the impact of all gaps and barriers analysed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, it speaks to the implications of several important ones: a) restricted access to the labour 
market; b) insecure residence status and limitations on re-entry and circular mobility; c) low mobility 
between employers; d) difficulties in recognition of foreign qualifications and diplomas; e) limitations 
to intra-EU mobility. 
 
5.2.1. The impact of self-reported gaps and barriers on work-related outcomes of third-country 
nationals 
Regarding two work-related outcomes, employment and overqualification, the EU LFS Migration 
Module (2014 wave) provides evidence on self-reported obstacles. Following the legal analysis of gaps 
and barriers in previous chapters, we are in particular interested to see how TCNs perceive the role of 
‘restricted rights’ and ‘recognition of qualifications’. In Figure 19, we compare responses of TCNs with 
those of mobile EU nationals to check whether indeed the perceived barriers are higher for the former.  
 
                                                        
attainment of TCNs: edat_lfs_9911 (Eurostat, 2018). We consider active population in the age between 25 and 55. 
Total number of TCNs as of 2016: 8.5 million. Educational attainment: 42.8%, low-skilled; 30.6%, medium-skilled; 
26.6%, highly skilled.   
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Figure 19. Obstacles among overqualified and unemployed third-country nationals and mobile EU nationals in the EU 
labour markets 
 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018, using EU LFS, 2014 wave.  
Note: Respondents are asked to identify the main obstacle to getting a job corresponding to their qualifications or to 
getting a job at all. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State in the years of survey. 
 
TCNs are indeed more likely than mobile EU citizens to name ‘restricted rights’ as the main reason for 
being unemployed or overqualified for their job: 6.5% vs. 2.2% and 7.1% vs. 2.5% respectively. While 
‘recognition of qualifications’ is not largely perceived as the main reason for unemployment, this barrier 
represents an important obstacle for TCNs to getting a job that matches their skills: 21% of overqualified 
TCNs name it as the main reason for being overqualified. To compare, ‘recognition of qualifications’ 
appears to be the major barrier for only 12% of mobile EU nationals.387 These results suggest that TCNs 
effectively face more barriers when trying to have their qualifications recognised in the EU. It requires, 
however, more research to investigate the roots of the barrier: first, difficulties with the recognition of 
qualifications in the EU for TCNs might result from the bureaucratic procedures and conditions for 
entry and residency inherent to specific national or EU migration status or a lack of information about 
the process; second, they may be due to imperfect transferability of human capital.  
In addition, the EU LFS Ad-hoc Module on Migration (2008 wave) asked respondents ‘[w]hether [their] 
current legal access to the labour market is restricted’. We then link answers to this question to current 
work-related outcomes of TCNs.388 To reduce omitted variable bias, i.e. bias due to unobserved factors 
that influence both work-related outcomes and reported legal restrictions, we use a rich set of controls. 
In essence, we compare two TCNs of the same gender, age group, education, and who are coming for 
the same migration reason from the same origin and living in the same destination for the same number 
                                                        
387 The difference still remains statistically significant when we condition responses on gender, age and education 
of respondents.  
388 The answer is counted as “Yes” if immigrants report that their access is a) restricted to employment for specific 
employers/sectors/occupations, b) restricted to self-employment, c) not allowing self-employment, d) falls under 
any combination of a, b and c.  
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of years, but one has a restricted legal access to the labour market whereas the other does not report any 
legal restrictions.  
As Figure 20 shows, legal restrictions have important consequences, in particular, for women TCNs: 
those facing restrictions are 13.5 percentage points less likely to be employed and 11.7 percentage points 
less likely to have a permanent contract relative to women TCNs with the same observable 
characteristics but with unrestricted access. The likelihoods of part-time and atypical work also increase; 
however, they are not precisely estimated. The effect on the incidence of supervisory tasks can seem 
counter-intuitive, however, first, it is not statistically significant, and, second, it can also relate to the 
change in the composition of employed women TCNs: while additional restrictions may be decisive for 
lower-skilled women to not take a job, they are not likely to discourage higher-skilled women from 
pursuing well-paid jobs.  
Results for men TCNs have an intuitive direction: legal restrictions on access to the labour market are 
associated with a 5.5 percentage point lower employment rate. Restrictions are also associated with a 
lower chance of having a permanent contract and with higher likelihoods of part-time and atypical 
work. Except for the effect on employment rate, the results, however, are imprecisely estimated. Such 
low precision is a combination of two factors: first, it is to be expected that restrictions on access to the 
labour market will be strongest at the employment stage; second, the measurement error of other work-
related outcomes is larger than that of employment. 
Figure 20. The role of self-reported legal restrictions for work-related outcomes of third-country nationals in the EU 
 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018, using EU LFS, 2008 wave.  
Note: Statistically significant results are in boldface. The sample includes TCNs aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State 
in the years of survey. Numbers below column titles show the average of an outcome for TCNs in the sample. All reported 
differences are conditional on gender, age group, education, migration reason, destination* origin, destination* arrival 
year, origin* arrival year and interview year. Corresponding table: Annex 5: Table 32. 
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Although we can account for observable individual characteristics of TCNs as well as for the destination 
and origin time-specific effects, the results of this analysis can still suffer from the omitted variable bias 
and can be thus interpreted as an upper bound of the true effect’s magnitude.389  
 
5.2.2 The causal impact of legal gaps and barriers for third-country nationals: the ‘EU experiment’ 
We further aim at establishing the causal impact of gaps and barriers for TCNs by exploiting the EU 
enlargement ‘natural experiment’. After the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, nationals of new EU 
Member States (NMS)390 who resided in old EU Member States experienced a change of status from a 
‘third-country national’ to an ‘EU national’. Effectively, this extended their rights concerning legal access 
to the labour market, job mobility, security of residence, circular migration, and intra-EU mobility.  
Yet this change in legal status (i.e. extension of rights) for NMS nationals, did not happen simultaneously 
in all EU Member States. Throughout 2004-14, NMS nationals faced different transitional provisions 
depending on their country of residence. For example, the UK lifted all restrictions for NMS8 nationals 
already in 2004, while for NMS2 nationals the restrictions were in place until 2014. Italy kept restrictions 
until 2006 for NMS8 nationals and until 2012 for NMS2 nationals. Germany kept restrictions until 2011 
for NMS8 nationals and until 2014 for NMS2 nationals.391 As a result, in some Member States, NMS 
nationals already enjoyed the same rights as other EU nationals, while in other Member States, they still 
faced the same restrictions as other TCNs. We can thus compare how granting more rights, i.e. extending 
to EU nationals’ rights, affects work-related outcomes.  
We conduct the analysis using EU LFS and ESS data, and thus the results illustrate an average EU case.392 
We consider the same outcomes as presented in the descriptive analysis. We limit the sample to TCNs 
and NMS nationals who arrived between 1995 and 2004 to ensure that transitional provisions did not 
influence decisions to migrate. To better understand the variation, which we exploit for this analysis, 
consider two immigrants from Poland, two from Bulgaria and two from Serbia arriving in the UK or 
Italy in 2003. All immigrants are of the same gender, age group and education level (see Table 11).  
  
                                                        
389 For instance, in the EU LFS we observe only an aggregated origin region of TCNs and not individual countries. 
The differences in both work-related outcomes and restrictions faced can be specific to countries of origin 
(especially if certain countries from the same origin region have closer ties – both in terms of language proximity 
and bilateral migration agreements – than others).  
390 NMS8, accession in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia (Malta and Cyprus were exempt from transitional provision). NMS2, accession in 2007: Bulgaria and 
Romania.  
391 Freedom of movement of workers in the EU 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_movement_for_workers_in_the_European_Union. 
392 Ruhs and Wadsworth (2017) use a similar setting and analyse the impact of the removal of restrictions in the UK 
for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals in 2014. They find that acquiring unrestricted work authorisation negatively 
affected NMS8 immigrants’ likelihood to work as self-employed, but at the same time the authors do not find any 
discernible effects on other labour market outcomes or on the receipt of welfare benefits.  
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Table 11. Illustrative example: time variation in the application of transitional provisions across EU destinations and 
NMS origins. Reference points: immigrants arrive in 2003; outcomes measured in 2014 
 
Extended rights:  
The UK 
2004 for NMS8 
2014 for NMS2 
Italy 
2006 for NMS8 
2012 for NMS2 
Poland 10 years since acquiring EU national rights 8 years since acquiring EU national rights 
Bulgaria 0 years since acquiring EU national rights 2 years since acquiring EU national rights 
Serbia 0 years since acquiring EU national rights 0 years since acquiring EU national rights 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
Note: This is an illustration using the UK and Italy as two examples. The actual analysis is conducted using data from 
most EU Member States (see Annex 5.2).  
 
As of 2014, all of them had resided in their destinations for 11 years, however, during this period, they 
faced different regulations. As of 2014, a Polish immigrant in the UK had held EU national rights for 10 
years, while a Polish immigrant in Italy for eight years. A Bulgarian immigrant in Italy had held EU 
national rights for only two years; a Bulgarian immigrant in the UK for none. Such a setting allows us 
to control for origin- and destination time-specific effects. The results can be also informative about 
longer-term effects: they show how an individual’s outcome will change with one additional year of 
having full EU national rights.393 
Figure 21. The role of extending rights (to EU national rights) for work-related outcomes of third-country nationals 
 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018, using EU LFS, 2008 and 2014 wave.  
Note: Statistically significant results are in boldface. The sample includes foreign nationals aged 20-55 living in an EU 
Member State and who had arrived between 1995 and 2004. The sample is limited to the nationals of new EU Member 
States and third-country nationals residing in one of ‘old’ EU Member States (AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, LU, PT, SE, 
UK) at the moment of the survey. All regressions control for gender, age group (five-year intervals), education, years 
                                                        
393 Under the assumption that the effect is linear in the years since receiving EU national rights.  
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since EU entry of the origin (otherwise zero), origin* arrival year (origin-specific time effects in the EU), destination* 
arrival year (destination-specific time effects), and interview year. Standard errors are clustered on ‘country-of-residence 
and year’ level. Data on monthly pay and overqualification is available only in 2014 wave. Corresponding table:Annex 
5. Table 33.  
 
Figure 21 illustrates the results of the analysis. In general, the statistically significant results are in line 
with the earlier findings on self-reported legal restrictions (Figure 20). The employment rate of women 
TCNs increases, on average, by almost 2 percentage points with every year since obtaining EU 
national rights. They are also less likely to work only part-time. For men TCNs, several job 
characteristics improve: on average, with every year since obtaining EU national rights they receive 
higher monthly pay and are more likely to have a permanent contract and to work full-time. Annex 5: 
Table 34 shows the estimated results for the sample of family migrants (who are often more 
constrained by legal obstacles in accessing labour markets than TCNs coming to the EU for work). 
Consistent with this, we observe a stronger effect of extending rights on work-related outcomes of 
family migrants from third countries. The employment rate increases by 1.8 percentage points for men 
and by 4.4 percentage points for women; similarly, probabilities to have a permanent contract and to 
work full-time increase.  
We repeat the analysis with the ESS data to estimate the effect of extending rights on life quality 
indicators: perceived discrimination, subjective happiness and health. Moreover, with this data set we 
can cross-check the result on employment (see Annex 5: Table 35). While the effect of extending rights 
is qualitatively confirmed for employment, econometric modelling does not detect any effects on 
subjective happiness or health of immigrants. First, as Figure 17Error! Reference source not found. 
illustrated, there are no detectable differences in reported subjective happiness and health between 
TCNs and EU nationals. This could be explained as for example, TCN tend to be younger than national 
population.  Second, the noise in measuring these subjective outcomes attenuates possible effects. 
Likewise, the econometric exercise does not capture effects of extending rights on perceived 
discrimination. As Chapter 4 and Box 4. Case study: Discrimination of immigrants in the labour market 
demonstrates discrimination is possible on multiple and intersectional grounds and needs to be studied 
in qualitative terms. Nevertheless, recent European Parliament study shows that when categories are 
lacking legal entry channels there can be grave revelations on the access to health services and increased 
mortality rates by 1.3-1.8%.394   
 
5.2.3. The impact of legal gaps and barriers on intra-EU mobility 
As Figure 18. Annual intra-EU mobility rates and conditional differences in intra-EU mobility between 
third-country nationals and EU nationals showed, TCNs are indeed less mobile than EU nationals with 
similar observable characteristics. Chapter 3 highlighted certain barriers to intra-EU mobility: among 
others, the need to obtain new residence and work authorisations, a lack of status recognition and the 
restriction on accumulating years of residence for long-term residence status.  There is evidence shown 
that many TCNs indeed delay their intra-EU mobility until they obtain long-term residence in one of 
the Member States (in most cases, this requires five years of residence). Poeschel uses a similar quasi-
experimental setting of the EU enlargement and shows that once legal constraints are removed (to the 
benchmark of full intra-EU mobility for EU nationals), intra-EU mobility of non-EU nationals increases 
                                                        
394 van Ballegooj, V., C. Navarra, V. Moreno-Lax, M. Fernandes (2018) Humanitarian Visas European Added Value 
Assessment accompanying the European Parliament's legislative owninitiative report (Rapporteur: Juan Fernando 
Lopez Aguilar), July 2018, Brussels. (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150782/eprs-study-
humanitarian-visas.pdf) 
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by 0.2-0.6 percentage points, which is a significant contribution given that an average gap in mobility 
rates between TCNs and EU nationals is estimated at 0.4 percentage points (see Figure 18. Annual intra-
EU mobility rates and conditional differences in intra-EU mobility between third-country nationals and 
EU nationals).395  
5.3. Qualitative estimates of costs at the individual level and societal level  
This section synthesises results of the legal analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 with the empirical 
findings in the previous two sections to qualify the impact of gaps and barriers in the area of legal 
migration. Following the econometric analysis, we focus on assessing the impact of gaps and barriers 
explicitly related to employment and work conditions of TCNs in the EU: access to the labour market, 
job mobility, re-entry and circular migration, secure residence status, recognition of qualifications and 
intra-EU mobility (seeTable 12). For this exercise, we draw on the findings presented in the previous 
section, where we estimated the impact of self-reported restrictions on accessing the labour market and 
the impact of extending rights of TCNs to those of EU nationals (see Table 13).  
Table 12. Gaps and barriers directly related to employment and work conditions of third-country nationals in the EU 
Gaps and barriers Direct consequences Direct individual 
impacts  
Societal impacts 
Work Authorisation -  
Restricted access to 
the labour market 
(‘Entry’ -  G2&B2)  
 
- Limitations -change 
employers (G3; B4); 
also as a consequences 
of unemployment (G4; 
B5) 
Limited employment 
opportunities 
 
Lower job mobility  
lower adjustment 
 
Lower bargaining 
power  lower wages 
Unemployment 
 
Overqualification 
 
Lower job quality 
 
Lower earnings 
GDP loss  
 
Budget burden 
Limitations on re-
entry and circular 
migration (G2&B2; 
B3) 
Lower geographic 
mobility  lower 
adjustment to shocks 
Fear of unemployment 
 lower bargaining 
power, acceptance of 
low-quality jobs 
Overqualification 
Lower job quality  
Lower earnings 
GDP loss due to 
overqualification 
Insecure residence 
status (G5&G6) 
Uncertain time 
horizon in the 
destination country  
underinvestment in 
country-specific skills   
Poorer long-term 
integration outcomes 
(employment, 
earnings, social 
integration) 
GDP loss  
Budget burden 
Negative attitudes 
toward immigrants 
 
Recognition of 
qualifications (G10 & 
B8) 
Employers experience 
difficulties in 
recognition of foreign 
qualifications  
Unemployment 
Overqualification 
Lower earnings 
GDP loss due to 
unemployment and 
overqualification 
                                                        
395 Poeschel (2016). 
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Difficulty to find a 
matching job  
 
Barriers to intra-EU 
mobility  (G7) 
Lower intra-EU 
mobility of non-EU 
immigrants 
Lower adjustment to 
economic shocks 
Unemployment 
Foregone earnings 
(due to lost job 
opportunities) 
GDP loss due to 
unemployment 
Productivity loss due 
to lower knowledge 
spillovers 
Lower attractiveness 
of the EU to foreign 
workers 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
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Table 13. Econometric analysis: summary of findings, individual impact 
Outcome Documented differences between 
TCNs and mobile EU nationals 
(conditional on observable 
characteristics)396 
Impact of self-reported gaps and barriers – 
restricted access to the labour market and 
barriers to recognition of qualifications – on 
outcomes of TNCs397 
Impact of extending rights: from TCN 
status to EU national status (for every 
year since obtaining EU national 
rights)398 
Employment rate Men: -5.2 pp                         
Women: -13.5 pp  
Men: - 5.5 pp 
Women: -10.6 pp  
Men: -                         
Women: +1.9 pp  
Monthly pay (decile) Men: -0.7 decile                   
Women: -0.4 decile 
Men: u/a 
Women: u/a 
Men: +0.1 decile                   
Women:  
Overqualification Men: +5.5 pp                      
Women: - 
Men and women: 21% of overqualified 
TCNs name recognition as the main obstacle 
(12% among foreign nationals from the EU) 
Men: - 
Women: - 
Permanent contract Men: -5.2 pp                        
Women: -2.5 pp 
Men: - 
Women: -12 pp 
Men: +1.4 pp 
 Women: - 
Supervisory tasks Men: -4.1 pp                         
Women: - 
Men: -                         
Women: - 
Men: -                         
Women: - 
Part-time work Men: + 8.3 pp                                   
Women: +2.7 pp 
Men: -                                    
Women: - 
Men: - 2.3 pp                                
Women: -1.5 pp 
Atypical work Men: -                                     
Women: - 
Men: -                                     
Women: - 
Men: -                                     
Women: - 
Perceived discrimination Men: +18.1 pp                       
Women: +9.3 pp 
Men: n/a 
Women: n/a 
Men: -                                     
Women: - 
Subjective health Men: -                         
Women: - 
Men: n/a 
Women: n/a 
Men: -                         
Women: - 
Subjective well-being Men: -                                     
Women: - 
Men: n/a                              
Women: n/a 
Men: -                                     
Women: - 
Intra-EU mobility, annual rate On average: -0.4 pp; low- and medium-
skilled non-EU nationals are more 
constrained. 
 +0.2-0.6 pp (Poeschel, 2016) 
Source: Authors own calculations, 2018 based on the results of the econometric analysis; pp: percentage point. 
                                                        
396 Summarises results of the analysis presented in Figures 16, 17 and 19 (see also Annex 5: Tables 28 -  30).  
397 Summarises results of the analysis presented in Figure 20 (see also Annex 5: Table 32).   
398 Summarises analysis presented in Sections 5.2.2  and 5.2.3 in particular in Figure 21 (see also Annex 5. Tables 33 -  35). 
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As Table 13 illustrates, legal gaps and barriers have some real implications for TCNs in the EU. For women 
TCNs, legal restrictions appear to strongly influence their employment rates. This relates to the fact that 
about 55% of women TCNs come to the EU for family reasons; especially during the first years after arrival, 
they still might face legal restrictions on accessing the labour market. This increases their likelihood to stay 
unemployed or to take jobs, which badly match their skills. Legal restrictions in the first years of 
immigration may in their turn lead to negative long-term implications: long-term unemployment due to 
scarring effects and eventual dependency on the spouse. Low employment rates among women TCNs 
further exacerbate gender gaps in activity rates and wages.399  
For men TCNs, statistically significant effects of legal restrictions are mainly detected on the intensive 
margin: monthly pay and quality of jobs. Legal restrictions reduce available employment options for TCNs 
and thus lead to lower bargaining power and hence lower wages. Unsecure residence status is often 
associated with employers’ unwillingness to offer permanent contracts and lowers incentives to invest in 
firm-specific skills by both sides. In line with this, our econometric analysis shows that removing legal 
restrictions leads to a higher incidence of having a permanent contract and increase in wages.  
Employers experience challenges in recognition of qualifications. As Chapter 3 has highlighted, recognition 
of foreign qualifications remains an important barrier, namely the difficulties and lengthy procedures in 
particular for the regulated professions. In addition, some of the native employers may also mistrust 
foreign qualifications, which can lead to discrimination of TCNs at the hiring stage or to wage 
discrimination of foreign employees. The discrimination (though not necessarily on the grounds of 
migration status, but also on ethnicity, race, religion, etc.) can partly explain wage and overqualification 
outcomes. Our findings show that TCNs who are overqualified in their jobs are almost 9 percentage points 
more likely than mobile EU nationals to name recognition of qualifications as the main reason for this. It is 
a more structural challenge as MS in the Council of the EU (and not employers) are unwilling to put in 
place systems to make it easier to recognise foreign qualifications as this clause was debated in the case of 
Blue Card.400 
Our analysis shows that TCNs are less mobile relative to similar EU nationals. This results in individual 
costs due to foregone job possibilities in other EU Member States and societal costs due to lower adjustment 
to economic shocks, poorer skill matching and lower knowledge flows. For instance, lower intra-EU 
mobility is likely to lower attractiveness of the EU as a destination for highly/qualified skilled.401 If this is 
indeed the case, it will impose a cost of lost opportunities. Several studies found a positive effect of 
migration on innovation though patenting in destination countries. Kerr & Lincoln use random visa 
allocations to find causal effects of migration on innovation and growth in the United States.402 They find 
that admission of highly skilled immigrants leads to an increase in science and engineering employment 
through contributions from the immigrants themselves.  
Hunt & Lioselle reach a similar conclusion; they measured how skilled immigrants increase innovation in 
the US.403 Using state panel data from 1940-2000, they find that a one percentage point increase in 
immigrant college graduates’ population share increases patent per capita by 9-18%. Another channel that 
may exert a positive productivity effect but is harder to measure may arise from the “place of birth” variety 
among workers. This may generate a greater variety of ideas and increase the variety of goods and services 
                                                        
399 Fachathaler et al. (2018). 
400 Interview with the Council of the EU, General Secretariat, 16.02.2018. 
401 Delphi method discussion, 9 March, 2018, Brussels.   
402 Kerr and Lincoln (2010). 
403 Hunt and Lioselle (2010). 
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supplied locally404 or enhance productivity.405 Bosetti et al., Parrotta et al., Ozgen et al. and Niebuhr find 
that cultural diversity is one of the main channels to generate new ideas and innovation in Europe.406 
Moreover, lower intra-EU mobility of TCNs also decreases their ability to contribute to knowledge flows 
within the EU. Kaiser et al. and Braunerhjelm et al. conduct firm-level analysis in Denmark and Sweden 
and show that hiring new knowledge workers increases a firm’s patenting activity.407 Interestingly, the 
former employers of these workers also increase patenting, which can be explained by reverse knowledge 
flows. While some Member States may be concerned about inner-EU competition for talented immigrants, 
Fackler, Giesing & Laurentsyeva show that free labour mobility of skilled workers within the EU in fact 
can positively affect innovation in both their destination and source countries.408 While mobile skilled 
workers are no longer inventing in their previous country of residence, they could contribute to cross-
border knowledge and technology diffusion and thus help their previous countries of residence to catch 
up to the technology frontier.  See Annex 9 for a brief description of other potential socio-economic impacts.  
 
  
                                                        
404 Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ortega (2015). 
405 Ottaviano and Peri (2006); Ortega and Peri (2014); Trax, Brunow and Suedekum (2012). 
406 Bosetti et al. (2015); Parrotta et al. (2014); Ozgen et al. (2014); Niebuhr (2010). 
407 Kaiser et al. (2015); Braunerhjelm et al. (2015). 
408 Fackler, Giesing and Laurentsyeva (2017). 
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CHAPTER 6. MONETISING THE IMPACTS OF THE STATUS QUO 
 
 
 
This Chapter synthesises the results of the individual and economic gaps and barriers provided between 
Chapters 3 and 5 and monetises the impacts of the forms in the area of legal and labour migration.  
First, following the econometric analysis, we focus on assessing the impact of gaps and barriers explicitly 
related to employment and work conditions of TCNs in relation to: work authorisation, job mobility, re-
entry and circular migration, secure residence status, recognition of qualifications, intra-EU mobility, 
family reunification, social security and discrimination. For this exercise, we draw on the findings 
presented in the previous chapter, where we estimated the impact of restricted access to labour market and 
the impact of extending rights of TCNs to those of EU nationals. We narrow the assessment to the area of 
employment due to the availability of comparable datasets and possibility to produce rigorous 
quantification.  
The gaps and barriers are closely interlinked and share similar impact pathways. For example, four of the 
five gaps and barriers are related to legal restrictions to employment for TCNs, although some groups may 
be more affected than others, in particular vulnerable groups such as TCN women, many of whom are 
family migrants. We focused our assessment on two key impacts: employment and wage level. These two 
impacts are translated into monetary figures of lost annual earnings (individual impact) and lost tax 
revenue (economic impact). The impacts on employment and wage level were obtained from the 
econometric analysis presented in sub-chapter 5.1.  
The translation involved economic modelling drawing on additional data from Eurostat such as average 
wages in the EU per decile (to correspond with the wage decile estimated in sub-chapter 5.1.) and the 
average tax rate per income level (to estimate tax revenue). Additional steps to support the modelling were 
also taken. This has included, for example, a linear extrapolation of income between deciles.409 The 
                                                        
409 Eurostat provides an average wage per decile. For example an income of €10,635 corresponds with the second decile 
of income in the EU in 2016 and an income of €12,563 corresponds with the third decile of income. A linear 
KEY FINDINGS 
• In this Research Paper we quantified and monetized the impacts for several gaps and 
barriers for TCNs as compared with the native population.  
• The analysis focused on two key impacts – employment and income – and assessed the 
implications for earnings of individual migrants (individual impact) as well as tax 
revenue (economic impact).  
• The greatest impacts were seen for barriers to family reunification, which was mainly 
due to the limited employment opportunities for spouses of third-country workers.  
• The estimated loss to individuals and society due to the poor recognition of qualifications 
was also relatively large. 
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econometric estimates are based on 2014 data. The key parameters are summarised in Annex 6 with the 
key parameters to assess impacts of gaps in employment and wages. We mainly used 2016 data for the 
translation of impacts into monetary figures.  
Table 14 below presents a summary of the estimated annualised monetised economic and individual 
impacts resulting from the gaps and barriers, which are described in greater detail in the remainder of this 
chapter. The estimates of lost annual income and tax revenue refer to the population of TCN workers 
residing legally in the EU. It is also worth noting that while our analysis focused on these two impacts – 
employment and wages – other impacts are possible but were difficult to quantify and monetise for the 
purposes of this Research Paper. Such impacts included health and GDP. With regards to GDP, a complex 
modelling effort would be needed to assess macro-level changes in labour force supply and demand.410  
Table 14: Summary of monetised impacts 
 Main Impact Estimates* 
Gap/barrier Employment Income Lost annual income for TCN 
workers in the EU, net 
(individual impact) 
Lost annual tax revenue 
in the EU (economic 
impact) 
Intra-EU labour 
mobility (G7) 
  €31.2 million EUR €8.5 million 
Recognition of 
qualification 
(G10; B7) 
  €3.2-5.3 billion €1.4-2.3 billion 
Re-entry and 
circular 
migration (G2; 
B3) 
  No estimate made 
Secure 
residence (G5 & 
G6) 
  Est 100,000 people affected; no estimate made 
Entry (G2&B2) 
and Work 
authorisation 
(change of 
employers 
G3&B4; 
unemployment 
G4&B5) 
  €1.1-2.3 billion  €445-891 million 
                                                        
extrapolation between deciles was made in order to obtain values for income between deciles.  
410 Some studies have investigated this issue. For example, one study investigated the potential economic impact of 
reductions in migration due to Brexit. The study found that a decrease in net migration of 91,000 could result in a 
reduction in GDP estimated between 0.63% and 1.19%. Per capita GDP would fall by an estimated 0.22% to 0.78% 
(Portes and Forte, 2017). 
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 Main Impact Estimates* 
Gap/barrier Employment Income Lost annual income for TCN 
workers in the EU, net 
(individual impact) 
Lost annual tax revenue 
in the EU (economic 
impact) 
Family 
reunification 
(G9&B7) 
  €6.9-8.7 billion €2.6-3.2 billion 
Social security 
(G8&B6) 
  Est. 100,000 people affected; no estimate made 
Equal treatment 
(G1; B1) 
  €21 billion €8 billion 
Note: *Author’s calculations unless otherwise noted. 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
6.1. Employment status 
In terms of employment, TCNs fare poorly compared with nationals whereas an ‘employment gap’ is not 
evident for mobile EU citizens (see Table 15 below). The employment gap magnitude of these differences 
may be explained in part by differences between these groups such as differences in educational 
attainment. However, our econometric analysis in Chapter 5 finds that the gap remains after controlling 
for other factors and that it is greater for females.  
Table 15: Employment rate by migrant status 
 Male Female 
Native born 77.1% 66.5% 
Mobile EU national 79.8% 66.4% 
Third country national  71.5% 52.0% 
Source: Descriptive statistics from LFS analysis - Ad-hoc Module on Migration, 2014. 
 
Several legal gaps and barriers stemming from the current EU sectoral and fragmented approach on legal 
and labour migration investigated in Chapter 3 of this Research Paper may directly contribute to the 
evident difference in employment rate between TCNs and national workers. Specifically, legal restrictions 
on intra-EU mobility may lead to a lower mobility rate and consequently, the exclusion of employment 
opportunities in other EU Member States. Restrictions on intra-EU mobility may thus lead to a lower 
probability of employment, especially for low- and medium-skilled individuals. Our earlier analysis found 
that legal restrictions are less evident for Blue Card holders. A lower probability of employment may 
translate into lower earnings as well as lost tax revenue.  
We estimated the cost associated with this gap by considering two scenarios. Scenario 1 was the status quo 
where low and medium-skilled TCNs exhibit lower labour mobility than national workers. Scenario 2 
considered a hypothetical situation where this population exhibited the same level of intra-EU labour 
mobility as EU citizens. The findings from our econometric analysis suggest that in Scenario 2, an additional 
estimated 11,000 low-skilled and 15,000 medium-skilled TCNs would exercise intra-EU mobility in a given 
year.411  One study found that labour mobility in the EU was associated with an increased 9% likelihood of 
                                                        
411 These numbers are obtained by multiplying the total number of non-EU nationals in each skill group by their 
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being employed.412 This study focused on refugees, and we assume a similar increased likelihood may be 
evident for TCNs in general. We assume that these newly employed individuals would earn the average 
EU-level wage by their skill category as well as gender, as estimated in Section 5.1. Based on this 
information we estimate gross earnings to increase by €31.3 million. The estimated tax revenue would be 
€8.5 million, leaving €31.2 million in net earnings.413 
The impact pathways for restrictions on re-entry and circular migration are expected to be similar to legal 
restrictions on intra-EU mobility, particularly in terms of bargaining power with respect to employment 
conditions. TCNs may not be able to access the same level of unpaid or paid leave as national workers, and 
this is especially a concern for low-skilled TCNs. No quantitative estimate could be constructed due to the 
limited availability of economic studies on this issue. 
Poor recognition of qualifications may also present barriers to seeking and securing employment. We 
assume that this is primarily an issue for a high-skilled foreign born population and that it can be proxied 
by estimates from discrimination testing studies. As described in Box 1 in Annex 8, a number of such studies 
have been conducted by sending two CVs that are identical except for the name of the applicant. For 
example, one study noted that call-backs were 50% lower for individuals with a foreign name.414 The study 
ascribed the discrimination to the grounds of ascribed race/ethnicity and not necessarily on actual 
migration status or nationality. Nonetheless, we consider this type of discrimination a proxy for poor 
recognition of qualifications, which is also a form of discrimination. More specifically, we assume that 
about 30-50% of the unexplained gap between highly-skilled TCNs and highly skilled national workers can 
be explained by poor recognition of qualifications.415 With this assumption and findings from the 
econometric analysis, we estimate the lost earnings and tax revenue associated with poor recognition of 
qualifications among highly skilled TCNs. In total, we estimate a loss of €3.2-5.3 billion in net annual 
income and €1.4-2.3 billion in tax revenue.  
The lack of secure residence has implications for obtaining of permanent residence and consequently social 
and labour market integration. Over the medium to long term, this gap may result in less likelihood of 
employment and poorer integration. Lastly, barriers to family reunification may have a multitude of 
adverse impacts, one being an adverse impact on the employment opportunities for spouses. As noted 
earlier in this Research Paper, about 60% of non-EU women come to the EU for family reasons. Barriers to 
their employment may reduce the likelihood of social integration and also increase the risk of poor mental 
health. These barriers may help to explain in part the sizeable gap in the likelihood of employment between 
TCN women and native women: 6% for the low-skilled category, 15% for medium-skilled and 28% for 
high-skilled.  
To estimate the impact of this gap, we considered a scenario where the gender gap in employment among 
TCNs approximates 80-100% of the gender gap in employment among the native population. At present, 
                                                        
respective mobility gap. Data source on the population of non-EU national:  lfsa_pganws (Eurostat, 2016). Data source 
on education attainment of non-EU nationals: edat_lfs_9911 (Eurostat, 2016). I consider active population to be aged 
25 to 54. Total number of non-EU nationals as of 2016: 8.5 million. Educational attainment: 42.8%, low-skilled; 30.6%, 
medium-skilled; 26.6%, highly skilled.   
412 Tanay et al. (2016), pp. 109-47. 
413 This estimation uses a tax rate of 27%, which is the rate for single adults without children with an income that is 
80% of the average wage. This wage level is comparable to the income level of low- and medium-skilled TCNs. 
414 Carlsson and Rooth (2006). 
415 This range is in line with estimates from the FRA MIDIS II of discrimination in the area of employment. Findings 
from the survey note that skin colour or physical appearance was noted by 50% of respondents when looking for work 
and that first or last names were understood to be a factor in discrimination for 36% of respondents. For more 
information, see FRA (2017). Sub-Saharan Africans and Muslims are among the most discriminated groups.  
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the gender gap in employment is much starker for the TCN population. We assume that up to 20% of this 
additional gap may be due to other barriers to employment such as language proficiency. We then assumed 
that the additional TCN women employed earn the average wage of TCN women of the same skill level. 
Overall, we estimate a loss in net earnings of €6.9-8.7 billion and a loss in tax revenue of €2.6-3.2 billion.  
6.2. Wages 
Our analysis of the LFS uncovered substantial wage-level differences between national workers and TCN 
workers (see The econometric analysis highlights a number of factors that may contribute to lower wages 
among third-country workers relative to national workers. These factors include the lower likelihood of 
supervisory tasks, greater prevalence of part-time work and less likelihood of a permanent contract. Our 
investigation found that lower wages is a key impact for several of the gaps and barriers. 
Table 16). Some of these differences may be explained by differences between the two groups such as age, 
but the gap remains after controlling for a large number of variables. The remaining gap may be driven in 
part by the legal gaps and barriers identified in this Research Paper. It is also important to highlight that 
the wage gap is known to decrease over time as migrants integrate more fully into society and the labour 
market.416  
The econometric analysis highlights a number of factors that may contribute to lower wages among third-
country workers relative to national workers. These factors include the lower likelihood of supervisory 
tasks, greater prevalence of part-time work and less likelihood of a permanent contract. Our investigation 
found that lower wages is a key impact for several of the gaps and barriers. 
Table 16: Wage gap (unadjusted) by migrant status, gender and skill level 
 Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
National Workers 5.21 3.16 5.93 4.12 7.54 6.17 
Mobile EU citizens 4.50 2.58 5.11 3.22 7.25 5.49 
TCNs 3.80 2.48 4.38 2.75 6.49 4.88 
Source: Authors.  
 
Gaps concerning work authorisation imply that foreign workers have lower bargaining power with their 
employers and an increased risk of exploitation including lower wages. This is especially a concern for low- 
and medium-skilled TCNs. With regards to high-skilled TCNs, the EU Blue Card Directive allows for the 
possibility to find alternative work in the case that employment is lost. To assess the potential impact on 
wages, we reviewed studies investigating the impact of naturalisation on wages.417 With naturalisation, 
work permits and authorisations are not needed. One study that conducted an econometric analysis of 
microdata from Germany found a wage premium of about 2% with naturalisation. We apply this parameter 
estimate to our econometric analysis findings from the LFS (see Section 5.1). The overall adjusted gap in 
wage decile between TCNs and nationals is about 0.4-0.6 for low-skilled workers and 0.9 for medium-
skilled workers. We translated these deciles into wage levels, and considered a hypothetical scenario where 
                                                        
416 OECD (2018). International Migration Outlook. OECD Publishing, Paris 
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2018-en.  
417 Two examples of such studies: Bevelander and Veenman (2006); Steinhardt (2008). 
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the wage level was 1-2% higher for these low and medium-skilled TCNs. Our analysis resulted in an 
estimate of €1.1-2.3 billion in lost earnings (net) and €445-891 million in lost tax revenue.  
The Impact Assessment of the revised Blue Card Directive provides insights into the economic impact of 
the gaps and barriers with respect to the work authorisation of highly skilled TCN workers.418 The study 
assesses the net benefits of several policy option packages. These policy option packages consider 
alternatives regarding the admission conditions of highly skilled TCNs, their rights and the relationship 
with the Blue Card scheme and national schemes. The net benefits are defined as the economic gains due 
to additional wages and revenue for higher education net of factors such as labour mobility, remittances 
and the administrative burden on the Member States. The assessment finds that several options would 
generate a positive impact. One of the the policy option packages (POP 2(a)) was estimated to have an 
impact of EUR 1.4 to EUR 6.2 billion while another (Pop 2(c)) was estimated to have a net impact of EUR 1 
to 6.9 billion419.  
Barriers in social security coordination including discrimination may lead to lower earnings and a greater 
risk of poverty in later life. Seasonal workers, who are already a vulnerable group, would be most affected. 
The impacts of these barriers may accumulate with the number of years spent engaging in seasonal work. 
No quantitative estimate of these impacts could be made due to the lack of available evidence on this issue.  
Lastly, we considered the cost associated with the lack of equal treatment overall. This analysis considered 
the gap in employment between TCNs and natives as well as the lower wages among TCNs and natives. 
The gaps were translated to lost employment, lost income and tax revenue and aggregated across all skill 
groups. This gap overlaps with several other more specific gaps and barriers previously discussed in 
chapter 3, for example recognition of qualifications is a specific issue within inequal treatment. It is the 
largest cost estimate generated and provides an upper bound of the potential loss associated with the gap 
of inequal treatment.  
 
  
                                                        
418 European Commission (2016) Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly skilled employment and repealing Directive 2009/50/EC.  
419 EPRS (2016) The New EU Blue Card Directive. Initial Appraisal of a European Commission Impact Assessment 
Briefing.  As explained:  Pop 2(a) would make the Blue Card scheme more widely accessible among highly skilled 
workers. Pop 2(c) would introduce two tiers into the Blue Card system, each targeting a different skill level. One tier 
would be more selective and would convey greater rights. 
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CHAPTER 7. POLICY OPTIONS: KEY DRIVERS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
There are four main policy options proposed for the future EU’s acquis in the area of legal 
immigration:  
• First, aim at better enforcement and practical delivery of common EU rules and rights 
foreseen in currently existing EU sectoral d There are four main policy options proposed 
for the future EU’s acquis in the area of legal immigration:  
• First, aim at better enforcement and practical delivery of common EU rules and rights 
foreseen in currently existing EU sectoral directives; 
• Second, gradually expand within the sectoral approach and add new categories of third-
country workers in EU law;  
• Third, develop a non-binding code in the area of legal migration, facilitating a ’one-stop 
shop’ of all existing EU rules and instruments on legal and labour immigration; 
• Fourth, adopt a Binding Immigration Code on conditions and rights for all third-country 
workers in the EU, which, similar to the area of free movement of EU citizens, would 
bring together all secondary legal instruments into one sole legal act. The assessment on 
the basis of Chapters 3-6 confirms that the fourth option would be the most efficient 
policy, closing most of the gaps and barriers resulting from the current sectoral nature of 
the EU legal migration acquis.  
• Options 4 has the greatest potential benefits due to their strong orientation towards equal 
treatment overall. The costs associated with inequal treatment between TCNs and 
natives are substantial. In addition, this option would add more legal certainty and 
labour security among all TCNs. 
• Options 1, 2 and 3 tackle all the gaps and barriers to some extent – they may be less 
preferred to Options 4 on the basis of benefits alone, but may be less costly and more 
feasible.  
• There are a number of accompanying measures, which could be additionally explored, 
such as broadening the social dialogue (engaging more formally social partners and civil 
society in informing and evaluating EU policies and their domestic implementation) and 
the potential role of the EU’s Common Labour Authority.  
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This chapter explores different available policy options and their potential in closing the gaps and barriers 
identified in Chapter 3 and 4. Chapters 5 and 6 identified some of the economic estimates and monetised 
the impacts related to gaps and barriers in the current legal migration acquis, which emerge mainly due to 
its fragmentation and the sectoral (worker-by-worker) approach.  
According to the main results in Chapters 3-5, Chapter 6 revealed a number of costs of the current status 
quo which require policy and legislative reforms. As studied in this Research Paper first admissions 
directives differentiate among TCNs on the basis of their assigned skills and qualifications in specific EU 
statuses, which often do not match their actual real skills and are subject to other entry and residence 
administrative conditions and limitations. As illustrated in the econometric analysis in Chapter 5, there is 
a need to devise policy options that could reduce  the impacts of the gaps and barriers, namely: the impact 
of restricted access to the labour market, the joint impact of other gaps and barriers (insecure residence 
status, low mobility between emloyers, barriers to circular migration, etc.), the impact of barriers to the 
recognition of qualifications – here can mention both overqualification of TCNs and address statistical 
discrimination, the impact of barriers to intra-EU mobility and EU equal treatment. Yet, for example, while 
an improved system of recognition of qualifications could improve the situation, there is a need to 
streamline and simplify existing EU legal migration law, so as to provide better possibilities for upward 
social mobility and economic participation.  
Whereas the EU Blue Card Directive offers the most extensive set of rights, this is not the case for seasonal 
workers. For example, the EU Blue Card includes a regulated form of intra-EU mobility (after 18 months), 
the accumulation of periods of time spent in different Member States to reach the five-year period for long-
term residence purposes, the possibility to bring family members, and equal treatment as concerns, e.g. 
social security, although with some exceptions. The recently proposed revision of the EU Blue Card 
Directive aims to further broaden the rights of the highly qualified and streamline them across the EU by 
abolishing parallel national schemes and permits. The Commission’s Impact Assessment has thoroughly 
demonstrated the remaining gaps in the current system, as well as the benefits and costs of a revised EU 
Blue Card system.  
Up until today TCNs granted the status of ‘seasonal workers’ (irrespective of their actual skills) have been 
subject to enforced circularity with very few basic labour rights that often are not properly checked, 
enforced and monitored in practice. In some Member States, seasonal workers are made more vulnerable 
because of legal provisions: employers are placed in a position of power over the residence status of their 
TCN employees, as discussed in Chapter 4. The dependencies and discrepancies inherent to current EU 
legislation institutionalise a form of discrimination by design on the basis of which the category ‘third-
country national’ was assigned to a specific individual as a holder of a Blue Card or as an ICT or researcher 
on the one hand or as a holder of a Seasonal Worker Permit in the EU on the other. In addition, a rather 
costly gap remains if TCNs do not qualify for either of the statuses foreseen in the sectoral directives and 
therefore fall outside any EU standards of protection.  
This chapter identifies and substantiates each policy option in light of previous and current academic and 
policy debates (sub-chapter 7.1). The assessment of the different policy options elaborates on how they 
could reduce the identified impacts of gaps and barriers resulting from a status quo situation (sub-chapter 
7.2). The chapter also puts forward a set of recommendations for EU policy-makers, mainly for the 
European Commission and the European Parliament as well as Member States (7.3). We call for a long-
term vision of the future of the EU’s legal migration acquis, which at its core will better uphold international, 
regional and EU human rights and labour standards and fully implement fair and non-discriminatory 
treatment among third-country workers, and between them and national workers, regarding rights at 
work, including intra-EU mobility.  
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7.1. Description of policy options 
Past and current academic and policy debates have already advanced and covered several policy options 
in the area of EU legal and labour migration policy.420 We take these as our starting point and reflect on 
which ones would more efficiently address the gaps and barriers, as well as the individual and economic 
costs assessed in this Research Paper. On the basis of the above discussed academic debate four policy 
options can be considered for the next generation of EU legal migration acquis (see Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22. Policy options 
 
Source: Authors own compilation, 2018.  
 
7.1.1. Academic and policy debate  
As Chapter 1 highlighted, the European Parliament reiterated the need for a general framework 
directive.421 In the meantime, the European Commission is undertaking a legal Fitness Check, so as to 
identify the main gaps and barriers in EU legislation and to propose various ways forward, including better 
implementation and the possibility to expand EU sectoral directives to other sectors, though not necessarily 
calling for an entirely new or renewed approach to legal migration.  
This Research Paper confirms the findings of previous literature according to which EU policy on legal and 
labour migration is characterised by fragmentation and discrimination which results primarily from the 
EU sectoral approach.422 Kostakopoulou has reflected on the need to codify the current EU legal acquis as 
                                                        
420 See in particular S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (2014), “The next generation of EU Labour Migration Policy: 
Conclusions and Recommendations”, in S. Carrera, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds), Rethinking Attractiveness of EU Labour 
Immigration Policies: Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and Beyond, Brussels: CEPS. S. Carrera, A. Geddes 
and E. Guild (2017), “Conclusions and Recommendations: Towards A Fair EU Agenda Facilitating Legal Channels for 
Labour Mobility”, in S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds),  Pathways to Legal Migration into the EU: 
Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, Brussels: CEPS.  
421 European Parliament (2016), Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a 
holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
422 Eisele, K. (2014), The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy: Different Legal Positions of Third Country Nationals 
in the EU, A Comparative Perspective, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Fudge, J. and P. Herzfeld Olsson (2014), “The 
Better enforcement of current EU sectoral directives (including monitoring 
equal treatment provision in Single Residence Permit at the EU level)
OPTION 1
Gradual extension of rights (within the logic of sectoral directives covering 
new 'first admission categories)
OPTION 2
Non-binding EU immigration code (eventually becoming binding)
OPTION 3
Binding Immigration Code ( in one leap  abandoning sectorial approach and 
covering all third country nationals with same set of rights)
OPTION 4
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it was subsequently envisaged in the Commission’s Action Plan implementing the Stockholm 
Programme.423 The Commission at that point foresaw drafting a code that would provide “a uniform level 
of rights and obligations for legal immigrants”, which is now scattered across different sectoral directives 
(Option 4 below).424  
Peers has also supported (and is already writing) an EU immigration code,425 which could eventually 
become binding as part of the EU’s legal acquis (Option 3). Groenendijk has instead argued for the gradual 
expansion of  sectors and rights attached and to not open up current EU legal standards so as to avoid 
lowering them (Option 2).426 Whereas all of the above-mentioned approaches include better 
implementation, the most modest approach reflects the current position of some Member States, which are 
refraining from new legislative initiatives in this area as well as from substantial revisions and even re-casts 
of the current sectoral directives (Option 1).  
The four policy options presented below are interrelated can be read as strategies for future EU policy 
intervention with different levels of ambition and speed as to how to streamline  or to reach maximum 
harmonization the current EU legal migration acquis (see Figure 22): solely by better implementing current 
directives (Option 1); by gradually extending the covered rights and sectors (Option 2); by starting with a 
non-binding immigration code that lays out migrant workers’ rights (Option 3); by adopting a Binding 
Immigration Code which would put the EU on track with the 1999 Tampere Programme and provide a 
longer-term vision for the next generation of the EU legal migration acquis (Option 4).  
All four policy options are assessed in relation to equal treatment, intra-EU mobility and EU attractiveness. 
The ‘benefits’ are understood not only as eliminating the gaps and barriers identified in this Research Paper, 
but also as creating ‘EU added value’ in more normative terms, such as in upholding EU Treaty and legal 
standards and contributing to internal and external consistency in EU action on economic immigration. 
 
7.1.2. Approach on assessment of different policy options 
The benefits and costs of different policy options are discussed in light of how they address the gaps and 
barriers identified in Chapter 3 and how they remedy individual and economic impacts studied in Chapters 
3 through 6 (see Table 17 and Table 18). The assessment does not perform a fully-fledged economic cost-
benefit analysis due to the following considerations:   
                                                        
EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration Controls Meet Labour Rights”, European Journal of Migration and 
Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 439–66.; Geddes, A. (2015), “Temporary and Circular Migration in the Construction of 
European Migration Governance”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, 571–88; Geddes, A. and A. 
Niemann (2015), “Introduction: Conceptualising EU policy on labour migration”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 523–35; Guild, E. (2011), “Equivocal Claims? Ambivalent Controls? Labour Migration 
Regimes in the European Union”, in E. Guild and S. Mantu (eds), Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration: 
Perspectives of Control from Five Continents, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 207–28; Peers, S., V. Moreno-Lax, M. Garlick and E. 
Guild (2012), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second Revised Edition, Volume 2: EU Immigration 
Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Wiesbrock, A. (2009), Legal Migration to the European Union – Ten Years after 
Tampere, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. 
423 European Commission (2010), Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens: Action Plan 
Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, Brussels, 20.4.2010.  
424 Ibid.  
425 Peers (2014) and Peers, S. (2012), “An EU Immigration Code: Towards a Common Immigration Policy”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 33–61. 
426 Groenendijk (2014). 
THE COST OF NON-EUROPE IN THE AREA OF LEGAL MIGRATION | 103 
 
First of all, Options 1 and 4 essentially present different long-term visions -  should the EU slow down with 
new legislative reforms and try to implement current directives (Option 1)? Or should the EU abandon the 
current sectoral approach altogether and create a Binding Immigration Code to simplify and harmonise the 
rules for all TCNs (Option 4)? Options 2 – Gradual extension of categories and 3 – Non-binding 
Immigration Code for 10 – 20 years woud take steps towards the goal of moving towards a Binding 
Immigration Code (while Option 4 would make it in one leap). They present different strategies to move 
away from the status quo and the impacts of gaps and barriers. Therefore, we rather draw our attention to 
potential qualitative and quantitative benefits, such as EU added value, intra-EU mobility, increased 
attractiveness; key drivers of costs to implement such measures, and the feasibility of implementing each 
of these options. We provide some rough quantitative estimates of these policy options in addressing the 
key gaps and barriers identified in Table 18: Summary of estimated annual  benefits of policy options at 
aggregate EU level Figure 23, but we refrain from summing them up, as some gaps and barriers are 
overlapping and interrelated. For example, ‘equal treatment’ entails better recognition of qualifications, 
broadened family reunification, more secure residence status and could lead to increased intra-EU 
mobility. 
Secondly, the costs would depend on the timeframe, and while the more long-term measures (Options 2 
an 3) would take up more resources. While, Option 1 and Option 4 could be felt in a short run. For example, 
Option 4 requires the establishment and implementation of common EU norms and standards for the entry, 
residence and rights/labour conditions of all TCNs, which are equivalent to those of Member States’ own 
nationals. Such a quantitative assessment would depend a great deal on the current design in each Member 
State, which is beyond the scope of this Research Paper, as the main focus of our analysis was instead on 
gaps and barriers left by current EU legislation and (in)action in this area.    
Thirdly, it is not entirely clear what these options would entail. Even for Option 1, ‘better enforcement’, it 
could be practical only if we limit ourselves to the area of sectoral directives. However, the EU’s action in 
this domain presents intrinsic synergies with other policy domains, such as better enforcement of non-
discrimination and equal treatment directives, the social pillar, system for recognition of qualifications, 
ensuring fundamental rights and rule of law, which are seen as related additional measures. 
Finally,  as a more meaningful assessment than coming up with a one price tag per option we propose tp 
estimate key benefits (see Table 18 and Figure 23) and identify cost drivers in qualitative terms (in the text 
below). As for the assessment of the overall preferred policy options - we highlight the feasibility and areas 
of potential overspill where the EU is acting together with Member States (Table 20). The qualitative 
assessment could be a starting point for an ex ante impact assessment for the preferred policy option.  
7.2. Key benefits and drivers of costs of different policy options  
This Section identifies through a qualitative approach how well different policy options relate to the gaps 
and barriers assessed and quantified in Chapter 6. We propose Table 15 below as a summary of these 
interrelations and potential positive impacts on different policy areas. Option 4 emerges with the greatest 
potential benefits due to their strong orientation towards equal treatment and family reunification overall.  
As highlighted in Table 12 of Chapter 6, the costs associated with unequal treatment between TCNs and 
nationals are substantial with lost income estimated to be over € 21 billion and family reunification over 
€6.9-8.7 billion. As highlighted in  
Table 17, Options 1, 2 and 3 also tackle the gaps and barriers to some extent – they may be less preferred to 
Options 3 and 4 on the basis of benefits alone, but may be less costly and more feasible. Thus, in order to 
have a more complete picture it is important to investigate these factors as well, which are reviewed below.   
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Table 17. Overview of policy options’ potential benefits in addressing key gaps and barriers  
 Option 1: Option 2: Option 3: Option 4: 
 
Gaps and barriers 
Better 
enforcement 
Gradual 
extension 
Non-
binding 
code 
Binding 
Immigration 
Code  
Intra-EU labour mobility (G7) + ++ ++ +++ 
Recognition of qualification (G10; B7) ++ + + ++ 
Re-entry and circular migration (G2; B3) + + + ++ 
Secure residence (G5 & G6) + ++ ++ ++ 
Entry (G2&B2) and Work authorisation 
(change of employers G3&B4; 
unemployment G4&B5) 
++ ++ + +++ 
Family reunification (G9&B7) + ++ ++ +++ 
Social security (G8&B6) ++ + + ++ 
Equal treatment (G1; B1)* + ++ ++ +++ 
Notes: Level of positive impact over identified areas: +++ high; ++ moderate; + low. *Equal treatment overlaps with other 
gaps and barriers. Source: Authors own compilation, 2018.  
 
The table above is based on interviews, e-questionnaires and Delphi method discussion. All of these 
methods indicated a higher correlation of the sectoral approach with intra-EU labour mobility, equal 
treatment, secure residence and family reunification. It should be noted that none of the policy options 
proposed above are capable of fully addressing the ‘recognition of qualification’ and ‘social security’ 
challenges (as it would require a separate European system for recognition of qualifications and social 
security coordination, which would fall outside ‘better enforcement’ option). Table 16 below provides a 
summary of the estimated benefits of each of the four Policy Options. This is completemented with Figure 
23, which visualises the estimated economic benefits for each of these Policy Options.  
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Table 18: Summary of estimated annual  benefits of policy options at aggregate EU level  
 
OPTION 1:  
Better 
enforcement 
OPTION 2: 
Gradual  
Extension 
OPTION 3: 
Non-binding 
Immigration Code 
OPTION 4: 
Binding 
Immigration Code 
Intra-EU labour 
mobility (G7) 
€7.8 million 
individual benefits  
and €2.125 million 
economic benefits   
€15.6 million 
individual 
benefits  and 
€4.25 million 
economic 
benefits   
€15.6 million 
individual benefits  
and €4.25 million 
economic benefits   
€23.4 million 
individual benefits  
and €6.375 million 
economic benefits   
Recognition of 
qualification 
(G10; B7) 
€1.6 - 2.65 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.7 - 1.15 
billion economic 
benefits   
€0.8 - 1.325 
billion 
individual 
benefits  and 
€0.35 - 0.575 
billion economic 
benefits   
€0.8 - 1.325 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.35 - 0.575 
billion economic 
benefits   
€1.6 - 2.65 billion 
individual benefits  
and €0.7 - 1.15 
billion economic 
benefits   
Entry (G2&B2) 
and Work 
authorisation 
(G3&B4;  
G4&B5) 
€0.55 - 1.15 billion 
individual benefits  
and €222.5 - 445.5 
million economic 
benefits   
€0.55 - 1.15 
billion 
individual 
benefits  and 
€222.5 - 445.5 
million economic 
benefits   
€0.275 - 0.575 
billion individual 
benefits  and 
€111.25 - 222.75 
million economic 
benefits   
€0.825 - 1.725 
billion individual 
benefits  and 
€333.75 - 668.25 
million economic 
benefits   
Family 
reunification 
(G9&B7) 
€1.725 - 2.175 
billion individual 
benefits  and €0.65 
- 0.8 billion 
economic benefits   
€3.45 - 4.35 
billion 
individual 
benefits  and 
€1.3 - 1.6 billion 
economic 
benefits   
€1.725 - 2.175 
billion individual 
benefits  and €0.65 - 
0.8 billion economic 
benefits   
€5.175 - 6.525 
billion individual 
benefits  and €1.95 - 
2.4 billion economic 
benefits   
Equal treatment 
(G1; B1)* 
€5.25 billion 
individual benefits  
and €2 billion 
economic benefits   
€10.5 billion 
individual 
benefits  and €4 
billion economic 
benefits 
€10.5 billion 
individual benefits  
and €4 billion 
economic benefits 
€15.75 billion 
individual benefits  
and €6 billion 
economic benefits 
Note: * Equal treatment is overlapping with other gaps and barriers, and therefore we refrain from summing up the different 
benefits per option. It is based on author’s own calculations taking into account Table 14: Summary of monetised impacts 
and  
Table 17. Overview of policy options’ potential benefits in addressing key gaps and barriers, when ‘low impact’ is assigned 
to be 25%; ‘moderate’ - 50% and ‘high’ - 75%. These are all estimations. These benefits may not be realised immediately, but 
may take several years. The figures have bee annualised. 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
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Figure 23. Estimated economic benefits annually at aggregate EU level (EUR millions) 
 
Note: Similarly, to Table 16, ‘equal treatment’ overlaps with some of the other categories. Intra-EU mobility benefits are so 
low in comparison to the other areas that they do not show up in the Figure 22. These are Option 1 (€2); Option 2 (€4); Option 
3 (€4) and Option 4 (€6). 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
Table 19. Qualitative assessment of key costs per policy option 
 
Cost drivers:  
__________ 
Options: 
 
Legislative 
change at 
the EU 
level 
EU level 
structures to be 
created 
Costs drivers at EU and 
national level 
Estimated 
Years for 
Reaching 
Maximum 
Harmonisation 
Level of 
Costs 
OPTION 1:  
Better 
enforcement 
No 
 Yes, 
coordination 
system to 
monitor 
enforcement of 
4 sectorial 
directives/ 
staffing/ 
databases 
• Additional 
administrative staff 
• Staff training 
• New databases 
• Additional funding 
for 
integration/language 
training of third 
country nationals 
More than 30 
years  Medium 
€ - € 1,000 € 2,000 € 3,000 € 4,000 € 5,000 € 6,000 € 7,000 € 8,000 € 9,000 € 10,000 
Option 4
Option 3
Option 2
Option 1
Intra-EU mobility Recognition of qualifications
Work authorisation Family reunification
Equal treatment
Millions 
THE COST OF NON-EUROPE IN THE AREA OF LEGAL MIGRATION | 107 
 
OPTION 2: 
Gradual  
Extension  
Yes,  3 – 5 
new 
directives 
covering 
new 
categories 
+ 2 - 3 
recasts of  
current 
directives 
No, but 
Commission is 
overseeing the 
transposition 
and 
implementation 
• New legislation costs 
• Transposition costs 
• Additional 
administrative staff 
• Additional staff 
training on 
legislation and 
updates 
20-30 years High 
OPTION 3: 
Non-
binding 
Immigration 
Code 
Not in the 
beginning/ 
after 10-20 
years 1 
directive/ 
or change 
of Treaty 
of the EU 
No, 
Commission 
oversees 
implementation 
of 1 directive + 
EU labour 
authority is 
involved 
• Costs for awareness 
raising, training 
• Communication 
campaign 
• Additional funding 
possibilities for 
Member States 
10 – 20 years Medium 
OPTION 4: 
Binding 
Immigration 
Code 
Yes,  1 
directive 
No, 
Commission 
oversees 
implementation 
of 1 directive + 
EU labour 
authority is 
involved 
• New EU and 
national legislation 
costs 
• Transposition costs 
• Additional staff re-
training  
5 -10 years Low 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
OPTION 1. Better enforcement  
 
Key benefits: 
A first option focuses on ensuring better enforcement of current EU sectoral directives, including enhancing 
non-discrimination and/or labour rights provisions in the current Single Permit Directive and monitoring 
their compliance at the EU level. It would essentially not close all the gaps but would address some of the 
practical barriers, such as lengthy procedures and administrative difficulties. As Table 17. Overview of 
policy options’ potential benefits in addressing key gaps and barriers indicates, the better enforcement 
policy option could moderately contribute to recognition of qualification, work authorisation and social 
security coordination, namely by better coordinating between the different systems and reducing lengthy 
waiting periods and bureaucracy. Better enforcement of rules would however have low positive impact on 
re-entry, circular migration and secure residence, as rules are stringent for different categories of workers, 
such as seasonal workers. If currently on-going integration measures would be better implemented, it could 
also improve employment rates and working conditions of third country nationals. The impacts of persons 
not covered by ‘first entry’ directives and thus falling undocumented is not monetised, but could even 
further reduce perceived benefits of this policy option. 
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Similarly, while certain equal treatment provisions are foreseen for all the Single Residence Permit holders, 
the current legal migration system is based on unequal treatment among different categories of workers 
according the ‘first entry’ directives. Improving non-discrimination litigation avenues would be beneficial 
to those who currently lack access to justice. Nevertheless, major issues, such as parallel national schemes 
in the Blue Card, would remain unaddressed, as essentially Member States would continue to have the 
wide margin of appreciation on what is their interpretation of the directives – which may include the 
options they accept, such as which family members, under what conditions, would reunify with Blue Card 
holders, and which rights would be applicable to seasonal workers.  
Key costs:  
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the current patchwork legal migration system would entail 
high costs. The main drivers could be increased staff costs and training, and the development of necessary 
EU level coordination systems. 
Interviews revealed that in some cases there is an issue of understaffing of relevant services – from 
consulates abroad to employment agencies at the local level. Another issue and challenge is the lack of 
knowledge about relevant European law, in particular, Single Residence Permit provisions or their national 
interpretation. This would entail training and devoting some of the current staff for the EU coordination 
schemes, better coordination between national and regional/local levels, and better coordination between 
ministries of interior and ministries of social affairs and employment. Better enforcement would also mean 
that people who would fall into irregularity due to current stringent provisions (or their national 
interpretations) would be more quickly identified and deported, which would entail additional resources 
among national and EU border agencies for return operations and voluntary repatriation schemes.  The 
additional funding for integration measures (such as language and vocational training) as well as 
additional systems to improve recognition of qualifications could be devised. 
Feasibility: 
The interviews and Delphi method discussion showed that while this option seems the most realistic, it is 
not likely to address identified gaps and barriers. The negative political climate and Member States’ 
ministries of interior positions on economic immigration have resulted in stalled negotiations revision of 
the EU Blue Card, which was seen by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the General 
Secretariat as the least controversial policy issue in the EU agenda.427  
In this context of reluctance to undertake any initiatives in the area of legal migration, Delphi method 
discussants chose Option 1 as most feasible or ‘politically realistic’. The gaps and barriers analysis in 
Chapter 3 shows that in the long run the Commission will need to streamline existing acquis so as to better 
ensure the enforcement of EU standards and rights foreseen in the current EU directives and provide less 
margin of discretion during the phases of domestic implementation by EU Member States.  
 
OPTION 2. Gradual extension of rights and working conditions 
 
Key benefits:  
A second option implies a gradual extension of labour standards and rights at work within the logic of 
sectoral directives to other categories of TCNs who are not covered by the current directives, i.e. migrant 
domestic workers or transport workers, etc. It would not close the gap but would avoid lowering the 
                                                        
427 Interviews with European Parliament (2), (3), European Commission (2), (3), Council of the EU.  
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standards, as it was feared by some academics. It potentially could resolve the issues in relation to the entry 
conditions and employment rights for those who are not currently covered by sectoral directives, such as 
migrant domestic workers and long-distance drivers, persons’ working in the beauty, service industry, self-
employed persons, talents in atypical industries who often risk being exploited and losing their residence 
rights, or accumulating their years to obtain Long Term Residence permit.  
 Gradual extension of rights to new categories of workers would not have high impacts on any of the gaps. 
Nevertheless, as  
Table 17. Overview of policy options’ potential benefits in addressing key gaps and barriers demonstrates, 
it could have moderate impacts on secure residence and work authorisation, particularly on the categories 
that are not yet covered by any sectoral directives. Potentially, the gradual extension of rights of the newly 
added categories, as well as those under the Seasonal Workers Directive and the Students and Researchers 
Directive could lead to raising the rights thresholds to those equivalent of the Blue Card. In that case this 
option would contribute towards more intra-EU mobility, equal treatment and secure residence. This 
option would have only minor positive impacts on recognition of qualification, re-entry and circular 
migration as well as social security, as these areas would require a separate approach. In addition, newly 
added categories cover atypical jobs, therefore it could raise more questions for the potential recognition 
of qualifications from third countries and/ or social security schemes coordination with third countries (for 
accumulating pension benefits for example).  
Key costs:  
The key cost drivers would originate from adding new categories of workers and extending different rights 
by type of worker. Thus, in a short and medium term, adding new categories and revising old directives to 
extend rights are highly likely to increase administrative burden – more staff would be needed at both EU 
and national. This would entail the costs of new EU legislation (3 – 5 directives) and transposition costs for 
Member States, as there would be additional recasts of current directives as to harmonize them. This could 
also lead to high costs for training and guidance to the EU and national authorities trying to catch up and 
keep updated with complex and fast paced developments. In a short and medium term, it would also 
extend fragmentation and will contribute to continuous bureaucratic hurdles among national and 
European authorities. Nevertheless, in the long run (30 - 20 years) this approach could lead towards a 
harmonised approach in the area of legal migration, where the rights of different categories of third country 
nationals would be approximated.  
Feasibility:  
While academic debate finds this option more ‘realistic’, Delphi method discussion pointed out the 
feasibility challenges in the revision of the EU Blue Card Directive. It is an example of what a gradual 
extension of rights could look like in practice – a lot of negotiations at EU level. The main goal of the BCD 
revision has been to set up an EU-wide regime for the admission of highly qualified TCNs. Nevertheless, 
Member States are reluctant to drop their own national schemes for highly skilled third-country workers. 
The interviewees and Delphi method discussants indicated the great political sensitivity of talking about 
any kind of migration in the context of the so-called ‘European refugee humanitarian crisis’. Therefore, we 
conclude that the feasibility of this approach would be moderate. National administrations also expressed 
the fatigue of new and updated legislation.  
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OPTION 3. Non-binding immigration code  
 
Key benefits:  
A third option entails the elaboration and adoption of a non-binding EU immigration code, in the beginning 
as an aspirational standard, which over the time, for example with the change of Treaty of the EU/ or by 
passing a separate directive could become binding. It could follow the example of the EUs Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, that was non-binding to begin with.  It would aim at providing a one-stop shop that 
brings together all existing EU legal instruments and regulations covering legal and labour migration, and 
in the long run it would pave the way towards closing the gap between sectoral directives.  
Table 17. Overview of policy options’ potential benefits in addressing key gaps and barriers shows the 
potential to address different gaps would be by and large moderate due to the non-binding nature. 
Nevertheless, it could be expected that EU level guidance or the immigration code could be a highly 
influential tool articulating Member States’ commitment to equal treatment. It would moderately extend 
the right to family reunification and intra-EU mobility. The non-binding immigration code could 
potentially spark reflection about social security coordination, recognition of qualifications, the need to 
create a better system for re-entry and circular migration based on choice, not necessity. However, as links 
are not strong, this might exert only very  neglible positive impact. Similarly, while in the long run it could 
exert a highly positive impact on the harmonisation of work authorisation and secure residence rights, the 
non-binding nature of the code in a short and medium term minimises these effects. 
Key costs:  
In the short run the impacts of the current gaps and barriers potentially would continue. Therefore, impacts 
would be similar to those of the better implementation scenario, Option 1. Nevertheless, if eventually the 
code would become binding in 10 – 20 years (unlike Option 4 – in 2 - 5 years), it would entail some moderate 
costs for transposition and implementation, as Directive would only acknowledge what Member State’s 
has agreed to do. Nevertheless, in the long run, we conclude that the costs would be moderate or low to 
implement this option, as one code would need to be developed and voluntarily agreed to by Member 
States. Implementation cost s could be on the side of the EU – awareness raising, training and 
communication about the new non-binding immigration code. It could also entail some funding 
possibilities for Member States willing to implement the needed reforms at the national level.  
Feasibility:  
This strategy essentially aims to reduce resistance by Member States’ ministries of interior and to apply the 
voluntary and incentives-based approach over 10 – 20 years’ period, and proposes a way like Fundamental 
Rights Charter was developed – as non-binding document summarising EU standards. The charter 
eventually became binding with Lisbon Treaty. As mentioned above, experiences with the Blue Card 
revision indicate that there is very little political willingness among the majority of Member States to 
undertake new legislative initiatives in the area of legal migration. This option would avoid being another 
‘legal initiative’. Nevertheless, the Member States’ respondents and Delphi method discussants highlighted 
that a pro-migrant worker approach is likely to ‘backfire’ on their national constituencies. Thus, even for 
the more moderate approach, to start with a non-binding code could be met with resistance by some 
Member States, as, for example, happened with the Global Compact on Migration. Finally, it is likely that 
a non-binding code may be quickly ‘buried’ by new initiatives and strategies if political priorities shift 
towards more restrictive migration policies.  
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OPTION 4. Binding Immigration Code: streamlining and codifying 
 
Key benefits:  
The fourth option is the elaboration of a Binding Immigration Code that would imply abandoning the 
sectoral approach logic and adopting the directive for all TCNs regardless of their skills status. This option 
would aim to close the gaps and barriers between different sectoral directives, in particular those related 
to equal treatment, intra-EU mobility, family reunification (see  
Table 17).  
A positive spillover effect would be simplification and streamlining of entry/residence and employment 
conditions for TCNs. Such a code would integrate all the existing instruments and eliminate their 
inconsistencies and unjustified variations, and provide an opportunity for clarity, simplification and raised 
rights standards.428 Therefore we conclude on the basis of interviews, e-questionnaires and Delphi method 
discussion that Option 4 would have a high positive impact on work authorisation, family reunification, 
equal treatment and intra-EU mobility. This is based on the argument that administrative authorities would 
be able to apply the same set of rights nationally and across the EU, therefore the speed of issuing work 
authorisation would increase. It would also increase the possibilities to accelerate intra-EU mobility. 
Employers and labour inspectorates would need to follow equal treatment clauses applicable to national 
employees, thus reducing exceptions from the rule. Finally, the right to family reunification in such a code 
should be recognised by everyone, thus reducing the likelihood of family members resorting to migrant 
smugglers or overstaying their visas and otherwise falling into irregularity.  
In addition, various stakeholders have called for restarting the legal migration ‘Fitness Check’ in order to 
facilitate more clarity, legal certainty and simplicity, as well as to ensure uniformity of rights and working 
conditions irrespective of the level of ‘skills’ or ‘qualifications’ attributed to or as framed in specific EU 
third-country worker status.429 The impact of ‘recognition of skills’ or ‘qualifications’ would essentially 
remain in the employers’ own interest, as is currently the case, for example, in the Netherlands; and the 
perverse incentive for employers to profit from faking persons’ qualifications would be likely reduced, as 
there would be more possibilities within different levels of qualifications under the same or similar 
conditions.  
The impact on re-entry conditions and circular migration as well as on secure residence and social security 
would be moderately positive. Streamlining and codifying per se would not create a circular migration 
system, regularisation programme or social coordination system. Nevertheless, this could make possible 
different initiatives in this area, since admission and employment criteria would be simplified. For example, 
the social security coordination systems could also be simplified by following precedent and applying the 
same conditions as for the national workers and students. 
Another important byproduct or condition is changing the narrative about legal migration, as labour 
migration and the mobility of students and families should be seen not as an issue primarily of security but 
employment, education and social affairs. While EU has limited competences to intervene in these areas, 
                                                        
428 Kostakopoulou, D. (2017), “EU Legal Migration Templates and Cognitive Ruptures: Ways Forward in the Research 
and Policy-Making” in S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild and M. Stefan (eds), Pathways to Legal Migration into the EU: 
Concepts, Trajectories and Policies, Brussels: CEPS, p. 181.  
429 European Commission (2017), Legal Migration Fitness Check, Summary of Replies to the public consultation on 
legal migration by non-EU citizens (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-
library/documents/policies/legal-migration/summary_of_replies_en.pdf). 
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the EU Citizens Directive has shown that harmonising rules in the area of admission is entirely possible 
without intervening in these fields and applying the principles of fairness and near equality (as discussed 
in Chapter 2). 
In addition, they are likely to reduce pressure regarding anti-migrant smuggling activities – people of all 
skill levels from destination countries would have access to cheaper, legal and safe pathways to Europe, 
and would be less likely to embark on dangerous journeys. The attention of law enforcement and labour 
inspectorates could rather be shifted to investigating other more violent crimes, human trafficking, slavery 
and servitude, and labour inspectorates could focus on labour exploitation of both nationals and migrants. 
 
Key costs: 
Such overall reform would entail elaborating a directive at the EU level and transposing it at national levels 
across the EU. While the directive would streamline the patchwork of directives into one, it would not 
create new provisions but rather would apply the fairness and near equality principles. In other words, 
third-country workers would be ensured the same or similar rights as those of nationals across the EU. At 
national level, implementation would require transposing the directive, mainstreaming migrant workers 
and their family members and students into respective national laws and procedures. This option would 
also require retraining personnel in immigration, employment and education agencies. The costs could be 
similar to those of the Single Residence Permit or EU Citizens Directive.  
While transposition and re-training costs are a one-off, it should be less costly than Option 2 on gradual 
extension – Option 4 entails having only one legislation clearly stating the EU standards created, and could 
actually lead to reduction of administrative staff, provide possibilities for automation of the process. EU’s 
labour authority could assist Commission in monitor the labour-related issues across the EU.  In the short 
to medium term streamlined procedures for all TCNs would reduce the administrative burden and current 
costs in the agencies responsible for visas, residence and work permits. Therefore, we conclude that there 
would be moderate costs endured.  
 
Feasibility:  
The possible legal basis could be Article 79 TFEU, that provides a possibility for the EU institutions to adopt 
of shared standards dealing with other administrative aspects of labour migration, besides the volumes of 
admission. As Peers et al. have highlighted, this provision “would be meaningless unless the EU had a 
competence to regulate such migration in the first place”.430 Another avenue could be, Article 151 TFEU is 
a central legal basis for the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions and 
combating social exclusion in the EU, irrespective of migration status. It does not talk about ‘migrants’, but 
about ‘workers’.  
Interviews with the European Parliament and European Commission showed the existence of a general 
preference for this policy option. For example, the European Parliament’s resolution calling for the holistic 
approach clearly reiterates the commitment of creating one scheme for all categories of workers.431 Yet, 
after the experience with the General Framework Directive in 2001, the European Commission remained 
cautious of putting such a proposal on the agenda.   
                                                        
430 S. Peers, V. Moreno-Lax, M. Garlick and E. Guild (2012), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): 
Second Revised Edition, Volume 2: EU Immigration Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 13. 
431 European Parliament (2016), Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a 
holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)). 
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Thus, although a Binding Immigration Code would be the most desirable policy option, in the current 
political context some policy actors interviewed  and majority of Delphi discussion participants considered 
it “politically unfeasible”.432 However, the EU has several past successful experiences in bringing together 
‘sectoral’ and fragmented EU rules into one sole legal directive, e.g.  the EU Citizens Directive, or even in 
the form of a code, e.g. the Schengen Borders Code.   
Great benefit and moderate costs aside, the low feasibility of this option is thus the main challenge (see 
Table 20). Two representatives of the European Parliament interviewed for this Research Paper highlighted 
that given that even negotiations over revisions of the EU Blue Card Directive have been frozen at the 
Council, the situation may worsen for TCNs and the need increase to add more variations.433 Therefore, in 
their view, the current ‘political climate’ does not appear conducive to revising the sectoral EU directives 
and can lead only to achieving minor improvements. In addition, Member States continue to oppose the 
idea of a Binding Immigration Code and, as mentioned above, some have openly opposed the idea of any 
new legislation in the Commission’s Fitness Check consultations.  
 
Table 20. Summary of policy options assessment 
 Key benefits Key Costs Feasibility 
Option 1 Low Moderate High 
Option 2 Moderate High Moderate 
Option 3 Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Option 4 High Low Low 
Source: Authors, 2018.  
 
Negative public attitudes towards migration from third countries were named by Delphi discussants, 
interviewees and e-questionnaire respondents as a key challenge. Chapter 4 indicates that EU actions are 
not only responding to but also shaping public opinion. Delphi method discussants highlighted that at the 
national level political campaigns are shaped by exploiting various anti-immigrant biases without any solid 
counter-narrative at the EU level. They see a greater role for EU level institutions and policies in addressing 
racist political agendas and enforcing the EU’s rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights values. 
Therefore, institutions should attempt to re-frame the overall narrative in the area of legal migration in the 
one that is evidence- based and fundamental rights compliant. Meaning also, stricter sanctioning of hate 
speech and xenophobic remarks, to begin with, EU’s own institutions, agencies, paties affiliated with 
European Political Families.  
7.3. Preferred policy option: Binding Immigration Code 
Different policy options were put forward and verified in terms of feasibility and desirability by the Delphi 
method discussion among key experts and stakeholders as well as among online survey respondents who 
represent social partners and civil society. The results of the e-questionnaire indicate that respondents were 
divided over which of these policy options should be preferred at EU level. Streamlining and codifying the 
EU’s legal migration acquis was seen as the main preference among 26% of respondents (see Annex 7, Figure 
1).   
                                                        
432 Interviews with European Parliament (2), European Commission (3), Council of the EU.  
433 Interviews with European Parliament (1), (2). 
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Delphi method discussants were divided into two camps on the most preferred policy options for legal 
migration policy in the EU. More than a half felt very strong about changing the sectoral approach with a 
Binding Immigration Code and saw added value in broadening social dialogue as a complementary 
measure (see Annex 7, Figure 2).   
Nevertheless, it emerged from the discussion that a Binding Immigration Code would essentially be the 
way to close gaps and barriers to equal treatment, particularly among different categories of TCNs. Finally, 
it would add to the EU’s attractiveness, because if equal treatment and non-discrimination are in place, 
Delphi method discussants said they would see intra-EU mobility and increased EU’s attractiveness as a 
result or outcome.434 
7.4. Recommendations 
1. Put a Binding Immigration Code back on the EU’s agenda 
This Research Paper has highlighted the high EU added value and preference among the different 
stakeholders (with the exception of some Member States) for a Binding Immigration Code covering all 
TCNs regardless of their perceived skills and qualifications. Such a directive would need to be based on 
equal treatment and fairness principles among different categories of TCNs, and between these workers 
and EU citizens. The European Parliament and Commission should undergo the full ex ante impact 
assessment on the basis of the concrete proposal or its variants. Such an assessment would need to take 
into account short-term and long-term costs and benefits.  
 
2. Embed the rights of third-country nationals in a rule of law mechanism 
In all four options proposes, EU’s legal migration system would rely on national administrations, their 
justice systems and may entail some additional databases as to exchange information with a view to speed-
up intra-EU mobility, therefore rule of law and related non-discrimination standards would need to be 
constantly monitored by independent Rule of Law mechanism.  
Differential treatment of TCNs is one of the results of the sectoral approach. It is by design institutionalised 
and therefore it is hard for individuals to challenge whether it is necessary, proportional and justified. 
Differential treatment of TCNs is not in line with international and regional human rights and labour 
standards benchmarks. There is currently a gap between EU legal and labour migration law and these 
legally binding and interpretative standards. Their correct implementation should be further scrutinised 
and monitored at the EU level, as they also affect the very effectiveness of EU legal migration law on the 
ground.  
Findings of international and regional monitoring bodies, if unaddressed and repeated or escalated, could 
constitute challenges to the rule of law more generally and become systematic in nature. The current 
discussion to establish an EU rule of law mechanism should also include institutional discrimination in the 
area of labour migration as one of its thematic components as proposed by the Parliament’s Legislative 
Own-Initiative calling for an EU mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights 
accompanied by a European Added Value Assessment.435  Member States’ representatives engaging in hate 
speech or promoting negative attitudes about TCNs should be disciplined, by cutting funding to offending 
Member States for their failure to apply the rule of law or uphold fundamental rights and democratic 
principles.  
                                                        
434 Delphi method discussion, 09.03.2018, Brussels. 
435 Bárd, P, S Carrera, E Guild, D Kochenov (2016) An EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights, Study for the European Parliament.  
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3. Strengthening access to justice for all third-country nationals despite their migration status 
Social partners, civil society and international organisations consulted in this Research Paper were cautious 
in case labour inspectors were transformed into immigration control (police) officers.436 The idea of a 
‘firewall’ was mentioned as a potential solution by some interviewees and during workshop and Delphi 
method discussions organised in the scope of this Research Paper. The firewall has been broadly defined 
as “a separation between immigration enforcement activities and public service provision”.437 The firewall 
in particular aims to cover those provisions that preserve the basic rights applicable to ‘everyone’ in the 
jurisdiction of the country, regardless of migration status. Such rights include prohibitions of torture, 
slavery and servitude, discrimination, and the rights to health, education, fair labour conditions and 
remuneration (including for undeclared work), and legal redress – under both international and European 
regional standards. 
The firewalls were also proposed in the UN Global Compact for Migration, and could actually enhance 
confidence that those who come forward to labour inspectorates before situations descend into severe 
labour exploitation will not be penalised. Firewalling could secure effective access by individuals, 
irrespective of their migratory status, to justice in labour, civil or criminal matters.438 In addition to this, the 
best preventive measures against labour exploitation and discrimination is for third-country nationals to 
have effective access to the options and information regarding how to defend one’s rights.439 
Improving access to justice and enforcement of existing standards could also be facilitated by investing in 
a permanent network of legal practitioners and judges specialised in legal and labour migration law, which 
would permanently and regularly monitor and identify key challenges in domestic practical 
implementation of EU regulations, as well as their compatibility with international, regional and EU 
standards.  
 
4. Injecting a social policy and labour standards approach  
Our research and the results of the Delphi method acknowledged the weak or less ambitious EU non-
binding policies in the area of social policy, such as the EU Pillar for Social Rights.440 A general lack of 
ambition was noted in thinking of the future of the EU’s social dimension, given the EU is not meeting 
requirements of the Fundamental Rights Charter or international labour rights standards.441 As 
demonstrated in this Research Paper, EU social policy already includes third-country nationals and even 
undocumented migrants within its scope of application. 
European Parliament interviewees were unanimous about the need to change the discourse about legal 
migration in the EU as a policy issue where a ‘ministries of interior’ (management and policing) approach 
                                                        
436 Ibid. 
437 Crépeau and Hastie (2015). 
438 Ibid. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Ibid.  
441 European Commission (2017), Reflection paper on social dimension of Europe, Brussels, 26 April 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/reflection-paper-social-dimension-europe_en). The most ambitious 
option for Europe suggests the following (emphasis added): “While the centre of gravity for action in the social field 
should and would remain with national and local authorities, the EU would explore ways to further support Member 
State action, making full use of all instruments in its toolbox. Legislation would not only set minimum standards but, in 
selected areas, could fully harmonise citizens' rights across the EU, with the aim of focusing on social convergence in social 
outcomes.” 
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has too often prevailed over an ‘labour and social affairs’ approach.442 Two European Parliament 
interviewees reflected that issues on legal migration have been only marginally covered by the European 
Parliament EMPL Committee, which is still responsible for equal treatment issues, and instead have fallen 
mainly under the mandate of the LIBE Committee, which is mainly responsible for negotiations on entry 
and residency conditions.443 Similar dynamics can be expected to occur at national levels. Therefore, legal 
migration should be discussed with the EMPL Committee as well as with national ministries of social affairs 
and labour.  
 
5. Strengthening the EU’s role in monitoring labour rights 
The new Commissions’ proposal for the European Labour Authority, in the context of the EU’s Pillar of 
Social Rights, is intriguing and could be better explored in relation to the labour rights of TCNs working in 
the EU.444 Although, the European Labour Authority is limited to cross-border situations, discussants  
suggested that looking in the future its competences could be expanded. Some of participants saw the EU’s 
added value in the coordination of social protection schemes, whereas others saw it in the coordination of 
enforcement, for example of labour inspections.445 Respondents to the e-questionnaire highlighted that 
there is a need for “[s]trengthening the EU’s competence in monitoring fair and decent employment 
conditions for all workers”, not only TCNs.446 Thus the EU could play a role in better streamlining a single 
EU labour standards policy. Such Authority thus could oversee the equal treatment provisions as enshrined 
in Single Residence Permit to begin with and to measure gaps and barriers between the actual rights and 
those enshrined in the international and regional human rights and labour rights bodies.  
 
6. Broadening social dialogue on labour migration at EU level 
Social dialogue, including dialogue between civil society, trade unions and employers’ organisations, 
should be more formalised and developed at EU levels. A broadened social dialogue could contribute to 
better enforcement of current EU legal migration acquis and its various directives, as well as to a 
practitioners-based (on the ground) assessment of evolving gaps and barriers at domestic levels. A 
broadened social dialogue through national counterparts could also better address questions related to 
labour rights and non-discrimination against TCNs. An EU-level broadened social dialogue could play a 
role especially by providing training and information about labour standards and fundamental rights in 
employment, and ensuring better linkages with ILO processes and standards. Such independent 
supervision of labour and living standards could be linked with and feed into the Rule of Law monitoring 
of EU institutions and Member States.  
                                                        
442 Interviews with European Parliament (1), (2), (3).  
443 Interviews with European Parliament (1), (2).  
444 European Commission (2018). 
445 Delphi method discussion, 09.03.2018, Brussels. 
446 A respondent representing Bulgarian trade unions/workers’ organisations, e-questionnaire, February-April 2018. 
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ANNEX 1. DETAILED METHODOLOGY 
Data collection methods 
The doctrinal and comparative legal analyses entailed desk research of the main legal and policy 
instruments at international, regional and EU levels. These included: all relevant EU directives on legal 
migration and related handbooks, guidelines for their interpretation and Impact Assessments;  EU primary 
law sources (the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights); regional human rights standards 
(especially the European Convention on Human Rights and Revised European Social Charter); relevant 
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
and applicable international human rights and labour standards. 
The latest desk research also included an account of all relevant academic publications and scholarly 
literature, as well as relevant studies and reports, reflecting and assessing the current state of EU policy 
and legal developments in the area of legal and labour migration.  
Desk research was complemented with 14 semi-structured interviews with experts who play a particularly 
important role in the policy area of legal migration at EU and national levels. Such expert information 
facilitated a better understanding of the main issues and challenges that characterise the EU policy 
approach and the most recent EU policy developments surrounding the EU Fitness Check and the revision 
of the EU Blue Card Directive.  
Out of 14 interviews, three were conducted with officials working for the European Commission, four for 
the European Parliament (MEPs and policy advisers who were involved in framing relevant legal migration 
directives), and one for the Council of the EU, and two with international organisations such as the ILO 
and the UN. In addition, interviews were conducted with four national officials447 selected from the nine 
Member States covered by the Research Paper, all of whom were invited to reflect on how the added value, 
‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ of the EU’s legal migration are perceived and assessed at national level (see, Annex 1: 
Table 21. Anonymised list of interviewees). 
A key method was an e-questionnaire. A total of 61 respondents answered it.448 The e-questionnaire was 
disseminated in cooperation with Social Platform, the Platform International for Undocumented Migrants 
(PICUM), the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) and Business Europe through their national 
members in selected Member States. Inputs were gathered from national social organisations as well as 
trade unions and employers’ organisations, working at the national level (see Annex1: Figure 24). The 
survey focused on the experiences in a selection of nine Member States, in particular: Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, France, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands (see Annex 1: Figure 25).   
These Member States were selected on the basis of geographical balance, different legal and migration 
policy traditions, different accession periods to the EU, importance of social history (whether immigration 
or emigration country), as well as their attitudes and negotiating positions towards ‘more EU’ in ‘legal and 
labour migration’. 
In addition, the Research Paper includes findings from a number of stakeholders working at the EU level 
(five respondents) as well as the Czech Republic (three respondents), the UK (two respondents), Slovakia 
(one respondent) and Italy (one respondent). The questionnaire posed a number of multiple choice and 
open questions about how they view the current ‘sectoral approach’ that characterises the EU’s legal 
                                                        
447 Two additional interviews were planned after receiving the EPRS feedback following the validation meeting. Due 
to the Easter holidays interviews were delayed until after the final draft deadline, one with the European Parliament 
(10.04.2018) and one with a relevant Member State (09.04.2018).  
448 The authors in the Technical Offer committed to reaching a target of 50 responses.  
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migration acquis, what gaps and barriers they identify, what evidence they have of the actual transposition 
and implementation at the national level, and what options they propose for future law and policy-making. 
The questionnaire was available from February to April 2018.  
Annex1: Figure 24. Percentage of respondents by type of affiliation (N=61) 
  
Source: E-questionnaire, February–April 2018. 
 
Annex 1: Figure 25. Number of respondents by country of affiliation (N=61) 
 
Source: E-questionnaire, February–April 2018. 
While the overall results of the e-questionnaire may not be representative, the expert knowledge gathered 
from practitioners representing social partners and civil society actors specialised in this field is highly 
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rather specialised policy domains. Their insights and experiences gathered on the ground are shared across 
the various chapters comprising the Research Paper, especially Chapter 3 on gaps and barriers as well 
Chapter 4 on barriers and impacts.  
The above data-gathering methods were complemented with a Delphi method (closed-door) discussion 
held at CEPS in Brussels on 9 March 2018. A select group of 13 experts participated in the Delphi method 
discussion. The selection of experts was limited to stakeholders already engaged in this project, thus 
covering the two out of three advisory board members of this research project, four leading 
researchers/academics, seven key stakeholders – four of whom represented civil society – two trade unions 
and one employers’ organisation. In addition, interim findings were discussed with the national trade 
unions that are taking part in ETUC’s Permanent Committee on Mobility on 18 of April, 2018. 449 
The Delphi method consisted of a number of ‘rounds’ in which participants expressed their thoughts and 
opinions, with the objective of identifying common priorities, objectives and concerns about the costs of 
non-Europe on legal migration.450 It included three interactive discussion sessions and ‘vote-casting’ 
rounds to give feedback on the preliminary findings and preferred policy options outlined in Chapter 7 of 
this Research Paper (see below, attached programme of the Delphi discussion).  
Data analysis methods 
The Research Paper started with in-depth doctrinal legal research taking into account the existing EU legal 
and policy framework and main legal acts and policy documents on legal and labour migration. Special 
focus targeted the current state of affairs and ‘what we already know’ about the current forms of existing 
EU instruments and their inter-relationships. The analysis deployed comparative legal research methods 
aimed at identifying in a structured manner the main divergences and convergences between the various 
EU legal instruments covering different categories/EU statuses of third-country nationals.  
On these bases, the Research Paper provides a comparative account of the different sets or rights and 
working conditions offered by the different EU directives in the area of legal and labour migration.   
Quantitative analysis of public perceptions follows the methodology used by the Observatory of Public 
Attitudes to Migration (OPAM) of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute 
(EUI). The Research Paper uses existing data sets, namely the European Social Survey and the 
Eurobarometer, FRA MIDIS II to evidence negative public attitudes towards third-country nationals 
(TCNs), discrimination and labour exploitation, linked to the third-country worker migration status. The 
qualitative data gave us indications about the broader societal and individual barriers and impacts, though 
they were not further quantified (Chapter 4). 
Econometric analysis of available data sets was used to establish the causal economic consequences of legal 
and practical constraints for TCNs legally residing in a Member State. The hypotheses were used to test the 
results of the legal analysis and the identified major gaps (See detailed explanation in Annex 5). The 
analysis targeted topics of intra-EU mobility and restrictions and rights. The main data set used in this 
Research Paper comprises micro-data from the EU Labour Force Survey, including two survey waves of 
the ad hoc modules on migration (2008 and 2014) and the European Social Survey. Econometric analysis 
was then further complemented with quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impacts resulting from 
the status quo – individual and societal costs of gaps and barriers (Chapter 6).   
The Policy Options are embedded in the academic and policy perspective and identify the main cost-benefit 
drivers but refrains from the full quantitative analysis (Chapter 7). The policy options put forward are those 
                                                        
449 ETUC (2018), Meeting of ETUC Permanent Committee on Mobility, Migration and Inclusion, 18 April, Brussels.  
 
132 | CARRERA, VOSYLIŪTĖ, VANKOVA, LAURENTSYEVA, FERNANDES, DENNISON & GUERIN 
 
compliant with the relevant EU and international legal provisions and standards/benchmarks, in 
particular with international labour standards on equal and fair treatment, and the EU Treaties (including 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).  
Annex 1: Table 21. Anonymised list of interviewees 
No. Institution Date Remarks 
 EU Institutions   
1.  European Parliament, MEP active on legal migration  
directives (1) 
31.01.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
2.  European Parliament, MEP active on legal migration 
directives (2) 
28.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
3.  European Parliament, Policy adviser active on legal 
migration (1)   
07.03.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
4.  European Parliament, Policy adviser active on legal 
migration (2) 
10.04.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
5.  European Commission, DG HOME (1) 29.01.2018 Call/completed 
6.  European Commission, DG HOME (2) 06.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
7.  European Commission, DG HOME (3) 20.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
8.  Council of the EU, General Secretariat 16.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
 International Organisations   
9.  International Labour Organisation 09.03.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
10.  UN Special Procedures/Rapporteur  (1)  23.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
 National Governments/Stakeholders   
11.  Belgium Official 07.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
12.  Polish Official 26.03.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
13.  Portuguese Official 12.02.2018 Face-to-Face/completed 
14.  Dutch Official 12.03.2018 Call/completed 
Notes: * One interview The additional interview with the National Governments official was arranged and confirmed, after 
the validation meeting at the EPRS, but eventually it was cancelled. It must be stressed that officials of all nine selected 
member states were also repeatedly invited to contribute to the interviews, but some of them used their right not to 
participate as it was voluntary exercise. In any case, in the Technical Offer, the authors have committed to conduct 10 – 15 
interviews. 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
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ANNEX 2. BENCHMARKS ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
STANDARDS 
 
Annex 2: Table 22. Benchmarks established on the basis of International and Regional Standards  
Policy Area International Standards Benchmarks 
Entry conditions No general international law 
provisions. Admission is national 
prerogative of states. 
 
- 
Re-entry   
European Convention on 
Establishment, Art. 1 
 
 
ILO Multilateral Framework on 
Labour Migration, Principle 15, 
Guideline 15.8  
 
 
Facilitate the entry into the territory of the contracting 
parties for the purpose of temporary visits. 
 
 
Adopting policies to encourage circular and return 
migration and reintegration into the country of origin, 
including by promoting temporary labour migration 
schemes and circulation-friendly visa policies. 
ICRMW, Art. 59 (2) 
 
The State of employment shall, subject to paragraph 1 
of the present article, consider granting seasonal 
workers who have been employed in its territory for 
a significant period of time the possibility of taking up 
other remunerated activities and giving them priority 
over other workers who seek admission to that State, 
subject to applicable bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. 
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Equal treatment   
ICCPR, Art. 26 
 
 
ICESC, Art. 7  
 
 
ILO Convention No 97, Art.6   
ILO Convention No 143, Art. 10  
Migration for Employment 
Recommendation (Revised) No 86, 
Art. 17  
Recommendation concerning 
Migrant Workers No 151, Art. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ILO Convention No. 111, Art. 2 
 
Equality (and equal protection) before law and non-
discrimination 
 
Right to the enjoyment of just and favourable 
conditions of work 
 
Equality of treatment, irrespective of skills, sector of 
employment and status, and no less favourable 
treatment than nationals with regards to: 
• Remuneration and working 
conditions, including hours of work, 
rest periods, annual holidays with 
pay, occupational safety and 
occupational health measures;  
• membership of trade unions and 
enjoyment of the benefits of 
collective bargaining; 
• accommodation; 
• social security; hygiene, safety and 
medical assistance; 
• recreation and welfare measures; 
• vocational or technical training 
 
Each Member undertakes to declare and pursue a 
national policy designed to promote, by methods 
appropriate to national conditions and practice, 
equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of 
employment and occupation, with a view to 
eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof. 
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Work permit  ECMW, Article 8(2)  
ILO Migrant Workers Convention 
(143), Art. 14 (a) 
ICRMW, Art. 52 (3a)  
 
 
ICRMW, Art. 59 (2)  
 
 
 
Access to employment in all industries and 
occupations with max. restriction of 1 or 2 years (with 
some limitations provided in the law). 
 
 
 
 
Contracting states shall consider granting seasonal 
workers who have already been employed in their 
territory for a significant period of time the possibility 
of taking up other remunerated activities 
       ILO Convention No. 143, Art. 8 (1)  
ICRMW, Art. 49 (2)  
 
 
ILO Convention No. 143, Art. 8 (2)  
ICRMW, Art. 49 (3); Art. 51  
 
Loss or termination of employment should not 
constitute a sole ground for withdrawal of migrant 
worker’s authorization of residence or work permit 
 
 
Possibility to find alternative work in case of loss or 
termination of employment 
 
 
Residence status   
ICCPR, Art. 12 (1), ICRMW, Art. 39, 
ECHR, Art. 2 (1) of the Fourth 
Protocol  
 
European Convention on 
Establishment, Art. 2  
 
 
Right to free movement and choice of residence 
within the country, where one is lawfully resident 
 
 
Contracting parties shall facilitate the prolonged or 
permanent residence of nationals of the other parties 
in its territory.  
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Social security, pension and 
healthcare benefits  
 
ILO Convention on Social Equality 
of Treatment Convention (No. 118), 
Art. 5 
 
ILO Equality of Treatment 
(Accident Compensation) 
Convention (No. 19), Art. 1 
 
Possibility to export: 
Old-age pensions and benefits 
 
Invalidity benefits, death grants 
 
Benefits in respect of accidents at work and 
occupational diseases, survivors’ benefits 
 
Maintenance of the Social Security 
Rights Convention (No. 157), Art.2  
Maintenance of Social Security 
Rights Recommendation (No. 167) 
ILO Convention on Social Equality 
of Treatment, Art. 7 (2) 
Migration for Employment 
Convention (No. 97), Art.  6 (b)  
European Code of Social Security,    
Art.  73 
ILO Convention on Social Equality 
of Treatment, Art. 7 (2) 
ILO Convention No. 143, Art. 9(1)  
ICRMW, Art. 27 (2) 
 
Maintenance of the acquired rights and rights in 
course of acquisition under their legislation.   
 
Totalisation of periods of insurance, employment or 
residence and of assimilated periods for the purpose 
of the acquisition, maintenance or recovery of rights 
and for the calculation of benefits. 
 
 
Reimbursement of social security contributions 
 
 
 
 
CRC, Art. 10(1)  
ICRMW, Art. 44 (2) 
ILO Convention No. 143, Art. 13(1) 
Obligation to facilitate family reunion 
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Source: Authors, 2018 on the baisis of Zvezda Vankova, PhD study “Circular migration from the Eastern partnership countries to the EU – the rights of migrant workers in Bulgaria 
and Poland” implemented as part of the TRANSMIC project. 
Entry and re-entry of family 
members  
ILO Migrant Worker 
Recommendation No. 151 
(Revised) European Social Charter, 
1996, Art.19 (6) 
ILO (1997) Guidelines on Special 
Protective Measures for Migrant 
Workers in Time-bound Activities 
 
Family reunion of seasonal migrants and “special 
purpose workers” who are legally resident in the 
country 
 
 
 
Recognition of qualifications  
 
ILO Convention No. 143, Art. 14 (b)  
ILO Recommendation No. 151,  
Paragraph 6  
 
ILO Multilateral Framework on 
Labour Migration. Non-binding 
principles and guidelines for a 
rights-based approach to labour 
migration, 2006, Guideline 12.6  
 
European Convention on the Legal 
Status of Migrant Workers, Art. 30 
 
Members may after appropriate consultation with the 
representatives organizations of employers and 
workers, make regulations concerning recognition of 
occupational qualifications acquired outside its 
territory, including certificates and diplomas 
 
Recognition and accreditation of migrant workers’ 
skills and qualifications and, where that is not 
possible, providing a means to have their skills and 
qualifications recognized 
Measures to assist migrant workers and their 
families on the occasion of their final return to their 
State of origin - information about equivalence 
accorded to occupational qualifications obtained 
abroad and any tests to be passed to secure their 
official recognition; equivalence accorded to 
educational qualifications, so that migrant workers' 
children can be admitted to schools without down-
grading. 
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ANNEX 3. GAPS AND BARRIERS AGAINST THE BENCHMARKS 
Annex 3: Table 23: Gaps and barriers assessment against the international and regional benchmarks 
Area  Aspirational standards/benchmarks based on international 
instruments presented in Chapter 2  
 
Gaps and barriers  
Equal treatment  Equality of treatment, irrespective of skills, sector of 
employment, length of residence, and no less favourable 
treatment than nationals with regards to: 
• Remuneration and working conditions, including hygiene, 
safety; 
• membership of trade unions and enjoyment of the benefits of 
collective bargaining; 
• social security and medical assistance; 
• vocational or technical training. 
Gaps (G1) 
All first admission directives grant equal treatment to 
nationals with regards to remuneration, and working 
conditions except for the ICT. 
 
First Admission Directives allow for possible restrictions 
and derogations with regards to education and 
vocational training (no equal treatment with regards to 
ICTs). 
 
All Directives but the FRD provide equal treatment 
clauses to social security but allow for restrictions (except 
the BCD). 
 
Barriers to equal treatment (B1)  
 
Lack of implementation and enforcement at the national 
level  in the Member States  of equal treatment provisions 
with regard to remuneration and working conditions. 
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Entry and Re-
entry conditions 
(circular 
migration) 
Facilitation of circular and return migration policies. 
 
 
Granting previously employed seasonal workers the possibility 
of taking up other remunerated activities and giving them 
priority over other workers who seek admission to that State 
(subject to applicable bilateral and multilateral agreements). 
 
 
 
Barriers with regards to entry: (B2) 
 
All Directives allow MS to pose requirement for migrants 
to apply from outside the EU (except LTRD). 
 
Few allow for in-country application (“may” clauses in 
the FRD; BCD and SRD only when TCNs have residence 
permit or long-term visa; SPD – in accordance with 
national law). 
 
ICTD and SWD – no in-country applications. 
 
Optional labour market tests envisaged in the SWD, 
BCD, SRD- for workers, mobile LTR. 
 
Requirement to provide address envisaged in LTRD, 
BCD, SRD, ICTD. 
 
Wide margin for member states to use ‘public policy or 
security clauses’ 
 
 
Barriers with regards to different re-entry options under 
the Directives (B3): 
 
• BCD provides for the highest rights-based circular 
migration standard (allows absences, mobility and 
accumulation of residence periods for LTR). 
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• SWD provides for short-term stays coupled with re-
entry conditions for bona fide workers. 
 
• ICTD – options for re-entry and cooling off periods. 
 
• SRD – no explicit re-entry options but a highly mobile 
group. 
 
• LTRD – absences for up to 12 months (24 in the BCD). 
 
 
Gaps with regards to different re-entry options (G2): 
 
Absence from the MS for the BC holders could be 
restricted to specific cases only. 
 
Circular migration for seasonal workers and ICTs 
depends on MS 
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Work 
authorisation  
 
Access to employment in all industries and occupations with 
maximum restriction of 1 or 2 years (with some limitations 
provided in the law). 
 
Loss or termination of employment should not constitute a sole 
ground for withdrawal of migrant worker’s authorization of 
residence or work permit. 
 
Possibility to find alternative work in case of loss or termination 
of employment (also for seasonal workers who have already 
been employed for a significant period of time)  
 
 
Gaps concerning change of employer (G3): 
 
Only the BCD and the SWD allow explicitly for change 
of employer (the LTRD, for instance, provides for free 
access). 
 
Changes are limited in the SWD. 
 
Changes of employer in the BCD are subject to prior 
authorisation. 
 
ICTD permit holders are bound to their employer. 
 
Barriers concerning change of employer (B3): 
 
Fear of loss of employment and dependency from 
employer.  
 
Different enforcement capacity of the labour inspectorates 
at the national level. 
 
Gaps concerning consequence of unemployment (G4): 
 
Only the BCD explicitly provides that unemployment 
does not automatically lead to permit withdrawal (unless 
for more than 3 months). 
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Only the BCD explicitly provides for possibility to seek 
alternative work in case of loss of work. 
 
Barriers concerning  consequence of unemployment 
(B5): 
 
Different provision of rights at national level due to the 
lack of explicit provisions in this regard. 
Residence status 
and mobility 
with the 
EU/Member 
State 
Right to free movement and choice of residence within the 
country, where one is lawfully resident. 
 
 
 
 
Facilitation of the prolonged or permanent residence. 
 
 
Gaps concerning mobility and choice of residence (G5): 
 
All first admission directives provide for mobility and 
choice of residence but SWD does not provide sufficient 
guarantees to address employer-organised 
accommodation. 
 
 
Gaps concerning residence status (G6): 
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ICTs (ICTD) and seasonal workers (SWD), as well as other 
TCNs residing on temporary and formally limited permits 
excluded from access to LTR. 
 
BCD provides facilitated access to LTR. 
 
SRD only implicitly provides for access to the LTR permit. 
 
 
Gaps concerning intra- EU mobility (G7): 
 
Different regimes: 
 
ICTD and SRD allow for temporary mobility. 
 
LTRD, ICTD, BCD, SRD allow long-term mobility. 
Social security 
coordination  
 
 
 
 
 
Export of benefits. 
 
Maintenance of the acquired rights and rights in course of 
acquisition under their legislation. 
 
Totalisation (aggregation) of periods of insurance, employment 
or residence and of assimilated periods for the purpose of the 
acquisition, maintenance or recovery of rights and for the 
calculation of benefits. 
 
 
Gaps concerning social security coordination (G8): 
 
Provisions on export of benefits differ between the 
Directives and there are no provisions in that regard in the 
LTRD and FRD.  
 
The Directives do not contain other social security 
coordination principles such as aggregation of periods of 
insurance, employment and residence. 
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Reimbursement of social security contributions. 
 
 
 
Barriers concerning social security coordination (B6): 
 
Coordination of social security at the national level is 
subject to conclusion of bilateral agreements between MS 
and third countries, which provide for the actual 
entitlements. Their number varies from MS to MS. 
Family 
reunification  
Facilitation of family reunification, including for seasonal 
workers  
 
 
Gaps concerning family reunification (G9): 
Four different regimes for family reunification: 
1) No right: seasonal workers, students, temporary 
workers with permits for less than one year 
2) Rules for FR: for workers with residence permit 
valid for one year or more and for LTR in the 
first MS 
3) Privileged rules: Blue Card Holders, researchers 
and ICT (e.g. no waiting period and labour 
market test for admitted family members) 
4) Free admission: family members of LTR TCN 
admitted in first MS free to move with the LTR 
TCN to the second MS. 
 
 
Barriers concerning family reunification (B7): 
 
Right to family reunion is foreseen for TCN with their 
spouses and minor children. For the rest of the family 
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members, MS have discretion, though volumes of 
admission are not applicable in this case   
 
Waiting periods, integration requirements, etc.  imposed 
on national level can disrupt or hinder family life. 
 
Negative impact on long term integration for both family 
members and the TCN workers. 
 
 
 
Recognition of 
qualifications  
 
Recognition and accreditation of migrant workers’ skills and 
qualifications 
 
Where that is not possible, providing a means to have their skills 
and qualifications recognized 
 
Gaps concerning recognition of qualifications (G10): 
 
Equal treatment in all Directives applies only once 
authorisation has been obtained, but not before 
 
 
 
Barriers (B8): 
In particular for regulated professions it takes longer to 
recognise diplomas and qualifications.  
This leads to de-qualification, and highly-qualified 
persons working in perceived ‘low skilled’ jobs, i.e. as 
a seasonal workers while awaiting the recognition. 
 
 
 
146 | CARRERA, VOSYLIŪTĖ, VANKOVA, LAURENTSYEVA, FERNANDES, DENNISON & GUERIN 
 
ANNEX 4. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND MOBILITY IN THE 
EU 
 
Annex 4: Figure 26. Share of non-nationals in the resident population, 1 January 2016 (%) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, migr_pop1ctz 
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Annex 4 : Figure 27. Total Net Migration in the EU Member States in 2012 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects, World Bank,  2012. URL. 
 
As regards to Figure 17, Eurostat 2015 results confirmed that the trends remain largely unchanged, with 
exception of Cyprus dropping towards a negative net migration:  
 
“A total of 17 of the EU Member States reported more immigration than emigration in 2015, but 
in Bulgaria, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Latvia and 
Lithuania, the number of emigrants outnumbered the number of immigrants” 
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Annex 4: Figure 28. ‘To what extent are the following important qualifications for accepting or excluding immigrants?’ 
  
Source: European Social Survey, 2014 
 
What do Europeans see as the effects of immigration? 
 
We now move on to the question of what Europeans see as the effects of immigration. This is applicable 
to the cost of non-Europe in migration insofar as citizens are unlikely to support a migration policy regime 
that is not able to address (if founded) or rebut with evidence their more pronounced fears. As we can see 
in Figure 19, when asked to place the effect of immigration on each area of public life—the national 
economy, culture, quality of life, jobs, government budget and crime—Europeans distinguish between 
them.  
 
Crime is the only facet in which a majority of Europeans perceive the effect of immigration as being 
negative---around 54% place the effect between 0 and 4 on the 0-10 spectrum. Conversely, the effect of 
immigration on culture is the only area in which a majority of Europeans see the effect of immigration as 
positive—around 54% placing its effect between 6 and 10 on the 0-10 spectrum. Europeans are more 
ambiguous on the other effects—with the economy perceived as being most positively affected and the 
government’s budget seen as most negatively, with the effects on jobs for native workers and quality of 
life being in the middle.  
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Annex 4: Figure 29. ‘Do you believe that immigrants have a good or bad effect on the following issues?’  
 
Source: European Social Survey, 2014.  
On the one hand, it supports the notion that individuals are most concerned about the effect of 
immigration on their safety and on the sustainability of rapid demographic transformation on 
government budgets and, on the other, we know that Europeans most concerned by immigration are 
those who value security most highly in their day to day lives. Nevertheless, the power of media re-shape 
such opinions should not be underestimated - in a forerun of Brexit debate – Leave campaign has 
successfully stirred fears about the EU citizens and TCNs from pre-accession countries like Turkey or 
Albania on their negative impacts, on Britain’s schools, jobs, houses, healthcare, crime and culture. 451 
The very dangerous assumptions about the ‘criminal migrants’ need to be further questioned and 
challenged as these are more often outcomes of irresponsible reporting about crimes when foreign 
nationalities are highlighted, than actual phenomenon of ‘criminal migrants’.452 In fact, migrants are more 
likely to be victims of violent racist and xenophobic crimes inspired by such toxic rethorics. For example, 
after Brexit, in London alone - ‘there were more than 2,300 recorded race-hate offences in London, 
compared with 1,400 in the 38 days before the vote’.453  
                                                        
451 M. Moore and G.Ramsay (2017) UK media coverage of the  2016 EU Referendum campaign, Kings College, Centre 
for the Study of Media,  Communication and Power, May 2017, p. 23. (https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-
institute/CMCP/UK-media-coverage-of-the-2016-EU-Referendum-campaign.pdf) 
452 Moore, K. (2015) Immigration coverage and populist cultural work in the 2015 General Election campaign: Early 
reflections from leading UK academics. In D. Jackson & E. Thorsen (Eds), UK election analysis 2015: Media, voters 
and the campaign. Bournemouth: Political Studies Association and Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and 
the Community, Bournemouth University. 
453 The Guardian (2016) “Horrible spike' in hate crime linked to Brexit vote, Met police say “article by M. Weawer 
(https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/28/hate-crime-horrible-spike-brexit-vote-metropolitan-
police).  
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ANNEX 5. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
5.1. Data sets  
European Labour Force Survey, Ad-hoc Migration Modules, waves 2008 and 2014 
For the analysis of work-related outcomes (employment status, monthly pay, duration of a contract, etc.), 
we use data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), which is a large household survey 
harmonised across Member States, three countries of the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, 
Switzerland and Norway) and two candidate countries (Turkey and FYR of Macedonia). The survey 
focuses on labour participation of people aged 15 and over, covering all industries and occupations, as well 
as on persons outside the labour force. In 2016, the survey’s sample size across the EU amounted to about 
1.5 million respondents.  
Specifically for this project, we focus on the data collected in the Member States for the Ad-hoc Migration 
Modules (EU LFS 2008 and 2014 waves).454 The migration modules cover sufficiently large samples of 
TCNs residing in the EU and allow us to conduct a representative econometric analysis of migrants’ 
economic integration (as proxied by their work-related outcomes). Annex 5: Table 24 summarises the 
availability of data by participating country and survey wave.  
 
Annex 5: Table 24. Representation of countries by survey year, EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration 
Wave Participating countries Number of 
available 
observations 
2008 AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FR GR HU IE IT LT LU LV NL 
PL PT RO SE SI SK UK 
745,169 
2014 AT BE BG CY CZ EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IT LT LU LV MT PL 
PT RO SE SI SK UK 
447,395 
Source: Authors, 2018 using EU LFS data.  
Note: Number of available observations with non-missing data for nationality, gender, age and education.  
 
To account for sampling issues and ensure representativeness, we weigh all the observations by the 
sampling weight (coeff) available in the data files and recommended by the data providers.455  
The migration modules contain specific questions relevant for the analysis of migrants’ experiences – 
country of nationality/birth, years since migration, migration reason and obstacles in the labour market – 
as well as standard socio-economic data collected in all waves of the EU LFS: age, education, employment 
status, occupation, job characteristics, etc. Annex 5: Table 25 presents the summary of main variables from 
the EU LFS used in the analysis. For variables that measure the outcomes, we also report the number of 
available observations.  
 
                                                        
454 We use anonymised micro data provided by Eurostat. The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data 
lies entirely with the authors.  
455 Eurostat (2018). 
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Annex 5: Table 25. Summary of outcomes and key variables, EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration 
Variable Definition and derivation Number of 
available 
observations 
Outcomes: 
Employed Variable label: ilostat 
Question in the survey: ILO working status of the respondent 
Coding of the variable: 1 - ‘Employed’; 0 – 
‘Unemployed/Inactive/Military service’. 
1,192,564 
Income decile 
(monthly pay) 
Variable label: incdecil 
Question in the survey: Monthly (take home) pay from main 
job (deciles) of the respondent 
Coding of the variable: numbers in decile (from 1 to 10). 
185,043 
(available only for 
2014) 
Overqualification Variable label: overqual 
Question in the survey: Is the respondent overqualified for 
the current job? 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Yes’; 0 – ‘No’.  
312,162 
(available only for 
2014, conditional on 
being employed) 
Permanent 
contract 
Variable label: temp 
Question in the survey: The respondent’s permanency of the 
job 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Person has a permanent job or 
work  contract of unlimited duration’; 0 – ‘Person has 
temporary job/work contract of limited duration’.  
744,533 
(conditional on 
being employed) 
Supervisory 
tasks 
Variable label: supvisor 
Question in the survey: Supervisory responsibilities at the job 
of the respondent 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Yes’; 0 – ‘No’. 
734,953 
(conditional on 
being employed) 
Part-time work Variable label: ftpt 
Question in the survey: Full-time/Part-time distinction of the 
respondent 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Part-time’; 0 – ‘Full-time’.  
883,646 
(conditional on 
being employed) 
Atypical work Variable labels: shiftwk, evenwk, nightwk, satwk, sunwk 
Question in the survey: Shift work, evening work, night 
work, Saturday work, Sunday work 
Coding of the variables: each variable is coded as 1 – ‘Yes’; 0 
– ‘No’. Then we derive a combined indicator ‘atypical work’ 
as an average of the five variables.  
841,766 
(conditional on 
being employed) 
Hours worked  Variable labels: hwusual 
Question in the survey: Number of hours per week usually 
worked in the main job 
Coding of the variable: actual number of hours worked (1-
100) 
744,209 
(conditional on 
being employed) 
Explanatory variables:  
Foreign national Variable label: national 
Question in the survey: Nationality of the respondent 
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Coding of the variable: ‘National’ – if a citizen of the reporting 
country; ‘Foreign, EU’ – if a citizen of another EU Member 
State, ‘Foreign, TCN’ – if a citizen of a country outside the EU. 
Origin region Variable label: national 
Question in the survey: Nationality of the respondent 
Coding of the variable: country of nationality in the EU LFS 
is not directly reported; countries are grouped as follows: 000 
–National/Native of own Country, 001 – EU15, 002 – NMS10 
(10 new Member States of 2004), 003 – NMS3 (3 new Member 
States of 2007 and 2013), 006 – EFTA, 007 – Other Europe, 009 
– North Africa, 010 – Other Africa, 011 – Near and Middle 
East, 012 – East Asia, 013 – South and South East Asia, 016 – 
North America, 017 – Central America (and Caribbean), 018 
– South America, 019 – Australia and Oceania 
 
Age group Variable label: age 
Question in the survey: Age of the respondent, calculated 
Coding of the variable: in five-year intervals (20-24, 25-29, 30-
34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-55) 
 
Gender Variable label: sex 
Question in the survey: Gender of the respondent 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Female’; 0 – ‘Male’.  
 
Education Variable label: hatlev 
Question in the survey: Highest educational attainment level 
of the respondent 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Low’ – no schooling, primary or 
middle school (ISCED 0-2); 2 – ‘Middle’ – completed high 
school or vocational degree (ISCED 3-4); 3 – ‘High’ – tertiary 
degree (ISCED 5-6). 
 
Reason for 
migration 
Variable label: ahm2014_migreas, ahm2008_migreas 
Question in the survey: Reason for migration 
Coding of the variable (categories corresponding to 
migration reasons): 1 – ‘Employment’, 2 – ‘Family reasons’, 3 
– ‘Study’, 4 – ‘International protection or asylum’ 
2008: 44,668 
2014: 30,713 
Restriction Variable label: ahm2008_restracc 
Question in the survey: Is current legal access to the labour 
market restricted? 
Coding of the variable: The answer is coded as 1 if individuals 
report that their access is a) restricted to employment for 
specific employers/sectors/occupations, b) restricted to self-
employment, c) not allowing self-employment, d) falls under 
any combination of a, b and c. Otherwise, the variable is set 
to zero.  
Available in 2008 
only  
TCNs: 25,025 
observations 
 
Main obstacle in 
the labour 
market 
Variable label: ahm2014_jobobst1  
Question in the survey: What is the main obstacle to getting 
a job corresponding to the person’s qualifications or to 
getting a job at all?  
Coding of the variable (categories corresponding to the 
Available in 2014 
only 
TCNs: 30,429 
observations  
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reported obstacles): 1 – ‘Language’ (Lack of language skills in 
host-country language(s)), 2 – ‘Recognition of qualifications’ 
(Lack of recognition of qualifications obtained abroad), 3 – 
‘Restricted rights’ (Restricted right to work because of 
citizenship or residence permission), 4 – ‘Background’ 
(Origin, religion or social background).  
Source: Authors, 2018  
 
European Social Survey, waves 2002-16 
To measure life quality indicators – subjective health, subjective happiness and perceived discrimination – 
we use data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The biannual survey has been conducted since 2002 
across Europe with newly selected cross-sectional samples. The survey aims to monitor social structures 
and social developments in Europe: respondents are asked about their life conditions, social behaviour, 
beliefs, attitudes, and judgements of key aspects in their societies. Along thematic variables, the survey 
also collects key socio-economic indicators, such as age, education, family structure, economic 
participation, country of origin, etc. These data are representative of the European population and are 
considered highly reliable. The data have been widely used by researchers in economics and social 
sciences.456 
For this project we use all available waves of the survey conducted between 2002 and 2016. We restrict the 
sample to individuals aged 20 to 55 (to focus on working individuals) and residing in one of the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We decided to limit the sample to these 
countries because most of them are well represented across all rounds of the survey. Annex 5: Table 26 
summarises the availability of data by participating country and survey wave.  
Annex 5: Table 26. Representation of countries by survey year, European Social Survey 
Wave Participating countries Number of 
available 
observations 
2002 IE GB FI BE DK IT DE PT AT ES LU GR NL FR SE 17,380 
2004 ES LU FR GB BE GR AT SE PT NL DK FI DE IE 16,384 
2006 DE AT PT FI SE BE DK NL GB IE ES FR 14,252 
2008 IE BE FR SE GR PT NL ES DK GB DE FI 14,442 
2010 SE DE BE FI GB IE GR ES NL PT DK FR 14,123 
2012 DK DE ES FR SE FI PT IE BE NL GB IT 13,417 
2014 FR SE NL AT DE DK IE ES PT GB FI BE 12,831 
2016 DE FI SE BE NL FR IE GB AT 10,018 
Source: Authors, 2018 using European Social Survey data. 
Note: Number of available observations with non-missing data for nationality, gender, age and education.  
To account for sampling issues and ensure representativeness, we weigh all the observations by the 
                                                        
456 See, for instance, www.europeansocialsurvey.org/bibliography/complete.html for the list of publications using 
the European Social Survey data.  
154 | CARRERA, VOSYLIŪTĖ, VANKOVA, LAURENTSYEVA, FERNANDES, DENNISON & GUERIN 
 
combination of two sampling weights (the post-stratification weights and the population size weights) 
available in the data files and recommended by the data providers.457  
Annex 5: Table 27 presents the summary of main variables from the European Social Survey used in the 
analysis. For variables that we use to measure the outcomes, we also report the number of available 
observations.  
Annex 5: Table 27. Summary of outcomes and explanatory variables, European Social Survey 
Variable Definition and derivation Number of 
available 
observations 
Outcomes: 
Discrimination Variable label: dscrgrp  
Question in the survey: Would you describe yourself as being 
a member of a group that is discriminated against in this 
country? 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Yes’; 0 – ‘No’; ‘Don’t know’ – 
missing. 
112,287 
Health Variable label: health  
Question in the survey: What is your subjective general health? 
Coding of the variable: on the scale from 1 to 5, where 1 – ‘Very 
good’; 5 – ‘Very bad’. We recode it to be between 0 and 1, where 
1 – ‘Very bad’ and 0 – ‘Very bad’.  
112,231 
Happiness Variable label: happy  
Question in the survey: How happy are you? 
Coding of the variable: on the scale from 0 to 10, where 10 – 
‘Extremely happy’; 0 – ‘Extremely unhappy’. We normalise the 
values to be between 0 and 1.  
112,062 
Employed Variable label: mnactic 
Question in the survey: What is your main activity in the last 
seven days? 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Paid work’ (employed); 0 – 
‘Education, Unemployed, Disabled, Military/civil service, 
Retired, Other’.  
111,923 
Explanatory variables:  
Foreign 
national 
Variable labels: ctzcntr and cntbrtha 
Questions in the survey: Are you a citizen of this country? What 
is your country of birth? 
Coding of the variable: ‘National’ – if a citizen of the reporting  
country; ‘Foreign, EU’ – if not a citizen and born in EU-28, 
‘Foreign, TCN’ – if not a citizen and born outside the EU.458 
 
Age group Variable label: agea 
Question in the survey: Age of respondent, calculated 
 
                                                        
457 European Social Survey (2014). 
458 The direct information on country of citizenship is of lower quality (many missing observations) than is that for the 
country of birth.   
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Coding of the variable: in five-year intervals (20-24, 25-29, 30-
34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-55) 
Gender Variable label: gndr 
Question in the survey: What is your gender? 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Female’; 0 – ‘Male’.  
 
Education Variable label: edulvlb 
Question in the survey: What is the highest level of education 
you have successfully completed? 
Coding of the variable: 1 – ‘Low’ – no schooling, primary or 
middle school (ISCED 0-2); 2 – ‘Middle’ – completed high 
school or vocational degree (ISCED 3-4); 3 – ‘High’ – tertiary 
degree (ISCED 5-6). 
 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
5.2. Empirical specifications  
Estimating conditional differences in work-related outcomes and life quality between third-country 
nationals and EU nationals  
The purpose of this descriptive analysis is to document differences in work-related and life quality 
outcomes between comparable third-country nationals (TCNs) and the EU nationals. We use data from 
both the EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration and the European Social Survey. In the analysis, we 
distinguish by nationality: the native population (nationals of the reporting country), mobile EU citizens, 
and TCNs. We also distinguish by gender to know whether there are significant differences between 
women and men. Equation 1 presents the empirical specification.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 +𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖            (1) 
 
Where:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 – is the outcome variable of a respondent i (see Annex 5: Table 25 and Annex 5: Table 27 for the 
definitions).  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 – are the main explanatory variables of 
interest. These are interaction variables of the gender and nationality. For example, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 is 
equal ‘1’ for men, who are nationals of another Member State. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 is equal ‘1’ for women, 
who are nationals of another Member State. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 are corresponding variables for 
men and women, who are TCNs. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 show by 
how much outcomes of foreigners from within the EU/TCNs differ from those of the native men/women. 
These differences are measured in the units of the outcome. For example, in Annex 5: Table 28, column (1) 
reports differences in employment rates. The coefficient for Male Foreign EU equals 0.00317, meaning that 
there is no statistically significant difference in the probability of being employed between the native men 
and EU mobile citizen - men. The coefficient for Male TCN equals -0.0527,** meaning that the probability 
of being employed for male TCNs is 5.3 percentage points lower than that for native men. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  is a dummy equal to 1 for women respondents and 0 for men respondents.  
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖       is an indicator for the age group of a respondent.  
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𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖        is an indicator for the attained education level of a respondent.  
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡   - year of the survey fixed effects.  
𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐         - reporting country fixed effects.  
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖         - error term.  
 
Hence, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 measure differences in outcomes 
between mobile EU citizens, TCNs, and the native population of the same gender, age and education level, 
residing in the same reporting country and answering the survey in the same year.  
In an additional specification, we add two more controls: industry fixed effects (industries are defined 
according to NACE classification, 1digit level) and occupation fixed effects (ISCO classification, 1 digit 
level). In this case, we measure differences between respondents not only of the same age, gender and 
education, but also who work in the same industry and occupation.  
For estimations we use linear probability models (OLS), the observations are weighted by sampling 
weights provided in the data. Robust standard errors account for possible heteroscedasticity. We cluster 
standard errors at the level of the reporting country and year of the survey as it is likely that standard 
errors are correlated among respondents residing in the same country and answering the survey in the 
same year.  
 
Corresponding tables with the results: Annex 5: Table 28 - Annex 5: Table 30. Corresponding figures in the 
text: Figure 16 Conditional differences in work-related outcomes between third-country nationals and 
mobile EU nationals (nationals, referred to as ‘native population’ in the text, is a reference group) and 
Figure 17. Conditional differences in life quality between third-country nationals and mobile EU 
citizens (nationals, referred to as ‘native population’ in the text, is a reference group). 
 
Estimating differences in intra-EU mobility between third-country nationals and EU nationals  
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate differences in intra-EU mobility rates between TCNs and EU 
nationals. Here, we distinguish by nationality: TCNs vs. EU nationals (both the native population and 
mobile EU citizens). We also distinguish by education level, as low-, medium- and highly skilled TCNs 
may face mobility constraints of varying extents. Equation 2 presents the empirical specification.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  +𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
 
Where:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 – is the indicator for intra-EU mobility, which takes the value of 1 if a respondent resided in another 
Member State one year before the survey or if a respondent resides and works in different Member States. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 – is the main explanatory variable of interest. It takes the value of 1 for TCNs and is equal to zero 
otherwise. The coefficient 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 shows by how much the likelihood of intra-EU mobility in a given year 
among TCNs differs from that among EU nationals. For example, in Annex 5: Table 31, column (1) reports 
differences in intra-EU mobility rates for the full sample of respondents. The coefficient for TCN equals 
- 0.00428,*** meaning that TCNs are 0.428 percentage points less likely to be mobile within the EU relative 
to an EU national of the same gender, age, education, industry of work, current and previous countries of 
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origin.  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  is a dummy equal to 1 for women respondents and 0 for men respondents.  
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖       is an indicator for the age group of a respondent.  
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖        is an indicator for the attained education level of a respondent.  
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗   - industry fixed effects.  
𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡        - reporting country time-specific fixed effects.  
𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡−1        - previous country of residence time-specific fixed effects.  
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖         - error term.  
 
To see whether there are differences depending on skill level, we also estimate the regression (2) for three 
different skill groups defined by attained education: low, medium and high.  
 
For estimations we use linear probability models (OLS), the observations are weighted by sampling 
weights provided in the data. Robust standard errors account for possible heteroscedasticity. We cluster 
standard errors at the level of the reporting country and year of the survey as it is likely that standard 
errors are correlated among respondents residing in the same country and answering the survey in the 
same year.  
 
Corresponding tables with the results: Annex 5: Table 31. Corresponding figure in the text: Figure 18. 
Annual intra-EU mobility rates and conditional differences in intra-EU mobility between third-country 
nationals and EU nationals. 
 
Estimating the role of self-reported legal restrictions for work-related outcomes of third-country 
nationals in the EU 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the role of legal restrictions in shaping work-related outcomes 
of TCNs in the EU. For this, we limit the sample to TCNs residing in one of the Member States and make 
use of the available question in the EU LFS Ad-hoc Module on Migration (2008 wave): “Is current legal 
access to the labour market restricted?” We then link answers to this question to current work-related 
outcomes of TCNs. Equation 3 presents the empirical specification. We take into account a rich set of 
explanatory variables to reduce possible endogeneity. As in the specification (1) we allow for 
heterogeneous effect of restrictions depending on gender of respondents, as it is likely that such restrictions 
are more binding for women TCNs.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  +𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
 
Where:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 – is the work-related outcome variable of a respondent i (see Annex 5: Table 25 for the definitions).  
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 – is the ‘restriction’ dummy. It is coded as ‘1’ if individuals report that their access to the labour 
market is a) restricted to employment for specific employers/sectors/occupations, b) restricted to self-
employment, c) not allowing self-employment, d) falls under any combination of a, b and c. Otherwise, the 
dummy is set to zero. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 – are the main explanatory variables of interest. These are interaction 
variables of the gender and the restriction dummy. For example, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 equals ‘1’ for men who 
report that their access to the labour market is restricted. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  show by how 
much outcomes of TCNs reporting restricted access to the labour market differ from those of similar TCNs who 
do not face such restrictions. These differences are measured in the units of the outcome. For example, in 
Annex 5: Table 32, column (1) reports differences in employment rates. The coefficient for 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 
equals -0.0552,* meaning that the probability of being employed for TCN men facing restrictions is 5.5 
percentage points lower than for TCN men with the same observable characteristics but who do not face 
such restrictions.  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 – is a dummy equal to 1 for women respondents and 0 for men respondents.  
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖       – is an indicator for the age group of a respondent.  
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖        – is an indicator for the attained education level of a respondent.  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 – is an indicator for migration reason.  
𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐  – origin region (𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐) fixed effects interacted with reporting country (𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐) fixed effects.  
𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡       – origin region fixed effects interacted with arrival year (𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡) fixed effects; controls for any 
unobservable effects specific to a migrant cohort from a certain origin (e.g. North Africa2003 – would 
capture all common factors among migrants leaving North Africa in 2003 and currently residing in one of 
the Member States).  
𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 – reporting country (𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐) fixed effects interacted with arrival year (𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡) fixed effects; controls for any 
unobservable effects specific to a migrant cohort entering a certain Member State (e.g. Italy2003 would 
capture all common factors among TCNs residing in Italy since 2003).  
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖         – error term.  
For estimations we use linear probability models (OLS), the observations are weighted by sampling 
weights provided in the data. Robust standard errors account for possible heteroscedasticity. We cluster 
standard errors at the level of the reporting country as it is likely that standard errors are correlated among 
respondents residing in the same country as of 2008.  
 
Corresponding tables with the results: Annex 5: Table 32. Corresponding figure in the text: Figure 20. The 
role of self-reported legal restrictions for work-related outcomes of third-country nationals in the EU. 
 
Estimating the causal role of extending rights (from ‘third-country national’ to ‘EU national’ status) 
using the EU enlargement natural experiment  
 
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the causal role of legal restrictions in shaping outcomes of TCNs 
in the EU. For this, we exploit the quasi-experimental setting created in the EU after the 2004 and 2007 
accessions. Following the accession of their countries to the EU, nationals of new Member States (NMS), 
who already resided in existing Member States, experienced a change from the status of a ‘third-country 
national’ to the status of an ‘EU national’. Yet this change in status, i.e. extension of rights, did not happen 
simultaneously in all Member States. Throughout 2004-14, NMS nationals faced different transitional 
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provisions depending on their country of residence. For example, the UK lifted all restrictions for NMS8 
nationals in 2004, while for NMS2 nationals the restrictions were in place until 2014. Italy kept restrictions 
until 2006 for NMS8 nationals and until 2012 for NMS2 nationals. Germany kept restrictions until 2011 for 
NMS8 nationals and until 2014 for NMS2 nationals.459 As the result, in some Member States, NMS nationals 
already enjoyed the same rights as other EU nationals, while in other Member States, they still faced 
restrictions as TCNs. We can, thus, compare how granting more rights, i.e. extending to EU citizen’s rights, 
affects outcomes of TCNs.  
 
We limit the sample to NMS nationals and TCNs residing in one of the EU-15 Member States (we consider 
only ‘old’ EU Member States, as these are the relevant destinations for migrants from NMS). We also limit 
the sample to TCNs and NMS nationals who arrived between 1995 and 2004 to ensure that transitional 
provisions did not influence the decisions to migrate. Equation 4 presents the empirical specification. We 
take into account a rich set of explanatory variables to reduce possible endogeneity. As in previous 
specifications, we allow for heterogeneous effect of restrictions depending on gender of respondents, as it 
is likely that such restrictions are more binding for female TCNs. We further check the hypothesis that legal 
restrictions are more binding for family migrants by limiting the sample to individuals who report ‘family 
reunification’ as their main reason to migrate.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
 
Where:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 – is the work-related outcome variable of a respondent i (see Annex 5: Table 25  and Annex 5: Table 27 
for the definitions).  
𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 – is the ‘full rights’ variable denoting the number of years since an individual has 
enjoyed full (EU national) rights in his/her country of residence. For example, as of 2008, this variable will 
be equal to 4 for a Polish national residing in the UK, 2 for a Polish national residing in Italy, and zero for 
a Polish national residing in Germany. For TCNs, this variable is always zero. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 – are the main explanatory variables of interest. These 
are interaction variables of the gender and the ‘full rights’ variable. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  show by how much outcomes of  NMS nationals change 
with every year since obtaining full (EU national) rights, i.e. since converting from the status of a ‘third-
country national’ to the status of an ‘mobile EU citizen’. These differences are measured in the units of the 
outcome. For example, in Annex 5. Table 33, column (1) reports differences in employment rates. The 
coefficient for 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 equals +0.0192,** meaning that the probability of being employed 
for foreign women increases by 1.9 percentage points with every year since obtaining full (EU national) 
rights. The implicit assumption is that this effect is linear, i.e. the same for each year since extension of 
rights.  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 – is a dummy equal to 1 for women respondents and 0 for men respondents.  
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖       – is an indicator for the age group of a respondent.  
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖        – is an indicator for the attained education level of a respondent.  
                                                        
459 Freedom of movement of workers in the EU (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_movement_for_ 
workers_in_the_European_Union). 
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 – number of years since accession to the EU: 2004 for NMS8 nationals and 2007 for NMS2 
nationals.  
𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡       – origin region fixed effects interacted with arrival year (𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡) fixed effects; controls for any 
unobservable effects specific to a migrant cohort from a certain origin (e.g. NMS8 2003 – would capture all 
common factors among migrants leaving NMS8 countries in 2003 and currently residing in one of the ‘old’ 
Member States).  
𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 – reporting country (𝜈𝜈𝑐𝑐) fixed effects interacted with arrival year (𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡) fixed effects; controls for any 
unobservable effects specific to a migrant cohort entering a certain old Member State (e.g. Italy2003 would 
capture all common factors among foreignersresiding in Italy since 2003).  
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡   – year of the survey fixed effects.  
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖         – error term.  
 
For estimations we use linear probability models (OLS), the observations are weighted by sampling 
weights provided in the data. Robust standard errors account for possible heteroscedasticity. We cluster 
standard errors at the level of the reporting country as it is likely that standard errors are correlated among 
respondents residing in the same country and answering the survey in the same year.  
 
Corresponding tables with the results: Annex 5. Table 33 - Annex 5: Table 35 Corresponding figure in the 
text: Figure 21. The role of extending rights (to EU national rights) for work-related outcomes of third-
country nationals. 
 
We can argue for a causal interpretation of the results because individual NMS nationals could not 
influence the exact timing of obtaining full (EU national) rights: the decisions on transitional provisions 
were taken by the governments of the old Member States and appeared as ‘given’ for NMS nationals who 
already resided in these States. Moreover, we are able to control for origin and reporting country time-
specific effects. Yet limitations of this strategy (external validity, selection to out-migration) should be also 
acknowledged (see the main text for the discussion). 
 
5.3. Tables with empirical results 
General remarks to the tables with empirical results 
• Each table shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. To denote statistical 
significance of the coefficients, we use the following labels: *** - 99% confidence, ** - 95% 
confidence, * - 90% confidence.  
• The samples include individuals aged 20 to 55, currently residing in a Member State.  
• The number of observations in regressions varies depending on the availability of dependent and 
explanatory variables and on whether we consider the whole population residing in the EU, all 
foreign nationals, or only TCNs (see the above section for explanations).  
• Our results represent an average estimated effect (across all observations – participating countries 
and survey years – included in a regression). 
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Tables  
Annex 5: Table 28. Conditional differences in work-related outcomes between third-country nationals and EU nationals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Employed Monthly 
pay 
(income 
decile) 
Overqualifi
ed 
Permanent 
contract 
Supervisory 
tasks 
Part-time 
work 
Atypical 
work 
Usual 
working 
hours 
(week) 
         
Foreign national from EU, 
male 
0.00317 -0.636*** 0.0659*** -0.0487*** -0.0689*** -0.0416*** -0.00242 0.0941 
 (0.00941) (0.161) (0.0145) (0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.217) 
Foreign national from EU, 
female 
-0.0216** -0.721** 0.133*** -0.0354*** -0.0530*** 0.0472* 0.0196** 0.698*** 
 (0.00962) (0.279) (0.0228) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0277) (0.00829) (0.211) 
Third-country national, 
male 
-0.0527*** -1.308*** 0.119*** -0.107*** -0.110*** 0.0418*** -0.00231 -0.462** 
 (0.0196) (0.170) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0152) (0.0134) (0.0103) (0.202) 
Third-country national, 
female 
-0.156*** -1.127*** 0.143*** -0.0604*** -0.0626*** 0.0742*** 0.0220*** 1.032*** 
 (0.0360) (0.310) (0.0292) (0.0171) (0.0121) (0.0201) (0.00819) (0.265) 
Female -0.128*** -1.729*** 0.0212*** -0.0250*** -0.104*** 0.217*** -0.0319*** -2.660*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0969) (0.00202) (0.00403) (0.00580) (0.0245) (0.00433) (0.200) 
Medium-skill 0.133*** 0.983*** 0.0808*** 0.0421*** 0.0759*** -0.0281*** 0.00886*** -0.221 
 (0.00746) (0.0741) (0.0131) (0.00822) (0.00822) (0.00542) (0.00287) (0.211) 
High-skill 0.221*** 2.827*** 0.120*** 0.0457*** 0.232*** -0.0748*** -0.0491*** -0.302 
 (0.00984) (0.108) (0.0171) (0.0138) (0.0119) (0.00745) (0.00820) (0.514) 
         
Observations 1,173,494 185,043 303,939 731,196 729,328 868,246 832,894 731,497 
R-squared 0.123 0.291 0.103 0.123 0.116 0.144 0.028 0.049 
Mean of outcome, nationals 
of the reporting country 
0.754 5.570 0.209 0.867 0.224 0.157 0.216 41.65 
SD of outcome 0.431 2.770 0.406 0.339 0.417 0.364 0.265 7.689 
Clusters 51 21 25 51 51 51 50 51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State. All regressions control for gender, education, age group (five-year intervals), 
reporting country and interview year. Baseline group: nationals of the reporting country. Clustered standard errors at the ‘reporting country and year’ level. Data on monthly pay and 
overqualification are available only in 2014 wave. Data on outcomes 2-8 are available only for employed individuals. Regression on working hours (outcome 8) includes only individuals 
working full-time. Source: Authors, 2018 using EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration, 2008 and 2014 waves.  
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 Annex 5: Table 29 Conditional differences in work-related outcomes between third-country nationals and EU nationals, accounting for occupation and 
industry of work 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Monthly pay 
(income 
decile) 
Overqualified Permanent 
contract 
Supervisory 
tasks 
Part-time work Atypical work Usual 
working 
hours (week) 
        
Foreign national from EU, male -0.250** 0.0502*** -0.0219 -0.0486*** -0.0439* 0.00657 0.0986 
 (0.103) (0.0115) (0.0130) (0.0158) (0.0242) (0.00848) (0.410) 
Foreign national from EU, female -0.0446 0.0791*** -0.0149 -0.0393*** -0.00884 -0.00299 -0.154 
 (0.112) (0.0154) (0.00910) (0.0131) (0.0269) (0.00723) (0.175) 
Third-country national, male -0.626*** 0.0793** -0.0555** -0.0884*** 0.0159 -0.00352 -0.512** 
 (0.0511) (0.0284) (0.0268) (0.0184) (0.0174) (0.00426) (0.247) 
Third-country national, female 0.0609 0.0662*** -0.0299 -0.0443*** -0.0220 -9.00e-07 0.619 
 (0.104) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0137) (0.0234) (0.00839) (0.470) 
Female -1.151*** 0.00512 -0.0150*** -0.0678*** 0.135*** -0.0449*** -1.861*** 
 (0.0834) (0.00463) (0.00449) (0.00526) (0.0247) (0.00532) (0.159) 
Medium-skill 0.437*** 0.117*** 0.0193*** 0.0380*** -0.00827** 0.0207*** -0.0152 
 (0.0588) (0.0145) (0.00668) (0.00622) (0.00392) (0.00266) (0.189) 
High-skill 1.085*** 0.269*** 0.0157 0.0784*** -0.0156*** 0.00743 0.407 
 (0.126) (0.0224) (0.00991) (0.0142) (0.00449) (0.00473) (0.374) 
        
Observations 184,720 303,124 258,211 257,750 310,596 310,583 263,606 
R-squared 0.456 0.149 0.165 0.277 0.187 0.283 0.155 
Mean of outcome, nationals of the 
reporting country 
5.570 0.209 0.867 0.224 0.157 0.216 41.65 
SD of outcome 2.770 0.406 0.339 0.417 0.364 0.265 7.689 
Clusters 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State. All regressions control for gender, education, age group (five-year intervals), 
reporting country and interview year. Baseline group: nationals of the reporting country. Clustered standard errors at the ‘reporting country and year’ level. Regression on working hours 
(outcome 8) includes only individuals working full-time. Data on occupation are available only in 2014 wave. Results from Annex 5: Table 24 qualitatively hold also if only estimated for 
2014 wave.  Source: Authors, 2018 using EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration, 2014 wave. 
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 Annex 5: Table 30. Conditional differences in life quality between third-country nationals and EU nationals  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Feeling 
discriminated 
Subjective 
health 
Subjective 
happiness 
    
Foreign national from EU, male 0.00155 0.0222* 0.00421 
 (0.0150) (0.0114) (0.00987) 
Foreign national from EU, female 0.0569*** 0.0204** 0.00712 
 (0.0194) (0.00830) (0.00764) 
Third-country national, male 0.181*** 0.0159*** -0.00956 
 (0.0215) (0.00602) (0.0106) 
Third-country national, female 0.149*** 0.00137 -0.0114 
 (0.0157) (0.00736) (0.00744) 
Female -0.00828** -0.0135*** 0.00996*** 
 (0.00364) (0.00202) (0.00186) 
Medium-skill -0.0158** 0.0403*** 0.0209*** 
 (0.00615) (0.00300) (0.00314) 
High-skill -0.000660 0.0817*** 0.0458*** 
 (0.00899) (0.00423) (0.00429) 
    
Observations 112,258 112,756 112,581 
R-squared 0.031 0.092 0.037 
Mean of outcome, nationals of the 
reporting country 
0.0900 0.736 0.742 
SD of outcome 0.286 0.210 0.180 
Clusters 170 170 170 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). All regressions control for gender, age group, education, reporting country and 
interview year. Baseline group: nationals of the reporting country. Clustered standard errors at the ‘reporting country and year’ level. In the data, we cannot directly observe 
nationality of respondents, but know if an individual is a national of the reporting country. If an individual is not national of his/her reporting country, we proxy his/her 
nationality by the country of birth. 
Source: Authors, 2018 using European Social Survey (2002-2016 waves)  
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Annex 5: Table 31. Conditional differences in intra-EU mobility rates between EU and non-EU nationals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full sample Low-skilled Medium-skilled Highly skilled 
     
Non-EU national -0.00428*** -0.00311*** -0.00583*** -0.00357*** 
 (0.000422) (0.000336) (0.000865) (0.000926) 
Female -0.00178*** -0.000111 -0.00213*** -0.00225*** 
 (0.000246) (0.000324) (0.000311) (0.000603) 
Medium-skill 0.00138***    
 (0.000276)    
Highly skilled 0.00286***    
 (0.000403)    
     
Observations 1,004,752 251,956 522,239 230,557 
R-squared 0.165 0.229 0.137 0.245 
Mean mobility rate 0.00836 0.00486 0.00902 0.0104 
SD of mobility rate 0.0910 0.0695 0.0946 0.101 
Clusters 46 46 46 46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes respondents aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State. All regressions control for gender, age group (five-year intervals), 
education, industry of work, countries of residence (current and previous year) interacted with time effects. Baseline group: EU nationals. Clustered standard errors at the 
‘current reporting country and year’ level.  
Source: Authors, 2018 using EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration 2008 and 2014 wave.  
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Annex 5: Table 32. The role of self-reported legal restrictions for work-related outcomes of third-country nationals in the EU 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Employed Permanent 
contract 
Supervisory 
tasks 
Part-time 
work 
Atypical work Usual 
working 
hours (week) 
       
Restricted access, male -0.0552* -0.0514 -0.00771 0.0216 0.0184 1.101** 
 (0.0299) (0.0599) (0.0170) (0.0142) (0.0194) (0.496) 
Restricted access, female -0.135*** -0.117* 0.0255 0.0291 0.0182 1.021 
 (0.0360) (0.0584) (0.0290) (0.0473) (0.0428) (0.916) 
Female -0.0574** 0.0578* -0.0557*** 0.246*** -0.00313 -1.509*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0293) (0.00842) (0.0397) (0.0568) (0.245) 
 0.0447 0.0221 0.0225 -0.00216 0.0156* -0.0574 
Medium-skill (0.0261) (0.0189) (0.0201) (0.00833) (0.00777) (0.244) 
 0.0655*** -0.00635 0.0866*** -0.0526* 0.0357 0.721 
High-skill (0.0139) (0.0503) (0.0244) (0.0289) (0.0220) (0.499) 
 -0.0552* -0.0514 -0.00771 0.0216 0.0184 1.101** 
       
Observations 12,883 9,367 9,358 10,422 9,022 8,249 
R-squared 0.134 0.222 0.228 0.189 0.090 0.134 
Mean of outcome, third-country 
nationals 
0.619 0.759 0.121 0.232 0.226 41.89 
SD of outcome 0.486 0.428 0.327 0.422 0.266 7.601 
Clusters 15 15 15 15 14 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample third-country nationals aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State. All regressions control for gender, age group (five-year intervals), 
education, migration reason, destination* origin, destination* arrival year and origin* arrival year. Baseline group: third-country nationals who do not report restrictions. 
Clustered standard errors at the ‘current reporting country’ level. Regression on working hours (outcome 8) includes only individuals working full-time.  Source: Authors, 2018 
using EU LFS Ad-hoc Module on Migration 2008.   
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Annex 5. Table 33. The role of extending rights (to EU citizens’ rights) for work-related outcomes of third-country nationals in the EU 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Employed Monthly 
pay (decile) 
Overqualifie
d 
Permanent 
contract 
Supervisory 
tasks 
Part-time 
work 
Atypical work Usual 
working 
hours 
(week) 
         
Years since extended rights, 
male 
0.00479 0.0944* 0.00292 0.0135* 0.000694 -0.0216** -0.00865 0.310** 
 (0.00866) (0.0485) (0.0178) (0.00741) (0.00873) (0.00960) (0.00575) (0.148) 
Years since extended rights, 
female 
0.0192** -0.0350 0.0128 0.00560 -0.00437 -0.0152** -0.00402 -0.0452 
 (0.00867) (0.0521) (0.0174) (0.00556) (0.00604) (0.00687) (0.00592) (0.168) 
Female -0.228*** -1.630*** 0.0563*** 0.0310 -0.0399*** 0.288*** 0.0146 -1.405*** 
 (0.0278) (0.209) (0.0163) (0.0230) (0.00790) (0.0218) (0.0196) (0.270) 
Medium-skill 0.0658** 0.146 0.213*** 0.0334** 0.0332*** 0.0125 0.0267*** 0.0210 
 (0.0264) (0.0942) (0.0345) (0.0156) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.00797) (0.199) 
High-skill 0.108*** 1.244** 0.381*** 0.0107 0.125*** -0.0360 0.0332* 0.396 
 (0.0285) (0.532) (0.0620) (0.0418) (0.0208) (0.0225) (0.0170) (0.398) 
         
Observations 20,235 3,479 4,185 12,064 12,027 13,491 12,521 10,367 
R-squared 0.131 0.282 0.178 0.162 0.196 0.165 0.061 0.068 
Mean of outcome 0.643 3.978 0.358 0.764 0.118 0.235 0.226 41.89 
SD of outcome 0.479 2.503 0.479 0.424 0.323 0.424 0.269 7.487 
Clusters         
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes foreign nationals aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State and who had arrived between 1995 and 2004. The sample is limited to the 
nationals of new EU Member States and third-country nationals residing in one of ‘old’ EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom) at the moment of the survey. All regressions control for gender, age group (five-year intervals), education, years since EU entry 
of the origin (otherwise zero), origin* arrival year (origin-specific time effects in the EU), destination* arrival year (destination-specific time effects) and interview year. Standard errors are 
clustered on ‘reporting country and year’ level. Data on monthly pay and overqualification is available only in 2014 wave. Regression on working hours (outcome 8) includes only 
individuals working full-time. Source: Authors, 2018 using EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration 2008 and 2014 wave.   
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Annex 5: Table 34. The role of extending rights (to EU citizens’ rights) for work-related outcomes of third-country nationals (family migrants) in the 
EU 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Employed Monthly 
pay (decile) 
Overqualifie
d 
Permanent 
contract 
Supervisory 
tasks 
Part-time 
work 
Atypical work Usual 
working 
hours 
(week) 
         
Years since extended rights, 
male 
0.0181* 0.0380 0.0292 0.0330** -0.00364 -0.0316 0.00778 -0.161 
 (0.0104) (0.0672) (0.0225) (0.0151) (0.00932) (0.0256) (0.0128) (0.341) 
Years since extended rights, 
female 
0.0439*** -0.121 0.0126 0.0319** 0.0128** -0.0313** 0.00558 -0.437 
 (0.00938) (0.0789) (0.0227) (0.0141) (0.00493) (0.0120) (0.00851) (0.361) 
Female -0.280*** -1.262*** 0.0732** 0.0139 -0.0699*** 0.334*** 0.00129 -1.216*** 
 (0.0343) (0.107) (0.0299) (0.0200) (0.0187) (0.0298) (0.0285) (0.351) 
Medium-skill 0.0918*** 0.176 0.150*** 0.0482 0.0240 -0.0295 0.0127 0.0333 
 (0.0307) (0.151) (0.0338) (0.0240) (0.0188) (0.0217) (0.0182) (0.507) 
High-skill 0.120*** 1.407** 0.226*** 0.0235 0.105*** -0.0966*** 0.0308** 0.175 
 (0.0383) (0.469) (0.0597) (0.0317) (0.0211) (0.0333) (0.0144) (0.621) 
         
Observations 6,933 913 1,126 3,287 3,280 3,629 3,398 2,375 
R-squared 0.183 0.272 0.190 0.183 0.202 0.211 0.106 0.164 
Mean of outcome 0.487 3.552 0.385 0.756 0.0995 0.340 0.220 40.58 
SD of outcome 0.500 2.275 0.487 0.429 0.299 0.474 0.263 6.846 
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes foreign nationals aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State and who had arrived between 1995 and 2004. The sample is limited to the 
nationals of new EU Member States and third-country nationals (who indicate ‘family reasons’ as the reason for migration) residing in one of ‘old’ EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom) at the moment of the survey. All regressions control for gender, age group (five-
year intervals), education, years since EU entry of the origin (otherwise zero), origin* arrival year (origin-specific time effects in the EU), destination* arrival year (destination-specific time 
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effects), and interview year. Standard errors are clustered on ‘reporting country and year’ level. Data on monthly pay and overqualification is available only in 2014 wave. Regression on 
working hours (outcome 8) includes only individuals working full-time.  Source: Authors, 2018 using EU LFS Ad-hoc Modules on Migration 2008 and 2014 wave.   
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Annex 5: Table 35 The role of extending rights (to EU citizens’ rights) for employment and life quality of third-country nationals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Employed Feeling 
discriminated 
Subjective 
health 
Subjective 
happiness 
     
Years since extended rights, male 0.0793*** 0.00136 -0.00654 -0.0207 
 (0.0257) (0.0264) (0.0109) (0.0138) 
Years since extended rights, 
female 
0.0542** 0.00152 -0.00606 -0.0159* 
 (0.0250) (0.0214) (0.0102) (0.00958) 
Female -0.178*** -0.0735 0.0142 -0.0184 
 (0.0577) (0.0486) (0.0249) (0.0233) 
Medium-skill 0.0917 -0.0659 6.97e-05 0.0598** 
 (0.0642) (0.0484) (0.0257) (0.0242) 
High-skill 0.164** 0.00426 0.0461 0.0507* 
 (0.0738) (0.0647) (0.0291) (0.0286) 
     
Observations 850 835 853 852 
R-squared 0.363 0.342 0.425 0.393 
Mean of outcome 0.593 0.240 0.757 0.732 
SD of outcome 0.491 0.427 0.205 0.199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Weighted regressions. The sample includes foreign nationals aged 20-55 living in an EU Member State and who had arrived between 1995 and 2004. The sample is limited 
to the nationals of new EU Member States and third-country nationals residing in one of ‘old’ EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) at the moment of the survey. All regressions control for gender, age 
group (five-year intervals), education, origin, years since EU entry of the origin, destination* arrival year, and interview year. In the data, we cannot directly observe nationality 
of respondents, but know if an individual is a national of the reporting country. If an individual is not national of his/her reporting country, we proxy his/her nationality by the 
country of birth. 
Source: Authors, 2018 using ESS data, 2002-2016 waves.  
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ANNEX 6. KEY PARAMETERS TO ASSESS IMPACTS OF GAPS IN EMPLOYMENT 
AND WAGES 
Annex 6.Table 36. Key parameters to assess impacts of gaps in employment abd wages 
Native population (nationals of the reporting country) 
 Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Share in EU population (20-55-
years-old) 10.8% 9.9% 24.1% 22.9% 10.6% 14.7% 
Employment rate2 66.6% 48.2% 78.5% 66.2% 87.8% 81.9% 
Average monthly pay decile4 5.21 3.16 5.93 4.12 7.54 6.17 
Foreign nationals from within the EU 
 Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Share in EU population (20-55-
years-old) 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.7% 
Employment rate2 75.2% 60.5% 80.8% 66.3% 88.3% 76.8% 
Conditional difference in 
employment rate to the native 
population, percentage point 
4.47*** 10.1*** 0.255 -3.21** -2.61** -9.42*** 
Average monthly pay decile4 4.50 2.58 5.11 3.22 7.25 5.49 
Conditional difference in monthly 
pay decile to the native population -0.588** -0.448** -0.931*** -0.931** -0.313 -0.614** 
Third-country nationals 
 Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Share in EU population (20-55-
years-old) 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3% 0.5% 
Employment rate2 64.2% 42.5% 70.0% 51.5% 75.5% 54.2% 
Conditional difference in 
employment rate to the native 
population, percentage point  
-2.19 -8.39* -6.37*** -12.8*** -13.9*** -26.5*** 
Average monthly pay decile2 3.80 2.48 4.38 2.75 6.49 4.88 
Difference in monthly pay decile (to 
the native population) to the native 
population 
-1.317*** -0.536*** -1.695*** -1.426*** -1.013* -1.323* 
Notes: 1 Estimated from Eurostat and LFS analysis. 2 Descriptive statistics from LFS analysis - Ad-hoc Module on Migration, 2014. 
3 Findings from econometric analysis of LFS - Ad-hoc Module on Migration, 2008 and 2014 for employment and 2014 for monthly 
pay. Population between aged 20 to 55; stars: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors, 2018
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ANNEX 7. PREFERRED POLICY OPTIONS                  
Annex 7: Figure 30. Percentage of e-questionnaire respondents on preferred policy options at EU level 
Source: E-questionnaire, February-April 2018.  
Delphi method discussants held two main positions on the most preferred policy options for legal 
migration policy in the EU. More than a half of Delphi method discussants felt very strong about changing 
the sectoral approach via a Binding Immigration Code or streamlined horizontal directive and saw added 
value in a broadened social dialogue as a complementary measure (see Figure 39). Others felt that the way 
forward should be through better enforcement of currently existing EU aquis (directives) in the area of legal 
migration, gradual expansion of EU Blue Card holder rights to other third-country nationals, covering new 
sectors and broadening the social dialogue.  
 Annex 7:Figure 31. Votes of Delphi method discussants on preferred policy options at EU level 
 
Source: Authors, based on Delphi method discussion, Brussels, 9 March 2018.  
4.35%
8.70%
8.70%
13.04%
17.39%
21.74%
26.09%
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00%
I do not know
Other (please specify)
Better transposition and implementation of the existing
legislation
Gradually expanding the rights foreseen for highly qualified,
towards other categories of migrants
Enhancing EU's equal treatment and non-discrimination
policies towards Third Country Nationals
Strengthening EU's competence in monitoring fair and
decent employment conditions for migrant workers
Streamlining & codifying current sectorial policies into a
single EU legal migration policy document
In your opinion, what are the preferred policy options at the EU level in the area 
of legal migration? (n=23)
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ANNEX 8. CASE STUDIES ILLUSTRATING GAPS AND BARRIERS 
This Annex provides practical and theme-specific case studies illustrating the gaps and barriers. Two 
case studies below provide examples of possible and potential trajectories of a seasonal worker (see 
Box 1), a Blue Card holder (see Box 2), third country nationals in domestic work sector (Box 3), and 
discrimination of third country nationals in the labour market (Box 4). They illustrate how gaps and 
barriers affect the lives of individuals and what exactly are/could be the individual costs.  
Box 1. A possible trajectory of Seasonal Workers  
Case Study: A possible migrant trajectory of seasonal workers under the Seasonal Workers 
Directive  
Workers who decide to engage in seasonal work under the SWD need to be based in a third country 
(see B2). They first need to check what activities are considered seasonal in the Member State where 
they want to work. They then need to find an employer who is willing to offer them a valid work 
contract or a binding job offer. They also need to have health insurance and evidence of adequate 
accommodation. Depending on the duration of the seasonal work, they might need to apply for a 
visa or/and work authorisation. If they, however, come from a country with which the EU has visa 
liberalisation (e.g. Ukraine), they might be exempted from the visa application. Nevertheless, the 
Member State where the seasonal worker wants to be employed might require a labour market test 
as part of the application process, meaning that the prospective employer needs to prove to the 
administration that the there are no other national, EU or legally residing TCN workers available to 
perform the job (see B2).  
Once provided with a visa and/or work permit, seasonal workers might be hosted in 
accommodation arranged by the employer, who must ensure an adequate standard of living 
according to national law and/or practice (see G5). They cannot apply for family reunification to 
bring their spouses during the period of stay as a seasonal worker (see G9). They can, however, 
change employers at least once depending on the Member State (see G3). After the end of their 
contract and the expiry of the work authorisation, seasonal workers need to leave the territory of 
the Member State after a maximum of nine months, unless the host country provides an opportunity 
according to its national law for in-country application and/or transition to a national permit (see 
G6). If seasonal workers fully respect the conditions under the directive during their stay, they can 
benefit from facilitated entry the following year, which varies according to host Member State (see 
B3). However, if seasonal workers have the option to stay in the host Member State, the period 
during which they resided as seasonal workers will not be counted in the five-year residence period 
required to obtain an EU long-term residence permit (see G6). 
Source: Authors, 2018. 
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Box 2. A possible trajectory of Blue Card holders 
Case Study: A possible migrant trajectory of Blue Card holders 
Depending on where Blue Card permit applicants would like to work, they might be able to 
apply for such a permit while already residing legally in a Member State; otherwise, they are 
required to do so while they are outside the territory of the Member State (see B2). TCNs who 
apply for Blue Card permits need to find a job and an employer in a Member State who is willing 
to offer them a valid work contract or a binding job offer of at least one year, as well as a salary 
which is as least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned. In 
addition, they need to meet other requirements such as having health insurance and present 
documents attesting to their relevant professional qualifications in the field specified in their 
contract or, if engaged in a regulated profession, present a document attesting fulfilment of the 
conditions set out under national law for the exercise of the profession (see G10). Depending on 
the host Member State, they might also be required to provide their address in the territory of 
the host country concerned (see B2). Furthermore, the Member State where Blue Card applicants 
want to be employed might require a labour market test as part of the application process, 
meaning that the prospective employer needs to prove that there are no other national, EU or 
legally residing TCN workers available to perform the job (see B2).  
 
For the first two years Blue Card holders are allowed to exercise only the employment activities 
for which they were granted a work authorisation. During these two years, Blue Card holders 
can change their employer only after prior authorisation by the competent authorities of the 
Member State of residence (see G3). If Blue Card holders become unemployed, they have three 
months to look for a job during which they are allowed to stay in the territory of the Member 
State (see G4). They can reunite with their family members (see G9). They can also reside in 
other Member States and accumulate periods of residence in different Member States in order 
to fulfil the five-year residence requirement for access to long-term residence (see G6). They can 
also benefit from circular migration outside the EU before and after getting long term-residence 
status because they are allowed extensive periods of absence compared to other categories of 
migrants (see B3).  
Source: Authors, 2018. 
  
174 | CARRERA, VOSYLIŪTĖ, VANKOVA, LAURENTSYEVA, FERNANDES, DENNISON & GUERIN 
 
Box 3. Case study: Third-country nationals in domestic work sector 
Case Study: A possible trajectory of migrant domestic workers  
With the ageing population and increased female participation in the EU’s labour market, the 
need to outsource someone else to perform cleaning, child care or elder care tasks has 
increased.460 In light of these societal developments at a global level, the ILO has called for a 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189).461 The European Parliament’s 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL Committee) made a concrete suggestion 
for the EU-level intervention in the motion for the above-mentioned resolution. The EMPL 
Committee stressed “the necessity of adapting European migration policies to the needs of the 
labour market in terms of domestic workers, in order to protect female migrants from ending 
up in illegal work situations.”462 
There are certain barriers that various academics463 attempted to deconstruct, firstly because 
domestic work is not considered proper ‘work’ and in many Member States is not properly 
regulated. In particular, labour laws in many countries do not have tools to enforce labour rights 
standards in private households, as it is an atypical place for employment. For example, the 
possibility for a labour inspectorate to enter the house was for a long time an exception found 
only in Ireland. Secondly, it is perceived as ‘low value’ work that does not require any ‘skills’ or 
‘qualifications’, as it is misperceived, from the standpoint of the feminisation of migration, that 
any female possesses them ‘by nature’.464 Thirdly, such work is low-paid and carries a ‘low 
social status’.  
The entry channels and labour conditions for domestic workers thus have been left entirely at 
the discretion of Member States. For example, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus have created a 
quota system for migrant domestic workers, whereas the UK and Ireland have opened borders 
only for migrants from the European Economic Area (EEA).465 On the other hand, the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Germany have been criticised by migrant domestic 
workers’ interest groups for not including any legal entry channels for migrant domestic 
workers “in their [national] managed migration policies.”466 
 A common pattern among Member States is the employment of migrant women for whom 
domestic work is a main entry point into the labour market. Data from the 2004 European 
Community Labour Force Survey show that 36% of all female migrant workers in Spain find 
work as domestic workers. Similarly, 27.9% and 21.1% of all female migrant workers are hired 
by private households in Italy and France. This category of migrant workers has a precarious 
legal status and is more vulnerable to abusive treatment.467 In addition, many Member States 
                                                        
460 F. Anthias and M. Cederberg (2010), “Gender, Migration and Work: Perspectives and Debates in the UK”, in Women 
in New Migrations, K. Slany, M. Kontos and M. Liapi (eds), Cracow: Jagelonian University Press, p. 35. 
461 ILO (2011). 
462 European Parliament (2016), REPORT on women domestic workers and carers in the EU, A8-0053/2016, 5 April 
(2015/2094(INI)), Opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs by co-Rapporteur Tania González 
Peñas, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A8-2016-0053&language=EN).  
463 Frank and Spehar (2010); H. Schwenken, “‘Domestic Slavery’ versus ‘Workers Rights’: Political Mobilizations of 
Migrant Domestic Workers in the European Union”, Working Paper 116, January, The Center for Comparative 
Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego; H. Lutz (ed.) (2008), Migration and Domestic Work: A European 
Perspective on a Global Theme, Hampshire: Ashgate. 
464 In particular, M. Hrzenjak (2007), Invisible Work, Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut, pp. 59-61. 
465 Gallotti (2009).  
466 Frank and Spehar (2010), p. 54.  
467 ILO (2013). 
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maintain possibilities to bring domestic workers for diplomats, and in these cases they are often 
tied to a particular employer and live-in arrangement.  
Despite these figures, among a majority EU Member States there is a reluctance to recognise 
households as places for paid employment and to create an admission category for migrant 
domestic workers in their national legislation. Therefore, often domestic work becomes part of 
informal economy, where migrant domestic workers are undeclared and subsequently risk 
falling in an irregular situation. For this reason, they often cannot benefit from the rights 
provisions under Single Residence Permit. 
‘Au pairs’ as covered by the recasted Students and Researchers Directive is to a certain extent 
acknowledging the growing needs for the domestic work in the EU, however it is conceptualised 
as a ‘cultural exchange’ and not a ‘employment’ scheme entailing the lack of labour rights 
safeguards.  The Seasonal Workers Directive, aimed to facilitate entry and labour conditions for 
perceived ‘low skilled/low qualified’ jobs also do not cover migrant domestic workers, though 
domestic work in households is not ‘seasonal’ but ‘long-term’.  Therefore, growing needs for 
migrant domestic work in Europe are not covered by any of the current EU first admission or 
sectoral directives. 
Currently, the EU Family Reunification Directive is de facto the sole legal entry means for women 
who are willing to engage in domestic work in line with national labour rights standards. Other 
avenues for migrant women are more fragile, for example touristic and, to a lesser extent, 
student visas to work in the undeclared domestic work sector. In these latter cases, legal entry 
for another purpose ends up in in the woman overstaying her visa and leads to irregular status.  
The high risks of labour exploitation, heightened by ‘live-in’ arrangements, include situations 
of servitude that are well-documented by legal cases in national and European courts,468 as well 
as the phenomenon of ‘modern slavery’ that is often portrayed in the media. Migrant domestic 
workers claim the possibility to claim their labour rights and have legal entry channels would 
be the best cures for labour exploitation and modern slavery.469 Inability to enter legally in the 
country for Migrant Domestic Workers could be compared with the situation of asylum seekers 
that are arriving into the EU and residing in an irregular situation. The later due to inability 
and/or fear of deportation when asking for help, thus resulting in 1.3-1.8% higher estimated 
risk of mortality rates.470   
Source: Authors on the basis of L. Vosyliūtė.471 
  
                                                        
468 For example, at the European Court of Human Rights, Siliadin v. France, (application no. 73316/01). ECtHR 
Chamber Judgment delivered on July 26, 2005. 43EHRR16 (2006); Kawogo v the United Kingdom (application no. 
56921/09), communicated to the Government in June 2010; C.N. v the United Kingdom (application no. 4239/08), 
communicated to the Government in March 2010.  
469 Frank and Spehar (2010), p. 54.  
470 van Ballegooj, V., C. Navarra, V. Moreno-Lax, M. Fernandes (2018) Humanitarian Visas European Added Value 
Assessment accompanying the European Parliament's legislative owninitiative report (Rapporteur: Juan Fernando 
Lopez Aguilar), July 2018, Brussels. (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150782/eprs-study-humanitarian-
visas.pdf) 
471  L. Vosyliūtė (2011), “Migrant Domestic Workers In The European Union: Potential Human Rights Avenues For 
Empowerment”, Budapest: Central European University. 
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Box 4. Case study: Discrimination of immigrants in the labour market  
Discrimination of immigrants in the labour market 
Discrimination in the labour market represents a situation when an employer treats differently 
two (potential) employees who only differ with respect to characteristics that do not affect their 
productivity at work.472 Hiring-productivity or wage-productivity gaps may arise for different 
reasons. The classical explanations provided by Phelps & Arrow are “statistical discrimination” 
and “preference-based discrimination”.473 Statistical discrimination arises due to negative 
stereotypes or a general misconception of native employers about the productivity of 
immigrants. This situation can turn into a “self-fulfilling prophecy” if it reduces the expected 
return on human capital investments and thus discourages immigrants to improve their skills. 
Preference-based discrimination refers to a situation when the preferences of employers – or 
their employees or customers – translate into lower demand and lower wages for foreign 
workers.  
 
Carlsson & Rooth present evidence of ethnic discrimination in the recruitment process in 
Sweden by sending fake applications (that were randomly assigned Middle-Eastern names, like  
‘Mohamed’ or Swedish names) to real job openings.474 They find that applications with Swedish 
names receive 50% more invitations to interviews. They explain this result by the “ethnic 
penalty”, which denotes the difference in labour market positions of immigrants as opposed to 
the native individuals and that cannot be explained by demographic and human capital factors. 
A potential explanation for wage discrimination (relating to statistical discrimination) can be 
that education and labour market experiences acquired abroad are less valued than domestically 
acquired human capital.475 Friedberg studies Israeli labour market wage differences and finds 
that this perception can fully account for the wage penalties on immigrants with the same 
professional and productivity characteristics as native individuals. Bratsberg & Ragan also find 
a link between wage penalties and foreigner education attainment in the US. They show that 
any additional schooling in the US upgrades previous education.476  
 
Statistical discrimination is also documented in the experimental study by Oreopoulos: 
thousands of randomly manipulated resumes were sent in response to online job postings in 
Canada to investigate why economic immigrants, who are allowed in the country based on their 
skills, still struggle in the labour market.477 The study finds substantial discrimination across a 
variety of occupations against applicants with foreign experience and/or those with Indian, 
Pakistani, Chinese, and Greek names compared to English names. Listing language fluency, 
multinational firm experience, education from highly selective schools, or active extracurricular 
activities had no diminishing effect. Recruiters had tendency to justify this behaviour based on 
language skills concerns.  
 
Policy implication: Such evidence points to the importance of transparent systems for recognition of 
foreign skills and qualifications, which are trusted by native employers. Language, however, appears to be 
                                                        
472 Heckmann (1998). 
473 Phelps (1972); Arrow (1973). 
474 Carlsson and Rooth (2007). 
475 Friedberg (2000). 
476 Bratsberg and Ragan (2002). 
477 Oreopoulos (2011). 
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a bona fide concern and can be used as justification for indirect discrimination. Competence-based 
assessments, such as during interview or requests for written samples, can simply and efficiently prove 
language skills by avoiding the discriminatory outcomes based on negative biases.  
 
Kampelmann & Rycx use Belgian firm-level data and direct information on wages and labour 
productivity to measure discrimination against immigrants in the labour market.478 The results 
suggest that not all of the observed wage differences between immigrants and native individuals 
are explained by productivity differences (for instance, due to lower language skills). Despite 
the strong anti-discrimination laws in Belgium, the authors still find evidence for some wage 
discrimination against immigrants. They find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of 
male immigrants in a Belgian firm is associated with a 0.2% average wage decrease in this firm. 
Using the same methodology, Bartolluci finds stronger effects for Germany, where a 10 
percentage point increase in the share of male immigrants in a firm is associated with a 1.3 
percent average wage decrease in this firm.479 
Bartolluci also reports double-discrimination against female immigrants in Germany: a 10 
percentage point increase in the share of female immigrants is associated with a 2.7% lower 
average firm wage. Yet such results might not be driven by discrimination per se, but rather by 
the fact that immigrants have lower bargaining power, for instance, due to legal obstacles, e.g. 
employment is tied to a specific employer/sector, or high costs of unemployment. Kampelmann 
& Rycx find that institutional factors like collective bargaining and firm size appear to decrease 
wage discrimination against immigrants.  
Source: Authors, 2018. 
 
  
                                                        
478 Kampelmann and Rycx (2016). 
479 Bartolluci (2014). 
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ANNEX 9. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
The economic research has examined the impacts of legal immigration across various economic and social 
aspects. In this overview, we focus on the empirical studies that evaluated the impact of immigration on 
the labour markets, ageing, growth and productivity.  
 
1) The impact of immigration on the labour markets  
The recent study by Edo et al. surveys the vast literature on the effects of immigration on the labour market 
in the destination countries.480 The authors report a certain consensus in the literature: studies find that 
immigration has a negligible average impact on the wages and employment of national workers (belonging 
to the native population). However, because adjustments take time, the initial and longer run impacts of 
immigration can differ: while in the shorter term immigrants can indeed displace national workers with 
similar age and skill profiles, in the longer term, both the national workers and local employers can adjust 
to higher and more diverse labour supply due to immigration.  
Moreover, a number of studies has shown that national and immigrant workers are complementary in 
production: immigrants specialise in different production tasks due to different abilities and experiences 
and therefore rather than causing lower wages or higher unemployment, they can instead complement the 
national workers and even make the latter more productive through occupational reallocation and 
specialisation in more advanced tasks.481 
 
2)  The impact of immigration on demographic developments 
Peri discusses the impact of immigration on demographic issues in the EU.482 He argues that immigrants, 
who are younger and have higher fertility relative to the native population, could change the age 
composition and the rates of population growth of receiving European countries. Peri evidences that young 
immigrants would increase the ratio of working to retired population and hence improve the sustainability 
of the welfare systems. 483  In the labour markets, immigrants could provide the skills and the abilities for 
jobs to be performed by young workers, preserving the demand for complementary jobs performed by 
older population.  
Such positive effects, however, are possible given a certain level of professional qualifications (or, at least, 
the potential to acquire or upgrade them). For instance, a recent report by OECD has identified a substantial 
number of jobs at the risk of automation, mainly in low-skill or high-routine occupations. Therefore, it 
would be risky if immigrants concentrate in these segments of the labour market.484  
                                                        
480 Edo, A., Ragot, L., Rapoport, H., Sardoschau, S., & Steinmayr, A. (2018). The Effects of Immigration in Developed 
Countries: Insights from Recent Economic Research (No. 2018-22). CEPII research center. 
481 Peri, G., & Sparber, C. (2009). Task specialization, immigration, and wages. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 1(3), 135-69. Cattaneo, C., Fiorio, C. V., & Peri, G. (2015). What Happens to the Careers of European Workers 
When Immigrants “Take Their Jobs”?. Journal of Human Resources, 50(3), 655-693. Foged, M., & Peri, G. (2016). 
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One positive example where immigrants have already contributed to filling the labour demand relates to 
home and health services (among others, to the elderly population). In several EU countries, especially in 
southern Europe, large part of these services is already performed by immigrants. In the absence of 
immigrants, these services would be performed mainly by stay-at-home women, affecting their labour 
force participation and their retirement decision.485 However, as Annex 8  Box 3. Case study: Third-country 
nationals in domestic work sector is predominantly undeclared work, where migrant women often fall into 
irregularity. Such workers are by and large not seen in the explicit EU and in many national first admission 
categories. 
 Inability to enter legally in the country for such categories could be compared with the situation of asylum 
seekers that are arriving into the EU and residing in an irregular situation. Recent European Parliamnet 
study found, that despite many basic social, employment and health rights applicable to such categories 
the outcomes show that their situation and in particular health is suffering due to inability and/or fear of 
deportation when asking for help, thus resulting in 1.3-1.8% higher estimated risk of mortality rates.486   
 
3) The impact of immigration on innovation and growth 
Several studies have found a positive effect of immigration on innovation though patenting in destination 
countries. Kerr and Lincoln use random visa allocations to find causal effects for the United States.487 They 
find that admission of high-skilled immigrants leads to an increase in science and engineering employment 
and patenting through direct contributions by immigrants. Hunt and Lioselle reach a similar conclusion; 
they evaluated whether skilled immigrants increase innovation in the US. Using state panel data from 1940-
2000, they find that a 1 percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates’ population share 
increases patent per capita by 9-18 percent.488 Peri analyses the impact of immigration on state 
employment, average hours worked, physical capital accumulation, and total factor productivity.489 He 
finds no evidence that immigrants crowd out employment and hours worked by natives, however there is 
robust evidence that they increase the total factor productivity and decrease capital intensity. Another 
channel that may exert a positive productivity effects but is harder to measure may arise from the “place 
of birth” variety among workers due to immigration. This may generate more ideas and increase the 
variety of goods and services supplied locally or enhance productivity.490 Several studies find that cultural 
diversity is an important channel to generate new ideas and innovation in Europe.491 
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Regarding aggregate economic impact, a report by the IMF in 2016 finds that immigration increases the 
GDP per capita of receiving economies, mostly by raising labour productivity.492 The estimated effect is 
economically significant: a 1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants in the adult population can 
raise GDP per capita by up to 2 percent in the long run. Both high- and low-skilled migrants contribute, in 
part by complementing the existing skill set of the population. Similarly, Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport 
and Ortega and Peri found that a higher share of immigrants increases GDP per capita.493 The effect of 
migration appears to operate through an increase in total factor productivity, reflecting an increased 
diversity in productive skills and, to some extent, a higher rate of innovation. Looking at OECD countries, 
Aleksynska and Tritah also find a positive effect of immigration on income per capita and productivity of 
receiving countries, especially for prime-age immigrants.494 
 
 
                                                        
innovation?." International Migration Review 48 (2014): S377-S416. 
492 Jaumotte, M. F., Koloskova, K., & Saxena, M. S. C. (2016). Impact of migration on income levels in advanced economies. 
International Monetary Fund. 
493 Alesina, Alberto, Johann Harnoss, and Hillel Rapoport. "Birthplace diversity and economic prosperity." Journal of 
Economic Growth 21, no. 2 (2016): 101-138. Ortega, F., & Peri, G. (2014). The aggregate effects of trade and migration: 
evidence from OECD countries. In the Socio-Economic Impact of Migration Flows (pp. 19-51). Springer, Cham. 
494 Aleksynska, M., & Tritah, A. (2015). The Heterogeneity of Immigrants, Host Countries' Income and Productivity: 
A Channel Accounting Approach. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), 150-172. 
THE COST OF NON-EUROPE IN THE AREA OF LEGAL MIGRATION | 181 
 
ANNEX 10. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
TERM Working Definition for the Purposes of this Research Paper 
EU national A person holding the nationality of an EU Member State. For statistical purposes this 
category is often referred to as 'native population' of the EU MS. It includes mobile 
EU citizens, i.e. EU nationals residing and working in a second EU Member State. It 
is also referred to as 'EU born' population.   
Intra-EU mobility The possibility for third-country nationals and EU citizens to move from one EU 
Member State to another for the purpose of employment, self-employment, studies, 
etc.   
Irregular migration  As distinguished from legal migration, this usually refers to a situation when a third-
country national entered the EU in an irregular manner (bypassing border controls, 
on forged documents), or resides irregularly, or who entered regularly and 
subsequently fell into an irregular situation (by overstaying the visa, if employment 
was terminated). 
Labour migration  The main component of EU legal migration: third-country nationals who come to the 
EU for the purpose of employment or self-employment.  
Legal migration  The area of EU migration policies covering conditions of entry/residence and rights 
for purposes of employment and self-employment, studies, family reunification and 
long-term residence. Thus legal migration is broader than labour migration.  
Migrant Any person who leaves his/her country for periods longer than three months for the 
purposes of residence and/or employment, studies, family reunifcation, etc., in 
another country.  
Migrant worker A migrant who comes for purpose of employment to the EU or elsewhere. The term 
is used in various international and regional documents.   
Mobile EU citizen An EU Member State national living and/or working in an EU Member State other 
than his/her own. Such citizens collectively can be also defined as 'EU born 
population', 'mobile EU citizens' or 'EU immigrants', depending on data source. 
Native population   EU Member State nationals born and living and/or working within their own 
country. Also referred to as 'natives' or  'nationals of a Member State'.  
Sectoral directives These are four EU legal migration directives assigning different statuses and rights 
depending on the category. These directives are: EU Blue Card Directive, Intra-
Corporate Transferee Directive, Seasonal Workers Directive, Students and 
Researchers Directive. 
Third-country 
national 
A national of a non-EU country who resides legally (unless indicated otherwise) 
within the EU. This category covers all persons from third countries regardless of 
their purpose of stay in the EU. In this study TCNs who are migrant workers can also 
be referred to as 'third-country workers', their family members as 'third-country 
family members', and TCNs who are students as 'third-country students'.   
Highly qualified 
worker 
A 'highly qualified' migrant, used in reference to the EU's current Blue Card scheme.  
Highly skilled 
worker 
A broader term that includes those with skills that are lacking at the national level, 
used in reference to national schemes that are based on actual skill levels and not 
official qualifications. The new Blue Card revision mentions replacing 'highly 
qualified' with 'highly skilled'.  
 
